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Edited by Robert Conquest

Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice

Each volume in the Soviet Studies series examines in detail the facts about an important aspect of Soviet rule as it has affected the Soviet citizen in the 50 years since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

Subjects include industry, culture, religion, agriculture and so on. A careful examination of official Soviet material in each field provides essential basic reading for all students of Soviet affairs.

Robert Conquest is a former Research Fellow in Soviet affairs at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Senior Fellow of the Columbia University Russian Institute. His works include *Power and Policy in the USSR*; *Courage of Genius* (the Pasternak Affair); *Common Sense about Russia*; *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities* and *Russia after Khrushchev*.

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Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice



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Editor's Preface

In the Marxist view, the nation is a specific historical category emerging from the economic necessities of rising capitalism. As Lenin writes:

‘The economic basis of these movements is that in order to achieve complete victory for commodity production the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, must have politically united territories with a population speaking the same language.’^{*}

In the long term this temporary phenomenon is to give way to a world community with a single culture and language. As Lenin, again, puts it:

‘The aim of Socialism is not only to abolish the present division of mankind into small States, and all-national isolation, not only to bring the nations closer to each other, but also to merge them.’[†]

The national problem, therefore, is one of a transitional stage. However, this transition is not (or not any longer) thought of as being a short one. Marx held, and Lenin repeated, that ‘the working men have no class’. But any idea that the proletarianised masses would everywhere start to abandon national feeling soon had to be given up. Instead, it is now recognised that such feelings represent the most difficult of all pre-Communist loyalties to uproot.

The reason national solidarities remain even when the whole machinery of power and of indoctrination works against them for generations is plain. Allegiance to one’s ‘nation’ requires no counter-organisation, no overt propaganda of its own. It resides in the simple realities of language, culture, land, and history.

Before the Revolution it was thought that, as Stalin—Lenin’s approved spokesman on nationality policy—wrote in 1913:

‘A minority is discontented not because there is no national union

^{*} Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 4, p. 250.

[†] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. 5, p. 270.

but because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and the discontent will pass of itself . . . give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent will disappear.’[°]

But already in 1917–18, it became obvious that the minority nations in Russia sought not merely cultural but also political expression. National equality without national sovereignty was not enough. Everywhere, local nationalist parties and national governments arose. In the largest minority area, the Ukraine, where there had previously been little national sentiment, a movement sprang up which is to this day perhaps the most refractory of all elements on the Soviet scene.

Even before the Revolution Lenin had established the idea of exploiting nationalist movements as temporary allies against his Russian opponents. But he had already also seen that the aspirations of various nations might run against those of the Bolsheviks. He said firmly that if necessary he would crush ‘small national movements’ tending to assist the bourgeoisie on the grounds that

‘In individual concrete cases a particular may contradict the whole, if it does then it must be rejected. . . . The interests of the democracy of one country must be subordinated to the interests of the democracy of several and of all countries.’[†]

After the Revolution, Stalin, now Lenin’s Commissar for nationalities, developed the theory:

‘There are cases when the right of self-determination conflicts with another, a higher right—the right of the working class that has come to power to consolidate that power. In such cases—this must be said bluntly—the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the working class in exercising its right to dictatorship.’[‡]

Lenin himself said flatly:

‘There is not a single Marxist who, without making a total break with the foundations of Marxism and socialism, could deny that the interests of socialism are above the interests of the right of nations to self-determination. Our Socialist Republic has done and is continuing to do everything possible for implementing the right of self-determination for Finland, Ukraine, etc. But if the concrete

[°] Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, p. 376.

[†] Lenin, *Works*, Vol. 22, pp. 326–330.

[‡] Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, p. 270.

position that has arisen is such that the existence of the Socialist Republic is endangered at a given moment in respect of an infringement of the right to self-determination of a few nations (Poland, Lithuania, Courland, etc.) then it stands to reason that the interests of the preservation of the Socialist Republic must take preference.*

For after the Communist victory in Russia proper nationalist movements inevitably came into the category of those hostile to the 'workers' state'. Nations which had been of great help to the Bolsheviks in the fight against the Whites, such as the Ingushi, now turned to sullen resistance. Russian troops spread the revolution to the Crimea and Turkestan and the Transcaucasus, and attempted to do the same in the Baltic States and Poland.

Lenin had explicitly rejected the idea of federation.† But now it was felt that, as Stalin pointed out (see p. 25-26), federation, in the form of the new 'Soviet Union', at least represented an advance from the 'state of complete secession' which had preceded it, and was moreover advisable because 'the national movement had proved to be far more weighty a factor and the process of amalgamation of nations far more complicated than might have appeared formerly'.‡

In the same passage, Stalin gives a crucial third reason why federation after all proved acceptable. Forms of it had been developed which did not contradict the essential unity of the state. And henceforward, the whole Soviet nationality policy was to be developed on the basis of the tightest centralisation on all points of substance combined with 'constitutional', cultural and linguistic concessions of the broadest sort to the nationalities concerned, within the limits of dictatorial rule by the unitary party.

The nature of these arrangements, which have persisted without substantial change ever since, is dealt with in detail in this book. But it is worth emphasising one important new development which has emerged in the past two decades. The establishment after the Second World War of new Communist states posed a number of problems. Though some of the Eastern European Communist leaders seem to have suggested the incorporation of their countries into the Soviet Union, on the

* Lenin, *Works*, Vol. 26, p. 408.

† Lenin, *Works*, Vol. 19, p. 453.

‡ Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 3, pp. 32-33.

same basis as the Baltic States, Stalin in fact maintained the formal state independence of the satellites. This was not intended to give them any of the substance of freedom from Soviet control. But over the years, as the result of various crises, several of them, against stubborn Soviet resistance, were able to give their shadow institutions of independence a certain reality. And the Russians saw in Yugoslavia, Poland, and in the battles in Hungary, that national feeling was indeed a powerful force against their system, and national independence an issue, moreover, on which even a section of the Communist leadership itself was prepared to take an anti-Soviet position.

It is not the province of this book to deal with those Eastern European events. But they had their effects actually within the Soviet Union, not merely in such direct echoes of the Hungarian events as the 1956 riots and demonstrations in Lithuania, but more generally in raising serious queries even within the Communist Party itself. A Georgian, even a Georgian Communist, could ask on what principle Poland or Rumania could be an independent Communist state, while Georgia could not. All over the Union nationalist anti-Party groups emerged in the leaderships—particularly in Latvia, Azerbaidzhan and the republics of Turkestan.

For the devolution of powers in Eastern Europe went contrary to the tendency within the Soviet Union itself. For many years the attempt had been made, while preserving the formal rights of the nationalities, to create a new 'Soviet patriotism' directed towards the federation seen as a whole. But in the past decade, the tide has set more strongly than ever towards a great increase in the unitary nature of the state. As the new Party Programme of 1961 puts it: 'The boundaries between the Union republics are increasingly losing their significance.' At the same time chunks of territory were actually exchanged between Union republics for purely economic reasons—as with the Chimkent area lost by Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan on the grounds of efficiency in the cotton industry, and contrary to the ethnographical principle which had hitherto, at least theoretically, prevailed.

The Party Programme also calls firstly for the acceptance of population shifts—that is, Russian immigration into the lesser republics; secondly for the denationalising of the local Party and State leaderships; and thirdly for the 'voluntary principle'

in language teaching—that is, the ending of the compulsory teaching of the local language in schools. These policies are specifically listed as arousing resistance.* And the various 'anti-Party groups' fought and lost on just such issues. But the issues remain, representing, moreover, far broader and deeper movements of feeling which still seek expression.

The national problem has indeed proved intractable. And real solutions have not been found. It is notable that the constitutional and cultural arrangements which proved so unsatisfactory in the forties that whole nations gave grounds for the accusation of mass collaboration with the Germans are those still regarded as suitable.

Every advanced country has in the post-war world faced, as one of the most consistent problems, the demand for independence by people previously ruled from the metropolitan centres. The Soviet Union has succeeded in delaying this confrontation, but almost wholly by sheer administrative power. It has yet truly to face it or resolve it on the political plane.

Robert Conquest

* *e.g. Voprosy Filosofii*, June 1963.

Acknowledgments are due to Messrs. H. S. Murray, I. I. Stepanov, L. Levine and M. Friedman for their invaluable collaboration.

Introduction

The population of the Soviet Union is divided into about 130 nations and nationalities. The quest for a nationalities policy has therefore inevitably been one of the major preoccupations of the Soviet leadership. In 1921 Stalin said:

‘The only régime that is capable of solving the nationalities question, i.e. a régime that is capable of creating the conditions for ensuring the peaceful coexistence and fraternal cooperation of different nations and races, is the Soviet régime, the régime of the dictatorship of the proletariat.’¹

Since then Communist propaganda has constantly asserted the superiority of the Soviet treatment of the national question, quoting it as an example to be followed by all other multinational States.² As the CPSU Programme states:

‘The solution of the *nationalities question* is one of the greatest achievements of socialism . . . Many previously backward peoples have achieved socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage of development. The union and consolidation of peoples with equal rights on a voluntary basis in a single multinational state . . . their close cooperation in State, economic and cultural development, their fraternal friendship and the flourishing of their economy and culture constitute the most important result of the Leninist nationalities policy.’³

The above extract begs several basic questions, e.g. do all Soviet people have genuinely (as opposed to theoretically) ‘equal rights’? Are they in fact united ‘on a voluntary basis’? What does the ‘consolidation’ of very different nations mean in practice? Does not the phrase ‘previously backward peoples’ itself display a somewhat insensitive approach to non-Russian

cultures? Finally, and most crucially, do improved social conditions outweigh the lack of political and cultural freedom in the non-Russian areas of the Soviet Union?

The following survey which is based almost exclusively on Soviet sources is relevant to these questions.

SOURCES

1. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 5, p. 37.
2. See, for instance, N. S. Khrushchev's speech to the XVth session of the U.N. General Assembly, *Pravda*, September 24, 1960.
3. *Programma i Ustav KPSS*, pp. 30-31. See also *ibid.*, pp. 189f. (translated in Appendix B).

I

Pre-Revolutionary Theory on the Nationalities Question

Marx and Engels

In few fields were the teachings of Marx and Engels of less definitive value to Soviet policy makers than in that of the national question. Their theories were primarily focused on the large, compact, industrialised States of Western Europe. Indeed, they regarded large industrialised economies as essential to world progress. For this reason, while decrying national oppression, they had no sympathy with demands for the self-determination of small nations. Support for, or opposition to, separatist movements had to be determined in the light of one criterion: whether these movements would facilitate or delay the advance of the proletariat, the class they deemed destined to lead the world. This ambivalence was exemplarised in Marx's attitude to the question of Polish independence. In 1870 he emphasised that the chief task of Russian Socialists was to work for the independence of Poland. At the same time, since the Tsarist occupation of Poland was one of the main supports of the military régime in Germany, the Russian Socialists would be assisting the destruction of this régime which Marx regarded as a prerequisite for the emancipation of the European proletariat.¹ Seven years later, however, when he considered a revolutionary situation to be developing in Russia, Marx urged the Poles to delay their demands so as not to provoke the intervention of Bismarck.²

Lenin and the 1903 Programme

The Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party* inherited Marx's pre-occupation with large States and his negative

*The RSDRP was formed in Minsk in 1898. The Party split into two factions (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) in 1903 over questions of admission to membership. These factions finally severed connections

attitude to national (as opposed to class) aspirations, but in adapting Marxist theory to the conditions of the multinational Russian Empire, it had perforce to develop a detailed programme with regard to national minorities. The Party's programme adopted at its Second Congress in 1903 contained the following definitions of policy on the national question.

- '(7) The abolition of the system of social strata (*sosloviya*) and complete equal rights for all citizens irrespective of sex, religion, race, and nationality.
- '(8) The right of the population to receive an education in its own language, a right to be secured by the setting up of the necessary schools at the expense of the State and of the organs of local government; the right of every citizen to express himself at meetings in his own language; the introduction of the native language on equal terms with the State language in all local, public, and State institutions.
- '(9) The right of self-determination for all nations comprising the State.'³

This programme, personally drafted by Lenin, made, on the face of it, extensive concessions to national as opposed to class interests, and met with considerable criticism from leading Russian Social Democrats. In the years following its adoption Lenin repeatedly defended his programme and clarified its main points in detail.

The Right to Self-Determination

Lenin declared that the right of nations to self-determination was to be understood solely in terms of their right to political self-determination, *i.e.* to secession and the formation of independent States; it had nothing in common with the national cultural autonomy advanced by the Austrian Social Democrats.

'From the point of view of Social Democracy it is impermissible to flourish either directly or indirectly the slogan of *national culture*. This slogan is a false slogan, for all the economic, political, and spiritual life of mankind is already under capitalism being increasingly internationalised. Socialism completely internationalises it.'⁴

with each other in 1912. The Bolsheviks continued to call themselves the RSDRP until 1918 when they renamed themselves the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [RKP]. In 1925 the Party was again renamed at the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)]. It received its present title of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1952.

'A struggle against any national oppression—unreservedly yes. A struggle on behalf of any national development, of "national culture" in general—unreservedly no.'⁵

The affirmation of this right in no way revised the Marxist preference for large States.

'Marxists, it stands to reason, are hostile to federation and decentralisation, for the simple reason that capitalism demands for its development the largest possible and most centralised possible States. . . . A centralised large State is an immense historic step forward from mediaeval disunion to the future Socialist unity of the whole world and otherwise than through such a State (*inseparably* connected with capitalism) there is not, nor can there be, any path to Socialism.'⁶

The Expediency of Self-Determination

Indeed, so Marxists argued, the whole historical process was moving towards the merging of nations and the formation of large States, and it was not for Marxists to oppose it.

'There remains the universal historical tendency of capitalism towards the breakdown of national barriers, to the erasure of national differences, towards the *assimilation* of nations, which with every decade manifests itself ever more mightily, and which constitutes one of the greatest propulsive mechanisms that change capitalism into Socialism.

He is no Marxist, he is even no democrat, who does not recognise and uphold the equal rights of nations and languages and who does not struggle against any national oppression or lack of equal rights. This is indubitable. But it is just as indubitable that the supposed Marxist who curses a Marxist of another nation to hell for 'assimilationism' is in fact simply a *nationalistic philistine* himself.'⁷

Furthermore affirmation of the *right* to secede was not synonymous with advocating secession:

'To accuse the champions of the freedom of self-determination, i.e. the freedom of secession, of encouraging separatism, is just as stupid and hypocritical as to accuse champions of the freedom of divorce of encouraging the destruction of family ties.'⁸

Nor did it preclude agitation against secession in particular cases if this should be against the class interests of the proletariat.

'The bourgeoisie always puts its national demands in the foreground. It puts them unconditionally. For the proletariat they are

subordinated to the interests of the class struggle. Theoretically, it is impossible to guarantee in advance whether the secession of a given nation or its equal status with another nation will complete the bourgeois-democratic revolution; for the proletariat it is important in *both cases* to ensure the development of its own class; it is important for the bourgeoisie to hinder this development by making its tasks secondary to the tasks of "its own" nation. For this reason the proletariat limits itself to the so-to-speak negative demand for the recognition of the *right* to self-determination, without guaranteeing any one nation, without entering into any obligation to concede anything at the expense of any other nation.⁹

Self-Determination as a Halfway House

Finally, the clause on self-determination was necessary in view of the rising tide of nationalism in Russia and the East.

'In Eastern Europe and in Asia the epoch of bourgeois-democratic revolutions only began in 1905. The revolutions in Russia, Persia, Turkey, China, the wars in the Balkans—this is the chain of the world events of *our* epoch, of our 'East'. And in this chain of events only a blind man cannot see the awakening of an *entire series* of bourgeois-democratic national movements, of endeavours towards the formation of nationally independent and nationally single States. It is because and only because Russia and her neighbouring countries are experiencing this epoch that we need a point on the right of nations to self-determination in our programme.'¹⁰

Its purpose was to remove the causes for distrust between nations and thus to facilitate their painless merger into large States.

'Having remade capitalism into Socialism, the proletariat creates the possibility for the complete abolition of national oppression; this possibility will change into a reality "only"—and "only"!—with the complete carrying through of democracy in all spheres, right up to determination of State frontiers in accordance with the "sympathies" of the population, right up to complete freedom of secession. On this basis in turn the absolute removal of the slightest national frictions, of the slightest national mistrust, will develop in practice and an accelerated *rapprochement* between and fusion of nations will be created . . .'.¹¹

Self-Determination and Local Autonomy

Lenin further declared that the right of the population to an education in its own language meant just this; it did not in any way mean that the people should have the right to determine the content of this education.

“One’s own programme” in one’s own national school! . . . Marxists, my dear social-nationalist, have a *general* school programme, which demands, for example, a categorically secular school. From the point of view of Marxists, in a democratic State at no point and at no time is any *departure* from this general programme permissible. . . .

‘From the principle that schooling “be taken away from the jurisdiction of the State” and handed over to the nations, it follows that we, the workers, leave it to the “nations” in our democratic State to spend the people’s money on a clerical school!’¹²

Organs of local government were necessary because ‘bureaucratic interference in *purely* local (provincial, national, etc.) questions is one of the greatest obstacles to economic and political development in general, and in particular one of the obstacles to centralisation.’¹³

However, local autonomy was to be on a regional rather than on a national basis. This was made clear by Stalin in his *Marxism and the National Question*, which was written in close collaboration with Lenin.

‘We have examined above national autonomy in general. The examination showed that national autonomy leads to nationalism. . . . The only correct solution is regional autonomy, autonomy for such crystallised units as Poland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc. The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, it does not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these barriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way for division of a different kind, division according to classes.’¹⁴

In this same work Stalin stressed the importance of enabling the nationalities to use their own language in everyday affairs, his view being that linguistic oppression was the prime motive force behind national discontent: permit a national minority to use its own language and have its own schools and discontent would pass of itself.¹⁵

Thus, with all the grounds for national distrust and discontent eliminated, the way would be clear for the formation of the future centralised Socialist State, for Lenin was convinced that

‘the masses of the population are supremely aware from their everyday experience of the significance of geographical and economic ties, of the superiority of a large market and a large State, and they

will agree to secession only when national oppression and national frictions make a joint life completely intolerable and impede all and every economic relationship.¹⁶

Such was Lenin's exposition of the original programme of the RSDRP on the national question, a programme which formed the basis of the *Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia*, published by the Soviet Government on November 15, 1917, shortly after the Bolshevik *coup*. This declaration proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; their right to self-determination, including secession and the formation of an independent State; the abolition of all and every kind of national and national-religious privilege and restriction; and the free development of national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.¹⁷ These principles were officially stated to be the essence of the Communist Party's nationalities programme when the dictatorship of the proletariat was in force¹⁸ and now, when a new stage is held to have been reached, they are still said to form the basis of all Soviet legislation on national sovereignty, as they will in the future.¹⁹

SOURCES

1. Marx and Engels, *Correspondence* 1846-1895, p. 287.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
3. KPSS v. *Resolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh*, Part 1, p. 40.
4. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 3rd edn., Vol. 16, p. 510.
5. *Ibid.*, Vol. 17, p. 146.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 448-449.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 439.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 436.
11. *Ibid.*, Vol. 19, p. 245.
12. *Ibid.*, Vol. 17, p. 152.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
14. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 2, pp. 348, 375.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 376.
16. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 17, p. 449.
17. *Sobranie Uzakoneny i Rasporiazheniy Rabochego i Krestyanskogo Pravitelstva*: 1917, No. 2, Art. 18.
18. *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (hereafter cited as *B.S.E.*), 2nd edn., Vol. 29, p. 292.
19. *Voprosy Istorii* 1965, No. 12, p. 27.

II

The Formation of the USSR

The Bolsheviks and the National Minorities in the Civil War

With the overthrow of the Tsarist régime in February, 1917, the Russian Empire began to disintegrate and this process continued and gained force after the Bolshevik *coup* in October. Numerous national governments and nationalist parties, demanding autonomy from Russian control, emerged in the West, South and East of Russia. These included:

(West)	Ukrainian Central Rada	April, 1917—April, 1918.
	Byelorussian Rada	July, 1917—January, 1919.
(South)	Bessarabian Sfatul-Tserii	November, 1917—November, 1918.
	(Regional Council	
	Crimean Kurultai (General	December, 1917—January, 1918.
	Assembly).	
	Azerbaidzhani Mussavat	} Independent republics established in these territories in May, 1918.
	Armenian Dashnak	
	Georgian Menshevik	
(East)	Autonomous Muslim Government in Turkestan.	

There were also at various stages various regional governments set up on the Don, in the Kuban and in Siberia.

The emergence of this nationalist third force was of immediate consequence in the struggle between the Bolsheviks and the White forces. It denied the Whites support on which they might otherwise have counted. The Bolsheviks, however, were far more aware of the need to harness this force for their own purposes, whatever they had ultimately in store for it.

The Provisional Government set up after the February Revolution had shown limited sympathy for the national aspirations of the minorities, and the White leaders displayed even greater intransigence. 'The preservation of a united Russian State was a symbol of my faith', wrote the White General Denikin, 'as well as that of the entire White Army. . . . It was an orthodox symbol allowing for no doubts, vacillations or compromises.'¹

Tactical Support of Minority Movements

On the other hand, the Bolsheviks from the outset made great efforts to win the support of the minorities. On November 20, 1917, shortly after the issue of the *Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia*, a special appeal was addressed to 'All Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East'. This declared:

'Muslims of Russia, Tatars of the Volga and the Crimea, Kirghiz and Sarts of Siberia and Turkestan, Turks and Tatars of Transcaucasia, Chechens and mountaineers of the Caucasus and all you whose mosques and oratories have been destroyed, whose beliefs and customs have been trampled underfoot by the Tsars and the oppressors of Russia. Your beliefs and usages, your national and cultural institutions are henceforth free and inviolable. Organise your national life freely and without hindrance. You have a right to this. Know that your rights like those of all the peoples of Russia are protected by the entire might of the Revolution and of its organs, the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Lend your support to this revolution and to its sovereign Government.'²

These declarations were followed by a series of gestures calculated to win the sympathy of the nationalists in the border regions. In November, 1917, national banners and other relics, formerly held in the Hermitage Museum and the Preobrazhensky Cathedral, were returned to the Ukraine. In December Muslim relics, including the Sacred Koran of Osman, were returned from the State Public Library to a congress of Muslims then being held in Petrograd. The following month Muslims were allowed to replace the crescent on top of the Sumbeki Tower in Kazan and the Karavansarai Mosque in Orenburg was given over to the keeping of the Bashkir Regional Soviet.³ In June, 1919, the Soviet Government published a decree forbidding any further settlement of Russians at the expense of Kazakhs, even on lands already allocated for the former's settlement.⁴ This was followed by a similar decree for the Kalmyk people.⁵ This policy was successful in gaining the Bolsheviks allies in critical moments of the Civil War. Thus in August, 1918, when the Cossacks seized the capital of the North Caucasus, Vladikavkaz, only the Chechens and the Ingushi stood between the Cossacks and the complete disruption of the Bolshevik forces in the area. To enlist their support for the Bolshevik cause, the Chechens and the Ingushi were promised that certain of their lands which had been occupied by the Cossacks in Tsarist times would be restored to them.

Ordzhonikidze, the Bolshevik commander, in a speech in December, 1918, declared:

'I recall the moment . . . when our fate hung on a hair; this was a moment . . . when we had no following . . . when we were looked upon with timidity . . . when only the Ingushi followed us without hesitation.'⁶

Suppression of 'Bourgeois' Nationalist Autonomy

The Soviet leaders, however, considered that secession in the conditions of the Civil War and foreign intervention was contrary to the interests of the proletarian revolution, and granted freedom of self-determination only when external considerations forced them to do so, *i.e.* with the collapse of the Soviet régimes in the Baltic States. Neither could there be any question of neutrality. As Stalin declared in 1920:

'When a life and death struggle is developing between proletarian Russia and the imperialist *Entente*, there are only two possible outcomes for the border regions. *Either* they go along with Russia, and then the toiling masses of the border regions will be freed from imperialist aggression;

Or they go along with the *Entente*, and then the yoke of imperialism will be inevitable.

There is no third course.

The so-called independence of so-called Georgia, Armenia, Poland, Finland, etc., is only an illusion, and conceals the utter dependence of these apologies for States on one or another group of imperialists.'⁷

Attempts by non-Bolshevik nationalist bodies to achieve autonomous status 'in bourgeois forms' were put down by force. Thus in February, 1918, the independent Turkestan Government, set up in November, 1917, at Kokand by the Fourth Muslim Regional Congress, which had proclaimed the autonomy of Turkestan, was 'liquidated by detachments of Red Guards',⁸ sent to Kokand from Tashkent, the Bolshevik headquarters in Turkestan.

A recent Soviet source has described the background to this episode as follows:

'In November, 1917, mullahs, sheiks, rich merchants, bais, representatives of the national bourgeoisie, prominent Pan-Islamists and Pan-Turkists gathered in Kokand at the so-called Muslim congress. Referring to the major point in the proletarian national programme, promulgating the people's right to self-determination up to and

including secession and formation of an independent state, the bourgeois nationalists endeavoured theoretically to "substantiate" their plans aimed at separating Turkestan from Russia and subordinating it to American and British imperialism."⁹

In the Crimea

"Tatar bourgeois nationalists, having already united in the period of the February Revolution in the *Milli Firka* (national party), formed in December, 1917, their own 'national government'—the bourgeois-nationalist parliament (*Kurultai*) in Bakhchisarai. Here the struggle for the power of the Soviets was prolonged and bitter. The workers of Sevastopol and the revolutionary sailors of the Black Sea Fleet played a decisive role in this struggle. At the beginning of January, 1918, the armies of the *Kurultai* were destroyed by revolutionary detachments and the power of the Soviets was established in Simferopol and, after Simferopol, throughout the Crimean Isthmus as well."¹⁰

In the Ukraine Russian forces also played a decisive role in the establishment of a Soviet régime. A Soviet historian has written:

"The actual help of Soviet Russia was of great importance in this matter. In the industrial centres of the Ukraine, such as Kharkov and Ekaterynoslav, the local Bolsheviks had neither the strength nor the resoluteness to seize power. In Kharkov and Ekaterynoslav this was achieved as a result of the active participation and the initiative of the Army units which arrived from North Russia, the detachments of Sivers and Antonov-Ovseenko, which were mostly from the Petrograd and Moscow garrisons. . . . It was these detachments that established the Soviet Government in Kharkov and made it possible to call the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets."¹¹

Tactical Concessions

In cases where the direct use of force was not immediately practical, owing to the strategic requirements of the Civil War, the Soviet leaders temporised with national governments until it became possible. In 1920 after Soviet forces had overthrown the Mussavat republic in Azerbaidzhan, a Polish invasion made the recall of Soviet troops from the area imperative. The Soviet Government accordingly signed a treaty with Georgia (May 7, 1920). This contained an unqualified recognition of Georgian independence:

Article 1

Proceeding from the right, proclaimed by the RSFSR, of all peoples to free self-determination up to and including complete

separation from the State of which they constitute a part, Russia unreservedly recognises the independence and sovereignty of the Georgian State and voluntarily renounces all the sovereign rights which had appertained to Russia with regard to the People and Territory of Georgia.

Article 2

Proceeding from the principles proclaimed in Article 1 above of the present Treaty, Russia undertakes to refrain from any kind of interference in the internal affairs of Georgia.

In return for this recognition, the Georgian Government undertook in Article 10 to cease the prosecution of persons who had worked to further the interests of the RSFSR and the Communist Party, and to release immediately all who had been imprisoned on this score.¹³

Ten months later units of the Red Army entered Tiflis. The establishment of a Soviet régime in Georgia followed. Thus by the end of the Civil War the territory of the former Tsarist Empire, with the exception of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States (independent) and Bessarabia (annexed by Rumania in 1918) had been taken under control by the central Soviet Government, though a native guerilla movement, the *Basmachestvo*,* continued to operate in Turkestan until 1923.

Integration of the Nationalities into the Soviet State

Immediately on their accession to power the Bolsheviks declared that the future Soviet State would be built on the federal principle. The *Declaration of Rights of the Toilers and Exploited People*, passed by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets in January, 1918, proclaimed: 'The Soviet Russian Republic is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics.'¹³

Before the Revolution both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks had been hostile to federation. In 1913 Lenin stated: 'We are against federation on principle—it weakens economic ties; it is a pattern unfit for a single State'.¹⁴ Stalin later gave the following reasons for this apparent revision of policy:—

'First, the fact that at the time of the October Revolution a number of the nationalities of Russia were actually in a state of complete secession and complete isolation from one another, and, in view of this, federation represented a step forward from the division of the

* See footnote on p. 59.

working masses of these nationalities to their closer union, their amalgamation.

'Secondly, the fact that the very forms of federation which suggested themselves in the course of Soviet development proved by no means so contradictory to the aim of closer economic unity between the working masses of the nationalities of Russia as might have appeared formerly, and even did not contradict this aim at all, as was subsequently demonstrated in practice.

'Thirdly, the fact that the national movement had proved to be far more weighty a factor and the process of amalgamation of nations far more complicated than might have appeared formerly, in the period prior to the war, or in the period prior to the October Revolution.'¹⁵

Pursuing the same line, the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 adopted Lenin's theses on the national and colonial questions. These defined federalism as a 'transitional form to complete union of the toilers of different nations'.¹⁶ In other words, it was to be a preliminary towards centralising State power in multi-national areas.

Centralising Role of the Party

The Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), which was ratified by the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July, 1918, established a pyramid of Soviets as the organs of government. Local Soviets were to send delegates to an All-Russian Congress of Soviets, to meet not less than twice a year, and this in turn was to appoint an All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTSIK). The VTSIK was to fulfil the functions of the Congress of Soviets between sessions. The Council of People's Commissars (*Sovnarkom*), the highest governmental organ, was formally responsible to the VTSIK and ultimately through it to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.¹⁷

The Constitution did not determine the relationship between the Soviets and the Communist Party. This was defined a year later in the first Party programme of the Russian Communist Party, which superseded the Russian Social Democrat 'Programme of 1903':

'The Communist Party assigns itself the task of winning decisive influence and complete leadership in all organisations of the labouring class: the trade unions, the cooperatives, the village communes, etc. The Communist Party strives particularly for the carrying-out of its programme by and for complete mastery in contemporary

State organisations such as the Soviets are. . . . The Russian Communist Party must win for itself undivided political mastery and effectual control over all their work by means of practical, daily, and selfless work in the Soviets and by means of the advancement of its most stalwart and devoted members to all posts in the Soviets.¹⁸

The use of the legislative powers, vested in the Soviets, was thus to be dictated by the Communist Party. Since this Party was built on the principle of 'democratic centralism', whereby all decisions of the higher bodies were binding on the lower ones, effective control of power lay, in the last analysis, with the highest organs of the Party, the Central Committee (after March, 1919, the Politburo) which used the Soviet and Party organs as channels to convey its decisions to the various levels of administration.

This monopoly of power largely determined the peculiar nature of Soviet federalism. It ensured that the forms used 'did not in any way contradict the aims of the economic merger of the toiling masses of the nationalities',¹⁹ for, while Lenin had agreed to national delimitation in the State structure, he remained adamant in refusing any introduction of federalist principles in the structure of the Party. On this point the Communist Party programme of 1919 stated:

'The Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Byelorussia exist at the present time as individual Soviet republics. This is how the question of the forms of *State* structure has been decided for the present. But it does not in the least mean that the Russian Communist Party should in turn reorganise itself on the lines of a federation of independent Communist Parties.

'The Eighth Congress of the RKP decrees: it is necessary that there exist a *single* centralised Communist Party and a single Central Committee to direct the entire work of the Party throughout all the parts of the RSFSR. All decisions of the RKP and its directing organs are unconditionally binding on all branches of the Party, irrespective of their national composition. The Central Committees of the Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian Communists enjoy the status of regional committees of the Party, and are wholly subordinated to the Central Committee of the RKP.'²⁰

Sverdlov, Chairman of the VTSIK, reminded the Ukrainian Communist Party of this principle at its Third Congress in March, 1919, when the first Constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was discussed.

'Comrades, all of you know that the basic principles and directives are not laid down by our own Central Committee of the

Communist Party of the Ukraine, but by our own Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. It cannot be otherwise, be it in the Ukraine or in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, or wherever we create independent Soviet republics—everywhere we must maintain the supremacy of our Communist Party. Everywhere the general leadership belongs to the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.’²¹

This principle also lay behind the reorganisation of the Muslim Party organisation, the Russian Party of Communist (Bolshevik) Muslims, which was carried out at the 1st Congress of Communist Muslims, held in Moscow on November 3, 1918. Here it was decided to rename the Central Committee of Muslim Communists (Bolsheviks) as the Central Buro of Muslim Organisations of the RKP and to omit the word ‘Muslims’ from the title of the Party.²² Stalin, who was elected Chairman of the newly-formed Central Buro, declared at the Congress:

‘The exceptional task of which I have just been speaking demands from us an exceptional cohesion among Communists. It is necessary in view of this to establish such a form of uniting Muslim and non-Muslim Communists as would ensure the greatest possible cohesion of our forces. Such a form is the unification of Muslim Communist organisations into a single section of the Russian Communist Party.’²³

The *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* was later to describe the work of the Congress in the following terms:

‘The Congress was preceded by a meeting of Communist Muslims, held in Kazan in June, 1918, which passed the draft of a programme, elaborated in accordance with a decision of the VII Congress of the RKP(b), but which on the question of organisation took, under the influence of nationalist elements, the incorrect road of forming a separate Muslim Communist Party, having elected a separate Central Committee of Communist Muslims. At the First Congress a decisive rebuff was given to the attempts of nationalist elements to set the Communist movement among the toiling Muslims in opposition to the All-Russian movement. The congress abolished the Central Committee, elected a Central Buro of the Muslim Organisations of the RKP(b) and adopted the statutes of the RKP(b).’²⁴

* In May, 1919, the Central Buro was renamed the ‘Central Buro of the Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East’. In January, 1920, it was further renamed the ‘Central Buro of the Turkic Peoples’. Finally, in May, 1921, it was abolished by a decision of the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the RKP(b).²⁵

Thus the Russian Communist Party was the arbiter of policy in all the federal units of the Soviet State; the nominal distinctions in autonomous status between one unit and another were largely nullified by this fact. Stalin was entirely justified when in 1920 he wrote to Lenin that 'in your theses you make a difference between the Bashkir [autonomous republic] and Ukrainian [Soviet or Union republic] types of federal union, but in reality there is no such difference or it is so small as to amount to zero.'²⁶

In the first years of Soviet rule when the national question was freely discussed within the Communist Party, dissatisfaction with this position was openly expressed by indigenous Communists in the Republics. A leading Georgian delegate, Makharadze, speaking in 1923 at the XII Party Congress declared:

'There has been talk here of independent and self-dependent republics. On this point it is necessary to exert the greatest caution so as to avoid any kind of exaggeration whatsoever. Comrades, it is clear to all of us what sort of self-dependence, what sort of independence, this is. We have, after all, a single Party, a single central organ, which in the final resort determines absolutely everything for all the republics, even for all the tiny republics, including general directives right up to the appointment of responsible leaders in this or that republic—all this derives from the one organ so that to speak under these conditions of self-dependence, of independence, reflects, to the highest degree, an intrinsically incomprehensible proposition.'²⁷

Evolution of the Forms of Federal Status

The 1918 Constitution of the RSFSR, while accepting the general principle of federalism, made no provision for the settlement of relations between the federal government and individual States. During 1918 it was not clear what, if any, difference in status there was between autonomous regions, autonomous republics and Soviet republics; all these terms were used interchangeably. Wherever the Bolsheviks came to power they simply proclaimed the laws issued by the Government of the RSFSR as valid and announced the establishment of a 'union' of the territory in question with the Russian Soviet Republic.

The first attempts to put the federal principle into practice were made in the spring of 1918, when the Government of the RSFSR ordered the formation of Tatar-Bashkir and Turkestan

Republics. They had little practical outcome. The Tatar-Bashkir State never came into being because the Bolsheviks had to evacuate the Volga-Ural region in the summer of 1918;²⁸ while Turkestan was cut off by enemy forces from the summer of 1918 to September, 1919,²⁹ and had, in consequence, no administrative connection with Moscow throughout this period.

The basic delimitation on federal principles of the territories under Bolshevik control was carried out between 1919 and 1922. It started with Bashkiria in February, 1919. Though the formation of the Bashkir Autonomous Republic initiated this process, however, it by no means set the pattern for it. Indeed, it was the only case of the formation of a republic resulting from a specific bilateral agreement between the central authorities and local nationals and the only case in which the nationals were granted wide measures of self-rule.

The Bashkir Experiment

The Soviet Bashkir agreement of February, 1919, proclaimed the establishment of the Bashkir Autonomous Republic. Under it, the Bashkirs were to elect at once a Bashkir Revolutionary Committee (*Bashrevkom*), which would exercise supreme authority in all matters concerning Bashkiria and its inhabitants until conditions permitted the convocation of a Bashkir Congress of Soviets. The *Bashrevkom* was to be master of everything in its territory, with the exception of railroads, mines, and factories, which were to be subordinated to the All-Russian Commissariat of National Economy. The Bashkir armed forces, while retaining their separate identity, were to come under the jurisdiction of the All-Russian Commissariat of War.³⁰

After this agreement the Bashkir leaders, who had previously collaborated with the White forces under Admiral Kolchak, issued a statement announcing the transfer of their allegiance to the Bolsheviks.³¹ However, 15 months later, with the Civil War virtually over, the Soviet Government, without prior reference to the Bashkirs, published a new decree on Bashkir autonomy. This subordinated virtually all the political, financial, and economic organs to the central authorities and left the Bashkirs only minor administrative powers.³²

The *Bashrevkom* at a secret session passed a resolution protesting against this breach of faith. The resolution stated:

'In view of the imperialist tendencies of the Russians, which hinder in every manner the development of the minor nationalities, in view of the lack of faith of the centre towards Bashkir Communists, Bashkir officials are abandoning Bashkiria and departing for Turkestan . . .'³³

Another complaint written by Validov, head of the *Bashrevkom*, objected to their present form of autonomy as giving the minorities less self-rule than they had enjoyed under Nicholas II and Stolypin, and accused the Communist Party leadership, and especially Stalin, of embarking on a course of out-and-out chauvinism.³⁴

The departure of the Bashkir leaders for Turkestan was followed by an anti-Bolshevik rising in Bashkiria which had to be put down by Russian troops. The new government of Bashkiria, formed to replace the *Bashrevkom*, included representatives of all ethnic groups in the Republic except the Bashkirs.³⁵

Pattern of the Autonomous Republics

The Bashkir experiment was not repeated. Between 1920 and 1923, 17 autonomous republics and regions (*Oblasts*) were established within the RSFSR, all by decree of the VTSIK, acting alone or in conjunction with the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. In addition to the Bashkir and Turkestan Republics, these included:

Autonomous Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic	May 27, 1920
Autonomous Chuvash Region	June 24, 1920
Karelian Toilers Commune	August 6, 1920
Autonomous Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic	August 26, 1920
Autonomous Region of the Mari People	November 25, 1920
Autonomous Region of the Votyak People	January 5, 1921
Autonomous Daghestan Socialist Republic	January 20, 1921
Autonomous Gorskaya (Highland) Socialist Republic	January 20, 1921
Autonomous Region of the Komi	August 22, 1921
Autonomous Crimean Soviet Socialist Republic	October 18, 1921
Autonomous Mongol-Buryat Region	January 9, 1922
Joint Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Region	January 12, 1922

Joint Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Region	January 16, 1922
Autonomous Yakut Soviet Socialist Republic	April 20, 1922
Autonomous Region of the Oirot People					June 1, 1922
Adygei Autonomous Region	July 27, 1922 ³⁶

The government of the RSFSR retained in these territories full control over military, economic, financial, and foreign affairs. The local administrations were granted competence only in such spheres as education, public health and social security, and even here they were subjected to the surveillance of the appropriate Commissariats of the RSFSR as well as of the local bureaux of the Russian Communist Party. The governments of the autonomous regions and republics, as a Soviet jurist remarked, had more in common from the point of view of authority and function with the Tsarist organs of local government, the *Zemstvos*,³⁷ than with federal unions.³⁷ 'Autonomy means not separation,' Stalin told the North Caucasians in 1920, 'but union between the self governing highland peoples and the peoples of Russia.'³⁸

The Narkomnats and the Autonomous Territories

The first attempt to consolidate the State apparatus of all the autonomous regions (*oblasts*) and republics was made in the early 1920s by the Central RSFSR People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs (*Narkomnats*), under the chairmanship of Stalin.

The *Narkomnats*, established on November 8, 1917, was originally intended to serve as an intermediary between the central Soviet organs and the minorities and to assist the Government in dealing with problems of a purely national character. It was organised on an *ad hoc* basis. Whenever the affairs of any nationality formerly belonging to the Russian Empire became in any way acute, the *Narkomnats* set up a special department under the direction of a member of the nationality in question to deal with them. These special depart-

*The *Zemstvos* were organs of local self-government established by the Tsarist Government in 1864. Their competence covered such matters as roads, hospitals, food, education, medical and veterinary services and public welfare in general. They also had the right to levy rates for local needs.

ments or 'sections', certain of which were called commissariats until 1920, were a part of the *Narkomnats* and subordinate to it. By the end of 1918 individual sections had been established for Poles, Letts, Lithuanians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Estonians, Tatars, Bashkirs, Kazakhs, Chuvash, the mountain races of the North Caucasus, Azerbaidzhanis, Mordovtsy, the Volga Germans, and other still smaller national units.

The *Narkomnats* thus formally took its cue from a series of national sections, each under its own national head. It was made to appear that these heads of sections were ambassadors pleading their national causes in Moscow; the word 'petition' was actually applied in a 1919 decree of VTSIK to a request put forward by the Commissar of Kazakh affairs.³⁹ However, the effectiveness of national representation was reduced by the difficulty of finding nationals who were good Bolsheviks as well as being nationally acceptable as heads of the various sections. In many cases this led to the appointment of people whose Party loyalties were stronger than their national affiliations and who were more interested in carrying out the policy of the centre in the national regions than in pressing national *desiderata* in Moscow. Pestkovsky, the Deputy People's Commissar for Nationality Affairs under Stalin, who complained of the prevalence of an 'internationalist' approach to the hierarchy of the Commissariat, is reported to have declared later:

'The Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs consisted of these russified non-Russians who opposed their abstract internationalism to the real needs of development of the oppressed nationalities. Actually this policy supported the old tradition of russification and was a special danger in the conditions of Civil War.'⁴⁰

In December, 1918, an instruction of the *Narkomnats* ordered the setting up of local sections in areas of the RSFSR where the national composition of the population was particularly diverse. The functions of these sections were to be:

- '(a) To implement the principles of the Soviet régime among the respective nations in their own language;
- '(b) To implement all decrees of the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs;
- '(c) To take all measures to raise the cultural level and class-consciousness of the working masses of the nations inhabiting the given territory;

(d) To struggle against counter-revolution in its national manifestations (struggle against "national"-bourgeois "governments," etc.).⁴¹

The need to consolidate the State apparatus of the autonomous republics and regions established within the RSFSR led in 1920 to a reorganisation of the structure of *Narkomnats*. A Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive (VTSIK), dated May 19, stipulated that all nationalities within the RSFSR were to send delegations, consisting of a chairman and two members, to the *Narkomnats*. These delegations were to be placed at the head of the relevant sections of the latter. A new body, the Council of Nationalities, was to be established as the leading organ of the *Narkomnats*. It was to consist of the chairmen of the various delegations headed by the People's Commissar and a Collegium of five members.⁴²

The Commissariat was also invested with further extensive powers. A joint decree of the VTSIK and the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars, dated November 4, 1920, transferred to the *Narkomnats* other national delegations which had previously been attached to VTSIK. It was stipulated that these delegations would in future work exclusively through the *Narkomnats*.⁴³ A further decree, dated December 16, empowered the Commissariat to attach representatives to the Central Executive Committees of the Autonomous Republics and the Executive Committees of the Autonomous Regions. These representatives were to participate in the work of these bodies in an advisory capacity. In the event of any deviation from the 'nationalities policy of the Central Federal Soviet régime,' they were to bring this to the notice of the relevant organs of the autonomous territories and simultaneously to report on it to the *Narkomnats*.⁴⁴

The *Narkomnats* was also granted certain powers *vis-à-vis* the Central Government. A decree of the VTSIK dated April 21, 1921, confirming the establishment of the Council of Nationalities, listed among the latter's functions the prior scrutiny of all measures of the VTSIK and the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars relating to the autonomous territories or bearing on the nationalities policy in general.⁴⁵

After supervising the political consolidation of the autonomous territories the Commissariat turned its attention to the economic framework. A revised statute for the *Narkomnats*,

issued in the summer of 1922, included among its functions the 'guaranteeing of conditions favourable to the development of the productive resources of the national-territorial units and the defence of their economic interests in the new economic structure.'⁴⁶ To fulfil this function the *Narkomnats* developed its own departments for agriculture, labour, education, Army, Press, forestry, and social security. The same year a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee empowered *Narkomnats* to send representatives to the Treaty (Union) Republics^{*} to act as advisers to the RSFSR representatives there. The representatives of *Narkomnats* were to take part in the work of the Republican Central Executive Committees and Councils of People's Commissars in an advisory capacity.⁴⁷

In 1923 the forthcoming dissolution of the *Narkomnats* was justified by the fact that 'it had completed its fundamental task of preparing the formation of the National Republics and Regions and uniting them into a union of republics.'⁴⁸

Union Republics and Their Relations with the RSFSR

In evolving the forms of the Soviet Federal State the Communists found it necessary to differentiate between the non-Russian areas situated inland and those on the periphery. The status of autonomous regions and republics was the rule for the former and that of Union or Soviet Republics for the latter. Constitutionally, the cardinal difference between these two types of political organisation lay in the fact that the Union Republics were recognised as fully-fledged independent republics with the right to separate from the RSFSR, whereas the Autonomous Republics were not. This constitutional difference, however, was of little practical significance, for with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat it was judged to be manifestly against the proletariat's interest to permit the alienation of any part of its territory. In Stalin's words:

'It should be borne in mind that in addition to the right of nations to self-determination, there is also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and the right of self-determination is subordinate to this latter right. There are cases when the right of self-determination conflicts with another, a higher right—the right of the working class that has come to power to consolidate its power. In such cases—this must be said bluntly—the right of

^{*} See following section.

self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the working class in exercising its right to dictatorship.⁴⁹

As has been shown Stalin originally held that for practical purposes there was no difference between Autonomous and Union Republics. The introduction of this distinction into Soviet constitutional law seems to have been due primarily to diplomatic considerations. The borderlands, which had separated themselves from Russia in 1917 and 1918, had entered into diplomatic or military relations with a number of foreign Powers.⁵⁰ It was therefore necessary for the Communists to create the impression that these territories still retained their independence, so as to be able to replace the diplomatic representatives of the overthrown borderland republics and to take stock of their foreign commitments.

The relationship of the Union Republics with the RSFSR and the consolidation of their economies with the central economy were established by a series of treaties between the RSFSR and the Union Republics. The first of these was signed on September 30, 1920, with Azerbaidzhan, after the forcible overthrow of the Mussavat Republic the previous April. This treaty made it incumbent on the signatories to unify, in the shortest possible time, military organisation and military command, the organs controlling the national economy and foreign trade, the supply organs, rail and water transport, postal-telegraphic administration, and finance. In a series of supplementary treaties signed simultaneously with the main treaty, the competent organs of the RSFSR in the fields of finance, foreign trade and national economy were empowered to appoint plenipotentiaries to the Azerbaidzhan Council of People's Commissars, 'with the right of a substantive vote.'⁵⁰

The treaty with the Ukraine, signed on December 28, 1920, differed in some essentials from the Azerbaidzhani model.

⁵⁰ The Ukrainian *Rada* had sent a delegation to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations in 1917. The Byelorussian National Republic set up in March, 1918, during the German occupation of Byelorussia, had initiated talks with Germany, and later in May, 1919, during the Polish occupation of Byelorussia, had negotiated with Poland on the subject of federal relations with the latter. The Transcaucasian Republics in 1919 sent delegations to the Paris Peace Conference. Their request to be placed under a League of Nations mandate was not acceded to but the Allied Supreme Council recognised their *de facto* independence.

Instead of empowering representatives of the central RSFSR commissariats to direct the work of republican organs in the republic itself, machinery was set up under which military, and naval affairs, national economy, foreign trade, finance, labour, communications and post and telegraphs were entrusted to 'unified commissariats' of both republics. These commissariats were to form part of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars and to be represented in the *Sovnarkom* of the Ukrainian SSR by plenipotentiaries to be confirmed and controlled on a joint basis by the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and Congress of Soviets. In turn the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the VTSIK were entrusted with the overall control of the unified commissariats and these two bodies were to include Ukrainian representatives as laid down by the Congress of Soviets.⁵¹

In 1921 treaties were concluded with the remaining Soviet Republics. The treaties signed with Byelorussia in January and August put the republic in virtually the same position as Azerbaidzhan.⁵² The treaty with Georgia (May 21) followed the pattern of the Ukrainian treaty with some minor variants,⁵³ while the treaty with Armenia, signed on October 20, was confined exclusively to financial matters and stood halfway between the shared control of the Ukrainian model and the subordinate status of Azerbaidzhan and Byelorussia.⁵⁴

The final step in attaching the Union Republics to the RSFSR was the unification between 1921 and 1922 of the Transcaucasian Republics into one federal unit. Until then the continued existence in Transcaucasia of a number of individual sovereign States had impeded the political and economic consolidation of this territory with the RSFSR.

The unification of Transcaucasia began on April 9, 1921, when Lenin directed Ordzhonikidze, head of the Caucasian *Buro* of the Russian Communist Party (*Kavburo*) and a close associate of Stalin, to establish a single economic administration for all Transcaucasia.⁵⁵

By June Ordzhonikidze had completed the integration of the railway administrations and foreign trade organisations of the three republics—Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzhan. In July, Stalin visited Tiflis, the Georgian capital, and attended a plenum of the *Kavburo** at which it was decided to set up

* The *Kavburo* was set up in February, 1920, at which time its

'a commission for the consolidation of the economic activities of the Transcaucasian Republics' and 'to conclude commercial and financial agreements between the Transcaucasian Republic and the RSFSR'.⁵⁶ In November, 1921, the *Kavburo* resolved to complete the economic unification of the Transcaucasian Federation. The project of the Transcaucasian Federation was worked out by the Central Committee of the RKP in Moscow, approved by the Politburo, and then relayed to the *Kavburo*.⁵⁷

The Transcaucasian Federation was formally established on March 12, 1922, as the Federal Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Transcaucasia (FSSSRZ). A Union Council was to exercise the function of the highest executive organ and to take over from the three republics the Commissariats of Military Affairs, Post and Telegraphs, Finances, Foreign Trade, Labour, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, as well as the Administration of the Means of Communication and the Cheka (Secret Police). In addition, the federal organ assumed direction of the foreign affairs of the individual republics and central control over the economic life of Transcaucasia through a Supreme Economic Council, which was to act as a permanent commission of the Union Council. Its decrees were to be categorically binding on all executive organs of the FSSSRZ and also on the Economic Councils of the three Republics.⁵⁸

The Republics retained the right of foreign representation and the use of their own currency and were still regarded in the FSSSRZ Constitution as independent sovereign republics.⁵⁹

In the course of 1922 the area of self-rule left to the Transcaucasian Republics was restricted by a series of agreements between the FSSSRZ Union Council and the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars. In May all three republics ceded to the RSFSR the right to represent them abroad. In the autumn all tariffs between the republics and the RSFSR were removed, and a uniform Soviet currency was introduced.⁶⁰

Finally, in December, the FSSSRZ was transformed from a Federal Union of Republics into a single Federal Republic, the Transcaucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (ZSFSR). This form of association was much tighter. Besides leaving unspecified the powers of the ZSFSR Supreme Economic Council, it restricted the budgetary powers of the Republics as well as

members were: Ordzhonikidze (Chairman), Kirov (Deputy Chairman), Mdivani and Stepani.

their ability to exert pressure on the Federal Government or its local agencies.⁶¹ There was no mention in the constitution of the independence of the constituent republics. A Soviet writer, commenting in 1923 on the ZSFSR Constitution, declared:

'We can establish with absolute certainty that... in its line towards centralisation it goes considerably further than the Constitution of the USSR and, in contrast to the latter, devotes exceedingly little space in its structure to national factors; by depriving the Union Republics of the right to unilateral secession from the Federation, it comes into contradiction with the principles proclaimed by the October Revolution.'⁶²

In effecting this consolidation of the Transcaucasian Republics into a single federal unit, Ordzhonikidze had completely overridden the objections of local Georgian Communists despite explicit instructions from Lenin that no measures should be undertaken without their approval.⁶³ In October, 1922, the Georgian Central Committee resigned *en bloc* in protest.

Lenin had always been fully alive to the depth of national feeling in Georgia, and after the Soviet conquest had stressed that the methods employed in Russia should not be applied to Soviet Georgia; he even advocated some form of coalition with the Georgian Mensheviks so as not to alienate local opinion from the Soviet régime.⁶⁴ Faced with the resignation of the Georgian Communists, old Bolsheviks whose loyalties and pro-Russian sympathies were beyond doubt, Lenin appointed three non-Russians, Dzerzhinsky, Mitskevich-Kapsukas and Manuilsky, to go to the Caucasus to investigate the causes of dissension. This commission on its return exonerated the *Kavburo* and accused the Georgian Communists of obstructing the political and economic unification of Transcaucasia. As a result of its recommendations the leaders of the 'Georgian opposition', Makharadze, Mdivani, Tsintsadze, and Kavtaradze, were recalled from Georgia.⁶⁵

Lenin was far from satisfied with the report of the commission. He had consistently maintained that a feeling of national injustice was one of the main reasons for the rise of nationalism and thus one of the greatest barriers to the merger of different nationalities in a single State. Prevented by illness from taking any personal action, Lenin, in December, 1922, prepared some notes on the national question which he later handed to Trotsky with instructions to bring them to the notice of the Party. Trotsky circulated them among members of the

Central Committee shortly before the Twelfth Party Congress, held in April, 1923. These notes constituted the background against which the last frank debates on the national question took place within the Russian Communist Party.

Lenin in his notes (for text of two of the three sections see Appendix A) had accused Stalin and Ordzhonikidze of conducting a Great Russian nationalist campaign in Transcaucasia and had stressed that in the interests of proletarian class solidarity ('it is better to be prodigal in the use of indulgence and leniency towards the national minorities than to be niggardly in the matter') a formalist approach to the national question was to be avoided. In the debates at the Congress Makharadze and Mdivani reinforced the charges made by Lenin. Stalin in reply defended the formation of the Transcaucasian Federal Republic, pointing out that he had prolonged the time originally envisaged by Lenin for the completion of this operation, and in his turn accused the Georgians of adopting a chauvinistic attitude towards the minor nationalities in Georgia. While acknowledging the danger of Great Russian chauvinism, he warned against over-emphasising the significance of the national question.

'It is clear to us, as Communists, that the basis of all our work lies in strengthening the power of the workers, and that only after that are we confronted by the other question, a very important one but subordinate to the first, namely, the national question. We are told that we must not offend the non-Russian nationalities. That is perfectly true; I agree that we must not offend them. But to evolve out of this a new theory to the effect that the Great Russian proletariat must be placed in a position of inequality in relation to the formerly oppressed nations is absurd. What was merely a figure of speech in Comrade Lenin's well-known article, Bukharin has converted into a regular slogan. Nevertheless it is clear that the political basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat is primarily and chiefly the central, industrial regions and not the border regions, which are peasant countries. If we exaggerate the importance of the peasant border regions, to the detriment of the proletarian districts, it may result in a crack in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is dangerous, Comrades. We must not exaggerate things in politics, just as we must not underrate them.'⁶⁶

The Congress accepted Stalin's report. Lenin died in January, 1924, and the question of the ZSFSR was not reopened. More than 30 years were to elapse before Lenin's notes, known to the outside world through a copy Trotsky preserved in his

exile, were published in the Soviet Union, *i.e.* after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party held in February, 1956.

The People's Republics

In addition to the Union and Autonomous Republics, there existed in the first years of Soviet power three State administrations which did enjoy a considerable measure of self rule. These were the People's Republics of Khorezm and Bukhara, and the Far Eastern Republic.* These States were established in 1920 and, outside the economic field in which they granted the RSFSR certain privileges, such as the right to exploit natural resources, to import and export without the payment of tariffs and to use Russian currency, they were in fact independent.

Their establishment was a temporary concession due to the special conditions prevailing rather than a major variant of the Soviet pattern of federation. The Khorezm (the ancient name for Khiva) and Bukhara People's Republics were founded after the Emirates of Khiva and Bukhara had been conquered by the Red Army in February and September, 1920, respectively. These emirates had previously been vassal States of Tsarist Russia, and had never been formally included in the Russian Empire. The Far Eastern Republic came into being in April, 1920, when Japanese troops were advancing into the area and the need for the unity of the entire Russian population, both Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik, was paramount.

By 1925 all three republics had been absorbed into the central Soviet State. On November 14, 1922, the Far Eastern Republic was incorporated in the RSFSR as the Far Eastern Territory⁶⁷ (later reconstituted as the Khabarovsk and Maritime Territories) three weeks after the Japanese evacuation of the Russian mainland.⁶⁸ The People's Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm were transformed into fully-fledged Soviet Socialist Republics in 1924, and these in their turn were disbanded in the course of the national-territorial delimitation of Russian Turkestan in 1925, which resulted in these territories being split up and incorporated into various of the Central Asian Republics.

* The Far Eastern Republic, set up on April 6, 1920, covered all former Tsarist territory between Lake Baikal and the Pacific coast.

The Establishment of the USSR

With the formation of the ZSFSR the integration of the Soviet State was almost complete, and it remained only to give this fact constitutional expression. In October, 1922, Stalin was appointed chairman of a commission appointed by the Central Committee of the RKP to prepare the draft treaty for a union of the four Soviet Republics—the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the ZSFSR.⁶⁹ On December 13 the Ukrainian and Transcaucasian Republics, through their respective Congresses of Soviets, went through the formalities of approving the proposed union; the Byelorussian Republic approved the union three days later.⁷⁰ The Tenth Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR gave its approval on December 26.⁷¹ On December 29 representatives of the four republics attended a conference at the Kremlin, where Stalin read the articles of union.⁷² The following day the Tenth Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR and representatives from the Soviets of the three other Union republics met in joint session as the First Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The session lasted a day and confined itself to ratifying the treaty establishing the Union.

This treaty was closely modelled on the RSFSR Constitution and the treaties concluded between the RSFSR and the Union Republics. It stipulated that the supreme legislative organ of the new State should be the Congress of Soviets of the USSR, its authority being exercised, during intervals between sessions, by the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets. The highest executive organ of the Union would be the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which was to be appointed by the Central Executive Committee and to be composed of the following officials: a Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, the Commissars of Foreign Affairs, War, and Navy, Foreign Trade, Means of Communications, Post and Telegraphs, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Labour, Food and Finance, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy and, in an advisory capacity, the head of the GPU (Secret Police). The Union Republics were to have their own Councils of People's Commissars composed of a Chairman, Deputy Chairman, the Commissars of Agriculture, Food, Finance, Labour, Internal Affairs, Justice, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, Education, Health, Social Security, the

Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy and, in an advisory capacity, representatives of the All-Union Commissariats. The Commissariats of Supply, Finance, Labour, Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and the Supreme Council of National Economy of each of the Republican Governments were to be directly subordinated to the corresponding agencies of the All-Union Government. Only the Commissariats of Agriculture, Internal Affairs, Justice, Education, Health, and Social Security were to be under the sole jurisdiction of the Republican Governments. The final article of the treaty guaranteed every republic the right of secession from the Union.⁷³

The Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee, appointed by the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR on January 10, 1923, formed six separate commissions to prepare the draft of a constitution based on the articles of the Union treaty.

The first Constitution of the USSR was ratified and brought into force at the second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on July 6, 1923, and was finally ratified by the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR on January 31, 1924. It contained only one major innovation on the Union treaty, the introduction of a second chamber, the Council of Nationalities, in the Central Executive Committee. Union and Autonomous Republics were to elect five representatives each, and Autonomous Regions one representative each, to this second chamber.*

During the formulation of the Constitution of the USSR considerable opposition was encountered from Georgian, Ukrainian, and Byelorussian Communist leaders. Their main objections were that in the proposed form of union their Republics had been granted insufficient independence from the central authorities, and that they would inevitably be in a subordinate position to the RSFSR.

At the Twelfth Party Congress in April, 1923, Georgian representatives proposed that all the Autonomous Republics should be removed from the RSFSR, the Transcaucasian

* With the adoption of the Stalin Constitution in 1936, the basis of representation in the Council of Nationalities was changed to 25 deputies from Union Republics, 11 from Autonomous Republics, 5 from Autonomous Regions and 1 from National Areas. In 1966, a decree increased the number of deputies from the Union Republics to 32.

Federation disbanded, and that all the Republics should then join the Union independently.⁷⁴ In this they were supported by the Bashkirs and Tatars.⁷⁵

At the same Congress the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine, Rakovsky, advocated that only the four Union Republics should elect deputies to the Council of Nationalities.⁷⁶ This was to prevent the RSFSR from gaining an overwhelming majority in this body, which was inevitable if the Autonomous Republics and Regions within the RSFSR were also to elect delegates. Both these amendments were rejected at the instance of Stalin. The Ukrainian and Byelorussian Communist leaders also presented alternative drafts for incorporation in the constitution. In these the formula the 'RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR and the ZSFSR are united in a single Union State' was omitted, and each Union Republic was to have its own citizenship in place of the officially proposed single All-Union citizenship.

Wider powers were also envisaged for the Union Republics. They were to retain conduct of foreign relations, ratification of international agreements, and independent direction of their armed forces and foreign trade. The Governments of the Union republics were to include Commissariats of War and Navy, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, Post and Telegraphs and Means of Communication.⁷⁷

A Soviet work on the formation of the USSR described the rejection of these draft amendments in the following terms:

'The Communist Party gave a timely rebuff to the counter-revolutionary plans of the Trotskyites and bourgeois nationalists, who had made their aim, as was afterwards established in the trials of 1936-1938, the dismemberment of the USSR and the handing over of the Ukraine to bourgeois Germany and of Byelorussia to bourgeois Poland.'⁷⁸

Of the early leaders opposed to the subordination of the republics to the central apparatus, the Georgian Mdivani was shot in July, 1937: the Ukrainian Rakovsky was imprisoned in March, 1938, and has not been heard of since.

The National-Territorial Delimitation of Russian Turkestan

The final stage in the organisation of the basic territorial and administrative structure of the USSR was carried out in the

years 1924–1925 with the division of Russian Turkestan by nationalities into a number of Union Republics and Autonomous Republics and Regions.

Before 1924 Russian Turkestan had consisted of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Soviet People's Republics of Bukhara and Khorezm. Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm were multi-racial areas. The population of Turkestan then consisted of 41.4 per cent. Uzbeks, 19.4 per cent. Kazakhs, 10.7 per cent. Kirghiz, 7.7 per cent. Tadzhiks, 4.7 per cent. Turkmenians, 1.4 per cent. Karakalpaks, 9.5 per cent. Russians, 3.7 per cent. other Central Asian nationalities and 1.5 per cent. other nationalities. Bukhara had 47.1 per cent. Uzbeks, 40 per cent. Tadzhiks, 8.5 per cent. Turkmenians, 1.5 per cent. Russians and 2.9 per cent. other nationalities. Khorezm had 64.7 per cent. Uzbeks, 26.8 per cent. Turkmenians, 3.4 per cent. Kazakhs, 3.8 per cent. Karakalpaks, and 1.3 per cent. other nationalities.⁷⁹ 96.6 per cent. of all Kirghiz and 66.5 per cent. of all Uzbeks lived in Turkestan, the Tadzhiks were almost equally divided between Bukhara and Turkestan, while the Turkmenians were split between the three territorial units: 42.2 per cent. lived in Turkestan, 27.9 per cent. in Bukhara and 29.9 per cent. in Khorezm.⁸⁰

In October, 1923, and September, 1924, respectively, Khorezm and Bukhara had been transformed into corresponding Soviet Socialist Republics. These were disbanded along with the Turkestan republic, and by the spring of 1925, 94.2 per cent. of all Turkmenians had been allotted to a Turkmenian Soviet Republic, 82.6 per cent. of all Uzbeks to an Uzbek Soviet Republic, 86.7 per cent. of all Kirghiz to the Kirghiz Autonomous Republic,⁸¹ and 75.2 per cent. of all Tadzhiks to a Tadzhik Autonomous Republic. A Karakalpak Autonomous Region was also established.⁸² The *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* states: 'The work of carrying out national and State delimitation in such a short period proceeded in conditions of a sharp struggle against bourgeois nationalists. Trotskyites and Bukharinites, who sought to obstruct national delimitation.'⁸³

An indication why nationalists opposed the formation of national States and Stalin abandoned his declared preference for autonomy on regional rather than on national lines is to be

⁸⁰ See p. 31.

found in a resolution passed by the First Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, which was attended by M. I. Kalinin, Chairman of the USSR Central Executive Committee. The resolution called for a merciless campaign against Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism.⁸³

The peoples of Central Asia had lived intermingled for centuries. They were united by ties of language and religion; all the Central Asians, except the Tadzhiks, speak local varieties of the same Turkic language group and all were united by the Muslim faith and way of life. The territorial division of Turkestan was carried out to sever these common ties and, on the principle of *divide et impera*, to consolidate the Soviet régime in areas where before 1917 there had been 'hardly a single Communist among the local nationalities'⁸⁴ and where for years after it 'the main burden of revolutionary leadership fell on the Russian workers in Turkestan and on the Russian revolutionary soldiers'.⁸⁵

Indeed Soviet sources acknowledge that in this area:

'The unification of the dispersed peoples and the formation of national republics was only a means for bringing the toiling masses still closer to the organs of power . . . and for organising the people better for the struggle for Communism.'⁸⁶

From this standpoint the Soviet leadership could naturally have no more sympathy for the campaign for a Central Asian Federation conducted by local nationalists in 1924⁸⁷ than it had displayed for the demands advanced by Asian Party members in 1919-1920 for the establishment of a 'Communist Party of Turkic peoples' and of a 'Turkic Republic', demands which were followed by a full scale purge of the Party organisations in Turkestan.⁸⁸

In retrospect the fate of the Young Bukharan movement, which had been used by the Soviet leadership to secure the overthrow of the Emir of Bukhara and had then been eliminated, has been an object lesson on the Soviet attitude to national movements. A volume of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* published in 1959 describes this episode as follows:

'The Young Bukharans' programme envisaged the overthrow of the Emir's régime and the establishment of a democratic republic in Bukhara. The Bukharan Communist Party (BCP), in the interests of rallying all the democratic forces against feudal reaction, formed a bloc with the Young Bukharans on the condition that they recog-

nised the programme of the BCP. After the establishment of the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic (BPSR) the Young Bukharans, in September, 1920, officially merged with the Communists and this led to the choking up of the BCP with bourgeois nationalist elements. The Young Bukharans entered the Government of the BPSR but with the development of the revolution manifested their anti-popular nature and supported the *Basmachestvo*. After the destruction of the main forces of the *Basmachestvo* and the consolidation of the Soviet régime, the Fourth Congress of Soviets of the BPSR (October, 1923) removed the Young Bukharans from power on the grounds of their being bourgeois nationalists. Many Young Bukharans were expelled from the BCP.⁷⁰

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III

The First Years of Soviet Rule (1920-1930)

'Indigenisation'

The first period of Soviet rule over the national minorities was necessarily one of self-consolidation. There were few native Communists in the national republics. In 1922 Russians made up 72 per cent. of the total membership of the RKP,¹ and they comprised a large proportion of the Party membership in the Republics.* In the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the second largest Communist Party, 53·6 per cent. of the members were Russian by nationality, while 79·4 per cent. considered Russian their native language.²

To consolidate Soviet control of the conquered borderlands, an early campaign was launched to 'indigenise' the administrative apparatus and to establish national cadres for local industry. In 1920 Stalin, outlining the policy of the Soviet régime on the national question, stressed the importance of such measures.

'Soviet power is not power divorced from the people; on the contrary it is the only power of its kind, having sprung from the Russian masses and being near and dear to them . . .

'Soviet power must become just as near and dear to the masses of the border regions of Russia. But this requires that it should first of all be comprehensible to them. It is, therefore, necessary that all Soviet organs in the border regions . . . should as far as possible be recruited from the local people acquainted with the

* By January 1965, this proportion had decreased to about 62 per cent., but Slavs still formed a significant proportion of many republican Parties. In 1965, some 44,300 Latvians were Party members and candidate members (throughout the CPSU) while the Latvian Communist Party was 95,742 strong; there were about 484,200 members and candidate members of the five major Central Asian nationalities while the combined membership of their republican Parties was 974,316.³

manner of life, habits, customs and language of the native population; that all the best people from the local masses should be drawn into these institutions; that the local labouring masses should participate in every sphere of administration. . . . Only in this way can the Soviet power become comprehensible and dear to the labouring masses of the border regions.⁴

A year later the Tenth Congress of the RKP passed a resolution to set up a wide network of courses and schools to provide professional and technical training as well as general education in the native languages. These courses were to provide local cadres of qualified workers and Soviet and Party officials for all spheres of management; they were primarily intended for the Kirghiz, Bashkirs, Tadzhiks, Azerbaidzhanis, Turkmenians, Uzbeks, Tatars, and Daghestanis.⁵

Achievements in the first decade were modest. In the Crimean Republic, where the results of indigenisation compared favourably with those achieved in many other autonomous units, of a staff of 107 in the Commissariat of Finance only seven were Tatars in 1930. In the Commissariat of Agriculture, 46 of the 606 employees were Tatars. The position was broadly similar in the other institutions of the central apparatus. In industry itself, 1,806 of the 27,210 workers belonged to the local nationality.⁶

In 1929 Daghestanis accounted for 25.3 per cent. of the employees at the headquarters of the Daghestan Government. This figure subsequently dropped to 20 per cent. in 1936.⁷

In Uzbekistan 22.6 per cent. of the workers in the central apparatus were Uzbeks in 1930. Moreover, in the Commissariat of Agriculture, which dealt exclusively with the indigenous peasantry, 80 per cent. of the correspondence was conducted in Russian.⁸

Bashkirs composed 8.4 per cent. and Tatars 7.9 per cent. of the workers in the State apparatus of the Bashkir Autonomous Republic in 1931. In the Republic's heavy industry 10.5 per cent. of the workers were Bashkirs.⁹

Five years later the position had not radically altered. In 1935 the official journal of the Council of Nationalities reported:

'Among the 398 leading and responsible officials of the District Executive Committees and village Soviets in Kabardino-Balkaria only 206 are indigenous. Of the 1,122 village Soviet Chairmen in the Bashkir Republic only 340 are Bashkirs; of the 51 chairmen of District Executive Committees only 20; only 24 District Execu-

tive Committees have Bashkir secretaries; the rest have Russian. . . . In the Chuvash Republic of 2,232 officials of District Executive Committees and village Soviets 1,746 are indigenous. In the Adygei Regional Executive Committee, of the 40 Adygeis only 16 can write in their native language. In the Regional Executive Committee and Party Regional Committee only Russian is spoken, and even in some district organisations the Adygei language is avoided. In the apparatus of the Chechen-Ingush Regional Executive Committee there are officials who know neither the Chechen nor the Ingush language. The secretary of the Balkar village Soviet in the Chechen-Ingush region accepts applications from the local population only in the Russian language.¹⁰

There is evidence to suggest that many nationals regarded this 'nationalisation' of the apparatus as an inadequate substitute for genuine self-rule. A case reported in 1930 was that of an Uzbek who, in a note handed to Ikramov, First Party Secretary in Uzbekistan, asserted at a meeting of the Samarkand Party *aktiv*:

'Our Uzbekisation proceeds in such a way that Uzbeks sit at the head of the institutions, and Uzbeks are the coachmen: some are riding, some are driving, but the work is directed by the Russians. Is this really Uzbekisation? Is this not colonisation by the Russians?'¹¹

This drive to increase native participation in the Soviet system was reflected in the reorganisation of the Red Army at the end of the Civil War. In November, 1924, a plenary session of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR worked out a plan for national formations. This was approved in May, 1925, by the Third Congress of Soviets, and was carried out promptly in respect of the nationalities which had been subject to military service in Tsarist Russia (the Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Transcaucasians). National divisions, regiments, and other sub-divisions were formed. Less progress was made with the other nationalities, because of lack of commanding personnel of the same origin.¹²

By 1934 national formations in the Red Army included 10 Ukrainian, three Byelorussian and four Transcaucasian (two Georgian, one Armenian, and one Azerbaidzhani) divisions. Apart from these there were national formations in the Volga area, the North Caucasus and the Central Asian districts, as well as within the territory of the Far Eastern Army.¹³

In 1939, however, Voroshilov, People's Commissar of

Defence, announced that the national formations had been disbanded. At the XVIII Party Congress he declared:

'The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is the sole army of the Soviet State on a common and equal basis. For this reason the existence of separate small national military formations, permanently tied to their own territory, contradicted the fundamentals of the Stalin Constitution and the principles of the extra-territorial recruitment of our Army. The national units have been merged in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on a common basis.'¹⁴

'Great Russian Chauvinism'

In addition to the campaign for the indigenisation of the apparatus in the national republics and regions, attempts were made to curb Great Russian chauvinism, that is any form of racial discrimination practised by Russians against members of other nationalities. In 1921 the Tenth Congress of the RKP passed a resolution in which it was stated:

'The Congress calls to mind that without overcoming colonising and nationalist survivals in the Party ranks it is impossible to create in the borderlands strong and truly Communist organisations connected with the masses, organisations which rally in their ranks the proletarian elements of the local and Russian populations on the basis of internationalism. For this reason the Congress considers that the liquidation of nationalist, and in the first place, of colonising waverings in Communism constitutes one of the most important tasks of the Party in the borderlands.'¹⁵

Stalin in his report on national factors in Party and State affairs to the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 described Great Russian chauvinism as the 'principal force impeding the merging of the republics into a single union.'¹⁶ Without Great Russian chauvinism, which was strong because it had been strong previously and had retained the habit of oppressing and humiliating, local chauvinism would exist only in a much attenuated form, because in the final analysis anti-Russian nationalism was only an ugly form of defence against Great Russian chauvinism.¹⁷ Finally, Stalin emphasised that the combating of this evil was, for good reasons, the concern exclusively of the Russian Communists.

'When it is said that the fight against Great Russian chauvinism must be made the cornerstone of the national question, the intention is to indicate the duties of the Russian Communist; it implies it is the duty of the Russian Communist himself to combat Russian

chauvinism. If the struggle against Russian chauvinism were undertaken not by the Russian but by the Turkestani or Georgian Communists, it would be interpreted as anti-Russian chauvinism.’¹⁸

The extent of the discrimination practised by Russians against the minority nationalities was illustrated in an article published by the journal of the Council of Nationalities in 1930. This stated:

‘Now and again from behind the high-flown declarations on “internationalism”, the “struggle for culture and progress” and so forth, the ass’s ears of the Great Russian chauvinist peep out. Take the teachers of Polotsk (Byelorussia), who are unwilling to conduct lessons in school in the Byelorussian language under the pretext that “knowledge of the Byelorussian language dooms the pupils to ignorance”. Take the “internationalists” of Baltin (Moldavia), who are declaiming against switching the work in the institutions of the Autonomous Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic to the Moldavian language on the ground that it will lead us to the severance of Moldavia from the USSR and arrest cultural progress. Take the school official Kryukov in Buryat-Mongolia, who tells the children that it would be “good if there were no Buryats in the world”. Take the Communist cell of the Simferopol City Department for Education, which listens to melancholy theories to the effect that “it is necessary to abolish the Jewish adult schools for literacy” and that “in the Tatar schools at least 30 per cent of the teaching must be switched to the Russian language” . . .

‘But the intensification of Great Russian chauvinism is noticeable not only in the sphere of cultural development. Great Russian chauvinism is in evidence in a still more active form in other fields of our work in the National Republics and Regions. Here are a few examples illustrating this.

‘The Assistant Public Prosecutor of Kzyl-Arvat (Turkmenistan), Telyatnikov, wrote the following profound resolution on the case of the Russian foreman, who had indulged in gibes at the expense of Turkmenian workers: “In the conditions of the National Republics, chauvinism can only be displayed on the part of the indigenous nationality”. Timber-floating managers in the districts of Buryat-Mongolia set lower wage rates for Buryat timber-floaters. In the Sevastopol naval yards the following, to put it mildly, “peculiar” justification for the non-fulfilment of the industrial finance plan is in favour: “How can one hope to fulfil the industrial finance plan when Tatars have been put in to work the lathes?” In the northern districts of Kazakhstan, especially on the Turksib railway, Kazakh workers meet with an extremely unfriendly reception on the “grounds” that “one has to do their work for them”. On the Turksib

railway, too, Kazakh workers are not infrequently assigned the worst accommodation. In the Kazan fur factory the senior staff sought to discredit and baited the only Tatar woman engineer, but for a long time the Party cell "did not notice" it. In the First of May Workshops (Tashkent) with the tacit consent of the Party cell, specially prolonged delays were introduced for the admission of Uzbek workers into the trade union. In Tashkent, too, in the Ilyich factory, the wage rates for Uzbek workers are lower than for Russian workers of identical skill. We shall not cite examples of the forays in which people of the Black Hundred* type beat up and bait indigenous workers . . .¹⁹

Attacks on Great Russian chauvinism became progressively fewer in the 1930s. Stalin in 1934 declared that the question whether Great Russian chauvinism or local nationalism represented the greater danger was purely academic.²⁰ In 1952 Beriia claimed at the XIX Party Congress that Great Russian chauvinism had been finally overcome.²¹ Some degree of discrimination, however, would seem to persist.

In July, 1965, Prime Minister Kosygin admonished:

'For our society, nationalistic survivals in any form—be they manifestations of nationalism, great-power chauvinism, racialism or antisemitism—are undoubtedly alien manifestations, contradicting our world outlook.'²²

His comments were echoed in a *Pravda* editorial two months later.²³

The Treatment of National Culture

In the cultural sphere the native intelligentsia was at first granted considerable freedom of expression. In view of the extreme shortage of native intellectuals it was judged 'unwise and harmful to alienate the all-too-few groups of native intellectuals, who perhaps would like to serve the masses but are unable to do so, perhaps because, not being Communists, they believe themselves to be surrounded by an atmosphere of mistrust and are afraid of possible repressive measures'.²⁴ Characteristic of this period was the return to the USSR in

* The Black Hundreds were extreme monarchist vigilante organisations, which, with the tacit approval of the Tsarist authorities, instigated *pogroms* against elements suspected of anti-Tsarist sympathies, i.e. students, revolutionaries, Jews, Poles, and Finns. These organisations were particularly active in 1905 at the time of the First Russian Revolution, and in the years 1908–1912.

1924 of Hrushevsky, a former chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada, to take over direction of the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.

The freedom granted to native writers in the Asian Republics is shown by the fact that, until 1956, of all the Uzbek writers of the 1920s only the works of Khamsa were still in print. This was admitted by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in October, 1956. Conceding that censorship had perhaps been too severe, he proposed to 'entrust a group of competent comrades with the studying of the Uzbek literature of that period, with looking into the cases of certain suppressed writers and poets, and ascertaining the correctness of the withdrawal of certain literary works of that period'. Writers and poets, who in their works had committed errors and tolerated shortcomings but who had no hostile intention and had not committed anti-State actions, should be rehabilitated and their most valuable works republished.²⁵

Among the masses in the national areas attempts were made to improve the rate of literacy and to introduce Communist forms of cultural organisation. In 1929 a Soviet ethnographer described the establishment of a cultural organisation for native peoples in North Russia:

'We celebrated the tenth anniversary of October by inaugurating the House of the Native. After the official part of the celebrations the Tungusi were treated to food and drink. They had been invited beforehand and told there would be refreshments. All those living nearby, about 30 people, turned up right on time. We treated them to food and drink in the same way as ourselves. The Tungusi were very pleased and when we commemorated the death of V. I. Lenin on January 2, a considerable number of them, to our astonishment, attended on the first evening. That evening passed off without refreshments and the natives were terribly grieved; not one of them returned for the second day. It became clear afterwards that they love celebrations with refreshments.'²⁶

The same year it was reported from Azerbaidzhan that 'transfers of mosques for cultural purposes have occurred not only in places where the public cultural and educational work is well organised, but also in the most backward villages, where the influence of the *mullahs* is still strong. Mosques in the Zakataly *uyezd* (district), the Khillia subdivision of the Salyan *uyezd* (15 in the latter) and the Geokchai *uyezd*, the huge Dzhume mosque in Salyany, and the mosques in Agdash,

Diially, and Geokchai, have been handed over for schools, clubs, cinemas, Red Corners, and reading huts.²⁷

In the Eastern republics attempts were made to destroy the power of tribal chieftains and religious leaders and to substitute class divisions for tribal and clan loyalties. In the carrying out of the land and water reform the property of the *beys* and *mullahs* was expropriated and divided among the poor peasantry, who were organised in special unions. Serious difficulties were encountered. The beys, as the traditional leaders of the tribesmen, 'not content with dominating the Soviets and co-operatives, had in some places also seized control of the Party organisations.'²⁸ Local nationals, even after joining the Communist Party, continued to feel ties of kinship with these officially discredited traditional leaders. An example of this was cited in 1929:

'[Balpekov], the holy man (*ishan*), as a member of the clergy exploiting the religious prejudices of the Kazakh population, committed fraudulent acts designed to rouse superstitions and to make propaganda aimed at undermining the Soviet State, restoring the monarchical régime and so forth... Can it be that Communists should intercede on behalf of that bey? Yet there were some such petitions and not from individuals but from entire cells; one from the *Komsomol*, and one from the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)]. The petitioners in their documents, signed by 34 Communists and *Komsomol* members, stated that the bey was a good man, a completely loyal Soviet citizen and so on.'²⁹

This hindered work in raising the class-consciousness of the Asian peasant. In 1929, the complaint was made that:

'In Kazakhstan the Koschi Union, as an organisation of the indigenous village poor, is strongly infested with alien social elements. With a membership after the reorganisation and purge of 1927 of about 200,000, it consists of 46 per cent. farm labourers and village poor, 34 per cent. of medium farmers and 20 per cent. of the well-to-do and beys. As a result the union has been transformed from a class organisation of the village poor into a national peasant organisation.'³⁰

Tribal loyalties proved tenacious. In 1949 the First Party Secretary of Kazakhstan, Shayakhmetov, while denouncing the survival of the tribal spirit within the Party, quoted the case of a Party Committee in which all key positions were held by members of the same clan, who, besides being Party members, were representatives of the ancient nomad aristocracy.³¹ In

January, 1959, one of the charges levelled against the former Turkmenian First Party Secretary who had been dismissed the previous month was that he had 'selected people [for advancement] . . . on the basis of their coming from the same locality'.³²

In 1963, the Kirghiz First Party Secretary condemned those who sought to revive clan divisions and the 'backward elements' who favoured representatives of one area or nationality to those of another in selecting and placing cadres.³³ At the Tadzhik Party Congress in 1966, the First Secretary, Rasulov, referred to the

'Conversations behind the scenes, particularly when proposing people for leading jobs, the artificial geographical dividing up of cadres, the absurd demands "for one's own district", "for one's own *kishlak* [village]" and many other manifestations of localism [which] do great harm to the cause of Communist construction. However these monstrous occurrences are not always given a suitable rebuff.'³⁴

Nationalist Counteraction

This first period of Soviet rule was marked by the last major revolt by anti-Communist elements in the national republics and the first arrest of a national Communist leader.

The revolt broke out in Georgia on August 27, 1924. It was led by Mensheviks and was centred on the rural areas of Western Georgia and the Chiaturi manganese mines. Within a few days it had been crushed by the Red Army with some 3,000 casualties. A British trade union delegation which toured the Caucasus shortly afterwards, and the report of which was largely non-critical, remarked: 'The insurrection probably had the sympathy of a majority of Georgians and would have had their support had it succeeded. But it never had any chance of success.'³⁵

The arrested national Communist leader was the Tatar Sultan Galiev, who had been a member of the Praesidium of the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs. In this capacity he had examined conditions in the Crimea and had conferred with important Muslim Communists from the borderland areas. As early as 1919 he had expressed doubts whether the world-wide class struggle, which the Russian Revolution had unleashed, would improve the lot of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of the East.³⁶

In 1923 he was arrested, and at a special conference of representatives of minorities was accused by Stalin of collaboration with the Basmachi guerilla movement* in Turkestan. According to Stalin, Sultan Galiev 'fully confessed his guilt and, having confessed, repented.'³⁹ He was expelled from the Party. Six years later he was rearrested⁴⁰ during a campaign against Pan-Turkism in the Tatar Autonomous Republic, and was imprisoned.

Although nothing further has become known of the subsequent personal fate of Galiev, frequent attacks on his ideas were published in the early thirties. It was asserted that he had proclaimed that the 'formula, which offers the replacement of the world-wide dictatorship of one class of European society (the bourgeoisie) by its antipode (the proletariat), *i.e.* by another of its classes, will not bring about a major change in the social life of the oppressed section of humanity. At any rate, such a change, even if it were to occur, would not be for the better but for the worse . . . in contradistinction to this we advanced another proposition: the conception that the material premises for a social transformation of humanity can be created only through the establishment of the dictatorship of the colonies and semi-colonies over the metropolitan countries.'⁴¹

It was also stated that Sultan Galiev had demanded the creation of a Colonial International, which would unite all the victims of colonial exploitation, and the establishment of a Soviet Turanian Republic, which would unite the Turkic peoples of Tataria, Bashkiria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia.⁴²

* The *Basmachestvo* was originally a bandit organisation which conducted raids on large settlements and caravans in Central Asia. It had operated in strength from the middle of the nineteenth century. After the overthrow of the Kokand Government in 1918, it became an anti-Soviet national resistance movement, an 'almost mass movement of the *dekhan* [peasant farmer] population in all the three republics of Central Asia—Bukhara, Turkestan, and Khorezm.'³⁷ By 1923 the main Basmachi forces had been destroyed but their activities were intensified during the forced collectivisation of agriculture in the early Thirties when they destroyed collective farms and attempted to assassinate the Latvian head of the Party Central Committee's Central Asian Buro.³⁸

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IV

The Creation of Soviet Nations

Originally the Communists had believed that the October Revolution would be followed shortly by a series of proletarian revolutions in other countries. In 1918 Lenin, at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, declared:

'Whereas in 1905 the October strike, these first steps of the victorious revolution, projected itself forthwith into Western Europe and gave rise then, in 1905, to the Austrian workers' movement—whereas already at that stage we saw in practice what the example of revolution, the action of the workers in one country was worth, now we see the Socialist revolution maturing in all the countries of the world not by the day but by the hour.'¹

Such revolutions did not materialise and the Soviet Union was completely isolated in its initial stages of development. The greatest possible integration within the Soviet State was therefore of first importance. This was particularly the case after 1928, when Stalin's plans for forced industrialisation and the compulsory collectivisation of agriculture were launched.

Stalin was well aware of the disintegrating forces at work in large political systems. In 1913 he had stressed the instability of empires lacking the integrating cement of nationality,² and years later, in 1950, he re-emphasised this point when he referred to the empires of Cyrus and Alexander, Caesar and Charlemagne, as 'temporary and unstable military and administrative combinations', 'conglomerates of tribes and peoples', lacking economic unity and a 'language understood by all members of the empire.'³

Russian Marxists had consistently held that nations were institutions peculiar to the rise of capitalism. Other forms of association had existed in feudal times but these could in no way be termed nations. In 1913 Stalin wrote that a nation 'is not merely a historical category but a historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism.'⁴ Faced with the need to provide for the stability of the Soviet

State, Stalin in 1929 introduced the concept of 'Socialist nations'. In an essay, *Leninism and the National Question* (first published in 1949), he stated that these new Socialist nations had developed and taken shape on the basis of the old bourgeois nations after the overthrow of capitalism in Russia and the elimination of the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties. They were cemented and led by the working class and its internationalist party; they differed from the corresponding old bourgeois nations both in class composition and spiritual complexion and in social and political interests and aspirations.^{5*}

Although in his essay Stalin spoke of the Socialist nations as having already developed, in fact it was only in the early 'thirties that this process began in earnest. From then on the Soviet rulers consistently attempted to remould the group consciousness and the group memory of the non-Russian nationalities so as to integrate them more fully in the central Soviet State. In the building of the 'Soviet family of peoples' both assimilative and disruptive measures have been used.

POSITIVE (ASSIMILATIVE) MEASURES

The Socialist alignment of Culture

'In the USSR . . . the ever-increasing merging of national cultures is taking place and a single socialist nation is being forged.'⁸

M. I. Kalinin, the titular head of the Soviet State, declared in 1929 that the aim of Soviet policy was 'to teach the people of the Kirghiz steppe, the small Uzbek cotton grower and the Turkmenian gardener to accept the ideals of the Leningrad worker.'⁹

The following year Stalin formulated the lines of development for the cultures of the new Socialist nations. Many Russian Communists, following Lenin's dictum that 'only the

* The problems such theoretical definitions cause have been demonstrated in recent years. For instance, there has been controversy over whether the Moldavian socialist nation bypassed the stage of a bourgeois nation or not.⁶ An ethnographer has stated that although his colleagues have written about a thousand encyclopaedia articles about the various peoples of the world 'they are incapable of defining which of these peoples is a nation and which is a *narodnost*' (i.e. a socio-political group which precedes the formation of a nation).⁷

clericals and bourgeoisie can talk of national culture in general,'¹⁰ had advocated the establishment of a single international culture for all the nationalities in the Soviet Union. At the XVI Party Congress Stalin dismissed these views as chauvinistic, and asserted that Lenin had qualified the slogan of national culture as reactionary only under the rule of the bourgeoisie. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, national culture was to be Socialist in content and national in form, having as its object the education of the masses in the spirit of Socialism and internationalism.¹¹ This formula was in line with Lenin's teaching on the problem of national schools, for here also the nationalities were to be permitted to use their native languages to give effect to a prescribed content. That the cultivation of national culture is conceived principally in terms of the use of native languages is confirmed by Soviet sources. 'The present Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and other cultures are Socialist in content and national in form, *i.e.* in language.'¹² 'The sense and significance of the national form of culture lies in the specific characteristics of the national languages.'¹³ In April, 1957, the then First Party Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, re-emphasised this theme:

'The national form of culture, being in close contact with the Socialist content, helps the Party to bring up the people in the spirit of Communism. It is necessary particularly to stress this, for without a Socialist content the national form of culture can be used as a mask for bourgeois nationalism.'¹⁴

The XVI Party Congress marked the end of the period of relative cultural tolerance. In December, 1930, Stalin attacked the Ukrainian poet Demyan Bedny, for implying that 'laziness' and a desire to 'lie down on the oven couch' were well nigh national traits of the Russians. This, said Stalin, was '*slander of our people, a discrediting of the USSR, a discrediting of the proletariat of the USSR, a discrediting of the Russian proletariat.*'¹⁵ In the early 'thirties the historical section of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was disbanded, Hrushevsky was exiled from the Ukraine to Russia, and national literary organisations which opposed direction of their culture by the Soviet Communist Party were 'unmasked and liquidated.' These included the Bashkir organisations the *Usyu* and the *Dzhidegen*¹⁶ and the Tatar *Diidigyan*.¹⁷

By 1933 it was recognised that:

'In Tataria, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Byelorussia the possibility is now excluded of making use of the entire national intelligentsia. Indeed, the Socialist advance will develop there in spite of and against a definite nationalist section of the national intelligentsia, which has gone over or is going over to the side of the class enemy.'¹⁸

In 1932-1934 the Party's control over the development of local national cultures was strengthened. By a decree of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, dated April 23, 1932, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) and its affiliated but partly autonomous non-Russian associations were abolished. In 1934 all Soviet writers were put under the control of a single Moscow-directed Union of Soviet Writers. From this time onward the non-Russian cultures 'developed in a struggle to master the method of Socialist realism.'¹⁹

Characteristic of the attempts made in the 'thirties to inculcate a Socialist content into the local national cultures were the much published works of the Daghestan poet Suleiman Stalsky, and the Kazakh *akyn* (bard improviser) Dzhabbul Dzhabaev. Stalsky was an illiterate in a Caucasian mountain village. His poems were taken down as he recited them. Maxim Gorky described him as a 'Homer of the Twentieth Century.'²⁰ Dzhabaev, who had devoted his first improvised songs to the wide pastures of Kazakhstan and the lives of the nomadic cattle breeders, was assisted in his later works by a Kazakh Communist, Kapan Satybaldin, as literary secretary and by a Russian, Pavel Kuznetsov, as translator.²¹ Both these poets during the 1930s composed a succession of works devoted to Soviet propaganda themes. These included the collectivisation of agriculture, the five-year plans, the Stakhanovite movement, the adoption of the Soviet constitution, and attacks on 'bourgeois nationalists and *kulaks* (rich peasants).

Stalin's formula about national cultures still applies, and works glorifying 'the new life of the peoples'²² as well as those which paint a black picture of their pasts continue to flow from the presses. Non-Russians are also expected to produce works on standard propaganda themes. It has been conceded, for instance, that a work by the Lithuanian Lenin prizewinner,

E. Mezhelaitis, dedicated to the struggle of the peoples of Latin America, was not distinguished

'by any specific Lithuanian features. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it will enter the golden treasury of Lithuanian national Soviet poetry.'²³

The Soviet régime, in addition to socialising the content of the non-Russian cultures, has sought to eradicate the expression of nationalist sentiment and to emphasise the cultural hegemony of the Great Russian people. This campaign against 'bourgeois nationalism' in culture was intensified after the Second World War, during which considerable concessions had been made in the interests of national unity. In 1946 Maxim Rylsky, Chairman of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers, was dismissed. He was accused of being a 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. With Rylsky the Ukrainian writers I. Senchemko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch were accused of nationalism and reactionary tendencies.²⁴ Attacks on leading writers in other national republics followed. Among them were the Bashkir writers Kadir Diyan, Zh. Kiekbaev, and Idelbaev and the Armenian writers N. Zaryan, D. Demirghyan, O. Shiraz and Ishkakov.²⁵

In 1951 the Leningrad literary journal *Zvezda* published in translation a poem *Love the Ukraine* by the Ukrainian poet Sosyura. The poem had originally been published in 1944. In July *Pravda* attacked Sosyura for singing the praises not of the new Soviet Ukraine but of a Ukraine outside time. The poem included the lines:

'Love the Ukraine like sun and light
'Like wind, grass and water.
'Love the vast sweep of Ukraine immemorial,
'Be proud of your Ukraine.
'Of her new and eternally living beauty
'And of her nightingale voice.'²⁶

Zvezda was censured for publishing it and the Russian poet A. Prokofiev for translating it. Public apologies were subsequently made by the poet and the translator.²⁷ Apologies were also made by the organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine and by the Chairman of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers. *Pravda Ukrainy* complained that Sosyura

'in his poem represented the Ukraine as standing alone, outside all

contact with the Great Russian people and the other peoples of the Soviet Union. He passed over in complete silence the fact that thanks only to Leninist-Stalinist friendship, to the daily help of the Soviet peoples and, above all, of the beloved elder brother, the Great Russian people, did the Ukrainian people achieve their social and national liberation.²⁸

Sosyura was further attacked in that

'while praising a certain "exclusiveness" of the Ukrainian language, he considered it possible not even to mention the Russian language, which is to every Ukrainian as native at Ukrainian itself.'²⁹

Korneichuk's (Rylsky's successor) attacked Sosyura for still being prey to bourgeois nationalist sentiments, and further deplored the fact that a Ukrainian philologist had so lost all sense of measure as to maintain that in his experiments with language the Ukrainian poet Malyshko was the superior of the Russian poet Mayakovsky.³⁰

In 1952 the Turkmenian poet K. Kubansakhatov was criticised for his poem *Thou art a Turkmenian*, on the grounds that he had 'glossed over the historical fact that only annexation by Russia had saved the Turkmenian people from age-long slavery and complete ruin, and that thanks only to the October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet régime were the Turkmenian people able to begin a new life and to achieve great success in economic and cultural development.'³¹

A biography of the poet T. E. Shevchenko was also attacked in 1952 because the author 'mainly says that Taras Shevchenko's views coincided with the views of the Great Russian revolutionary democrats Belinsky, Herzen, and Chernyshevsky, but does not say that it was specifically under their influence that the revolutionary-democratic world outlook of the great Ukrainian poet was formed'.³²

On the principle that 'in our country the only sort of work of art which has the right to exist is that which promotes the growth of the people's Communist consciousness and the strengthening of the Soviet State and social order',³³ the campaign against national elements in the context of the non-Russian cultures was also directed against the cultural heritage of the Asian nations.

From 1948-1953 the Mongol national epic *Geser* was attacked as a symbol of feudalism, Pan-Mongolism and religious prejudice. The mythical Geser, it was stated, was none other

than Genghis Khan and a Genghis Khan cult in disguise could not be tolerated.³⁴ These views, according to the *Short Literary Encyclopaedia* published several years later, were held by 'certain Buryat writers and folklorists' themselves but 'rejected by scholars'.³⁵ In 1966 it was claimed that:

'Only now has the necessary profundity and thoroughness in solving the problems which arise from reading *Geser* become possible.'³⁶

In 1951, the Azerbaidzhani epic *Dede Korkut* was condemned as being harmful and alien to the Azerbaidzhani people. Its condemnation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan meant that a great work of Turkic folk poetry was withdrawn from circulation. *Pravda*, approving the suspension of *Dede Korkut*, declared: The 'intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Azerbaidzhan helped to unmask the reactionary essence of *Dede Korkut*, which serves as an instrument for Pan-Turkic and bourgeois nationalist propaganda.'³⁷

In August, 1951, the Communist Party of Turkmenia denounced their local national epic, *Korkut Ata*, as a work of religious fanaticism. (Once again, an encyclopaedia article written several years later suggested that it was 'literary scholars' who were guilty of an error of judgment.³⁸) The Kazakh epic *Koblandy-Batyr* was put on the Soviet index in October, and in 1952 the same thing happened to the Uzbek epic *Alpamysh*. The only national epic not to be suspended was the Kirghiz *Manas*. Here, as the result of strong opposition from the Kirghiz intelligentsia, it was decided to produce a new expurgated edition of *Manas* from which all 'reactionary' passages would be removed.³⁹ In March, 1956, it was stated that the re-editing of *Manas* had in the main been concluded. However, in places the idealisation of the feudal past still seeped through.⁴⁰ This process was completed in 1959 when the first volumes of a compromise variant of *Manas* were published.⁴¹

In the latter half of 1956 it became evident that the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party had decided to pursue a more liberal policy towards the cultural heritage of the Asian republics, and to republish certain works suppressed for their 'bourgeois-nationalist' content. This change in approach was heralded by an article under the title 'Forgotten Riches', published in the organ of the Union of Soviet Writers in June. Here

it was stated that there had in the past been considerable discrimination in the evaluation of the cultural heritage of the Central Asian nationalities. Certain unspecified 'nihilist vulgarisers' had condemned epic after epic, *akyn* after *akyn*, calling them anti-popular, reactionary bourgeois-Nationalist and ideologically corrupt, without foundation. 'Thus the wonderful Uzbek epic *Alpamysh* was suddenly called anti-popular, and the Azerbaidzhani epic *Kitab Dede Korkut*, the Turkmenian *Korkut-Ata* and the Buryat-Mongol epic *Geser* were categorically rejected. . . . [Afterwards] if the unjustly defamed works of national literature were mentioned at all, they were labelled with abusive "epithets" as a result of which they began to be dropped from the living cultural treasury and to be forgotten.' The USSR Academy of Sciences had recently restored the Buryat-Mongol epic *Geser* to its legitimate status and the works of the poet Berdakh, who had until recently been considered reactionary, had been restored to Kara-Kalpak literature.⁴²

However, subsequent developments were to show that despite the rehabilitation of a number of previously banned poets and writers this re-evaluation had been conceived within closely defined limits and also was to be entirely selective. For example, in 1959 the Kazakh literary scholars A. Konratbaev, K. Suyunshaliev and I. Zharylgapov were severely criticised for trying 'to represent the works of the reactionary poets of the past, Shortanbai Kanaev, Dulat Babataev and Mashur-Zhusup Kopeev as being progressive and national'. They were reminded that 'there is absolutely nothing Marxist about an approach to the legacy of the past which includes various anti-national works of literature and art among cultural treasures on the grounds of their supposed aesthetic value'.⁴³

In 1960 a number of Kirghiz literary scholars and workers were censured for playing down the importance of the 'democratic bards' who had welcomed the October Revolution, and for pressing for the republication of the works of such 'reactionary poets' as Moldo Kylych and K. Tynystanov. The latter had even been declared by a lecturer at the Kirghiz State University to have been the founder of Kirghiz Soviet literature. These people had wrongly 'interpreted the civil rehabilitation of K. Tynystanov as an amnesty for his nationalist views'.⁴⁴ It was subsequently stated:

'It is well known that the main literary works of these poets were filled with anti-Russian and anti-popular ideas. Therefore the popularisation of their works would do great harm to the education of the toilers in the spirit of socialist internationalism and the friendship of peoples.'⁴⁵

In 1961 it was revealed that as a result of the removal of 'aggressive tendencies and elements of militant Islamism' from the Kirghiz epic *Manas* only 40,000–45,000 of the original 465,000 lines had been retained in the new authorised version. A Kirghiz teacher who had protested against the omission of certain episodes was told that these were 'not harmless stories of giants and magicians but stories saturated with the spirit of Pan-Islamism which is hostile to us.'⁴⁶

In the other Soviet republics also, while a number of writers, including Sosyura and Maxim Rylsky have won their way back into official favour, similar standards have been set. In the Ukraine itself, a Secretary of the Lvov *obkom* revealed in December, 1965, that writers had been criticised for regarding Ukrainian literature as a 'single stream', i.e. irrespective of socio-political changes. Individual men of letters had given 'excessive praise to certain writers of the past'.⁴⁷ A few months previously, a local Party journal had mentioned the 'belchings-forth of debilitated nationalism' which sometimes penetrated into works of literature.⁴⁸ Reports reached the West in 1966 of many arrests among the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

In Armenia, the same complaints have been voiced regularly through the years.⁴⁹ In 1966, for instance, the Secretary of the board of the Armenian Union of Writers said:

'One of the important questions in our ideological work is the profound . . . elucidation of . . . Soviet patriotism which decisively repudiates any manifestation of national narrow-mindedness. Comrade Kochinyan [the First Party Secretary] was quite right when he spoke of the dangerous errors in the nationalities question made by individual, politically immature, young people—I would add by individual poets. There are people who bemoan the past of the Armenian people day and night, reciting names dear to us and trying to convince naïve people that they are fulfilling a patriotic deed. This is not patriotism but unworthy speculation with the ideas of patriotism.'⁵⁰

In Moldavia, sensitivity towards anti-Russian sentiments has become particularly acute since clear Rumanian hints at the illegality of the Soviet title to Bessarabia, most of which now

constitutes the Moldavian SSR.* (The way had been cleared for the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia by the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet pact.⁵¹) For instance, at the end of 1965, the First Party Secretary of Moldavia declared—after stating that ‘nationalist prejudices’ had ‘become stronger in recent times’:

‘Quite a few literary works have appeared here from which . . . it is difficult to understand what period they reflect, the interests of which society they serve . . . Some writers somehow speak ashamedly of . . . the life of the Soviet people.’⁵²

Literature is of course not the only field where such tensions are felt. For example, workers in the Kazakh film industry were rebuked in 1966 for views which had a bearing on various art forms:

‘The assertion that, inasmuch as the cinema of Kazakhstan was a national art, everything in it should be Kazakh, has evoked serious protest. By the word ‘Kazakh’ here was meant, in the main, everything that had already become obsolete and that was not characteristic of the Kazakh socialist nation. The influence of Kazakh folklore, literature and music was regarded as being more beneficial than the influence of the contemporary, professionally-created literature and art of the peoples of our country. Certain “critics” have even maintained on these grounds that Kazakhstan’s cinema has, allegedly, not yet become a national one.’⁵³

There is evidence of continued preference for native, as opposed to European, music in Central Asia.⁵⁴

In 1962, Kalpin, the Latvian Minister of Culture, was dismissed⁵⁵ after criticism that he had not deserved the leniency shown towards his previous ‘political mistakes of a nationalist character’.⁵⁶

The Socialist Reconstruction of the non-Russian Language

‘The unflinching implementation of the Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy has ensured among us in the Soviet Union the development of national languages and their reconstruction in the spirit of Socialism.’⁵⁷

From the time of the original RSDRP programme on the national question, the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party

* The first major step was the publication by the Rumanian Academy of Sciences, towards the end of 1964, of Marx’s manuscript *Observations on the Rumanians* containing unflattering references to Tsarist Russian rule in Bessarabia and questioning its legality.

had attached considerable significance to the psychological factor in the use by the national minorities of their native languages. In the course of Socialist construction and the integration of the Socialist nations into the Soviet State, far-reaching reforms were introduced into these languages to reduce elements they shared in common with other language groups, such as Turkic, or with other individual languages, such as Rumanian, Polish, or German, and also to bring these languages closer to Russian. Measures employed included the introduction, through the Party-controlled communications media, of a large number of Russian loan words and, in the case of the Asian languages, extensive reforms in orthography and syntax.

Describing the part played in these reforms by Russian loan words, the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* stated in 1947: 'The development and enrichment of the vocabulary, and the increase in the number of words assimilated by the languages of the peoples of the USSR from the Russian language and through the Russian language, increase the general store of words of these languages and facilitate the still greater rapprochement of the cultures and languages of the peoples of the USSR with Russian culture and the Russian language.'⁵⁸

Prominent among the areas where this enforced process may be observed today is Moldavia, where efforts are made to prove the existence of a 'Moldavian language which, as distinct from other Romance languages [*i.e.* Rumanian], has evolved and continues to evolve in continual, very close contact with the Russian and Ukrainian languages'.⁵⁹ In 1966, a review of a new 'orthographic dictionary' welcomed the fact it included

'... many words of a socio-political nature which ... reflect the daily activity of our Communist Party in the cause of the ideological education of the masses and in directing the building of a Communist society in our country: *azhitator*, ... *ideolog*, ... *international*, *demokratsie*, *Leninizm*, ... *sochializm* etc.' [N.B. These words are transliterated from the Cyrillic alphabet in which 'Moldavian'—unlike Rumanian—is written.]

On the other hand, the reviewer regretted the inclusion of words tinged with archaism and dialect, and the fact that the compilers

'were not completely consistent. For instance, religious vocabulary occupies a not unprominent place in the work ...'.⁶⁰

These innovations in their native languages have been represented by many in the non-Russian republics. This is evident from Soviet sources. In Byelorussia, for example

'bourgeois nationalists demanded the replacement of the international words *internatsional*, *biblioteka*, *opponent*, *gorizont* by such artificial parochial words as *mezhnarodnya*, *knigarnya*, *supyarechnik*, *pozem*, etc., and they tried to replace such terms as *proletariat*, *bednyak*, *sotssorevnovanie*, *sovretnuyushchiysya* that have a precise social sense and an accurate class sense by the bourgeois-nationalist forms *galota*, *zlyden*, *idti na vyperadki*, *vyperednik*, etc.* . . .

'Bourgeois nationalists sought to take their orientation from foreign languages, denigrating in every way the significance of the Russian language. Byelorussian and Ukrainian nationalists littered their native languages with aristocratic elements from Polish; Moldavian nationalists sought to drag into their language *salon* and aristocratic elements of Rumanian; Latvian nationalists, taking their cue from the German nobility, sought to Germanise their language. . . .

'Bourgeois nationalists artificially propagated words and forms so as to prevent Russian words and forms from penetrating their national languages. . . . Thus, for example, Byelorussian nationalists, seeking artificially to widen the differences between the Byelorussian and the Russian language, legitimised the narrow dialect form of the prepositional case in the plural *na stolokh* ["on the tables"] in the place of the widely used *na stolakh* [the Russian form].⁶¹

The reconstruction of the native languages of the Asian peoples in the USSR began in the late 'twenties and early 'thirties, when Latin alphabets were introduced for all nationalities which had previously used Arabic scripts.⁶² The purpose of this reform was two-fold. First it was maintained that the simpler Latin alphabet would aid the drive against illiteracy. Second, it was considered a means for combating the influence of Islam in that the Arabic alphabet 'was the alphabet of the Muslim religion and one of the instruments of the enslavement of the masses through the medium of the priesthood.'⁶³

Latinisation was fiercely resisted by the Asian peoples. The journal of the Council of Nationalities, describing opposition to the Latin script, declared in 1930:

'The practical application of the new latinised alphabet and its substitution for the Arabic alphabet in all the National Republics and Regions of the Soviet Union, from the Caucasus, Azerbaidzhan,

* The meanings of the quoted Russian-international words are 'international', 'library', 'opponent', 'horizon', 'proletariat', 'poor peasant', 'Socialist competition', 'competitor'.

Tataria, the Crimea, Central Asia to the Altai and Buryat-Mongolia and so on, has provoked a class struggle so sharp and embittered that in terms of the sharpness and range of ideological clashes and discussions, other social reforms in the Soviet East can scarcely compare with it. . . .

'The active resistance of the Arabists to the latinisation of the alphabet in Azerbaidzhan received active backing from the Mus-savatists, who in their mouthpiece *Eni-Kavkazia*, published in Constantinople, afforded every assistance to the Arabists in Azerbaidzhan.

'The same resistance to latinisation emanated also from the home-bred sheikhs, murids and mullahs in Daghestan and among the mountain peoples of North Caucasia. The latter, led by Sheikh Ali Mitaev, drawing on the services of their hirelings (bandit elements) met literally with daggers drawn the first copies of the Soviet alphabets in the new script which appeared in the mountain villages. The hunger strike proclaimed by the Chechen mullahs in protest against latinisation was a characteristic token of this opposition.

'We observe, too, the same scene of counter-action on the part of Ibrahim Valiev's supporters in the Crimea, who in every way sabotaged and tried to discredit the idea of latinisation.

'The counter-revolutionary Sultan Galiev movement and the chauvinist Tatar national bourgeoisie headed by Alimdzhan Sharaf (who published his own anti-Latin pamphlets against the Latin alphabet in Constantinople) resisted in every way the introduction of the new alphabet in Tataria. At that time Kazan was virtually the main centre of Arabism. The Tatar Arabists, in their desperate struggle against the new alphabet, went so far as to demand in the famous "Petition of the 82",* to the Central Committee of the Party, that the Arabic alphabet should be recognised as the official one in Tataria.'⁶⁵

Repressive measures had to be taken against opponents of the 'Alphabet of Lenin' and the 'Alphabet of the October Revolution' as the Latin characters were described.

Reforms in the structures of the Asian languages followed. In Uzbek, for example there were no rules to determine when the basic phoneme denoted by the Latin letter 'A' was to be

* 'In Tataria in 1927 a group numbering 82 persons of the bourgeois-nationalist intelligentsia presented a protest against the introduction of a latinised alphabet among the Tatars to the Party's Regional Committee. Only recently has it become clear that the author and ideological inspirer of this protest, which the OK of the VKP categorised as pressure on the Party by the national bourgeoisie, was the former Right-wing 'Communist,' Mukhtarov, who has now been expelled from the Party as an active supporter of the Sultan Galiev movement.'⁶⁴

pronounced as 'a' and when as 'o'. 'Thus, to read any word correctly it was necessary, without any kind of rule, to know how it was pronounced. . . . This caused great confusion and considerably complicated the learning of the Uzbek language, especially for persons of non-Uzbek nationality, and Russians in particular.'⁶⁶ Steps to overcome this difficulty were taken by the First Scientific Congress on the Question of the Orthography of the Uzbek language held in 1934.⁶⁷

During the 'thirties the limitations of latinisation became apparent. Some of the new alphabets had been badly compiled (*e.g.* those for the Kabardins and Adygeis of the North Caucasus), and others had been prescribed for small peoples (the Selkupi in the Tomsk area and the Ude in the Soviet Far East), who had no prospect of developing a culture of their own. Further Latin alphabets had been prescribed for nationalities which lived in areas where Russians (who in any case used Cyrillic) constituted a majority of the population (the tribes of North Russia), and even for nationalities which had previously used the Cyrillic alphabet (the Oirots in the Altai region and the Shorians in the Kemerovo area).⁶⁸

Indeed, the Committee for the New Alphabet of the Peoples of the North, established in 1932, declared that the Latin alphabet was 'the alphabet of the world Communist society' and 'the only revolutionary one'.⁶⁹ Attempts to propagate Cyrillic were branded as counter-revolutionary and at least one scholar, who tried to preserve the Cyrillic alphabet for Ossetia, was accused of 'great-power chauvinism' and of being 'a class enemy'.⁷⁰

However, the utility of the Latin scripts began to be questioned. In 1935-36 in Kabardinia it was acknowledged that 'although the Latin alphabet had played a positive role in the struggle against Arabism, it proved later more expedient to adopt the Russian [Cyrillic] alphabet'.* In 1937 alphabets based on the Russian script were created for the Oirots and Shorians, and also for the small nationalities of the North.⁷¹

* The Cyrillic alphabet, which is used by all Slav nationalities except the Poles, Czechs, Slovenes, Croats and Lusatians, was originally compiled by two Greek missionaries from Salonika, Cyril and Methodius, who were invited to the Slav kingdom of Moravia in the ninth century. It is based largely on Greek characters, with some borrowings from Hebrew.

When on March 13, 1938, the Soviet Government and Communist Party decreed that Russian would be a compulsory subject in all non-Russian schools,⁷² a thorough revision of the latinisation policy became urgent. Accordingly a second alphabetic revolution was inaugurated. In 1938–40 Cyrillic alphabets were established for all the nationalities previously affected by latinisation. Commenting on this, the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* declared:

‘The transfer of the majority of languages to the Russian script not only assisted the development of these languages, which at the present time are still being enriched thanks to extensive borrowing from the Russian vocabulary, but also gave considerable aid in the successful assimilation of Russian by representatives of the various nationalities in the Soviet Union.’⁷³

An article published in 1966 answered the question of whether the intermediate stage of Latinisation was a mistake as follows:

In the dual [*dvuediny*] process of the development of national cultures—the “flowering” and the “*rapprochement*”—questions concerned with the “flowering” were more pressing in the initial period following the Revolution . . . *Apart from that, the demand to transfer to the Russian script in the first years of the Soviet régime might have been interpreted as a relapse into the old, russifying policy of Tsarism*’ [*italics added*].⁷⁴

The Soviet argument is that the transfer, when it ultimately came

‘did not signify any kind of subordination to Russian culture at all but was the most rational form for the development of an individual national culture and, at the same time, an act of friendship towards the Russian people and a manifestation of the international unity of Soviet peoples . . .

‘The chief distinguishing feature of all this complex and painstaking work was that it was carried out *exclusively on the basis of the free choice by peoples under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet State*.’⁷⁵ [*italics added*]

The process of gradually assimilating the Asian languages has continued. In June, 1953, a decree was published relating to the orthography of the Kirghiz language, according to which all Russian words, whether incorporated into the language before or after the Revolution, were to be spelt as in Russian.⁷⁶ The previous practice had been to allow pre-revolutionary loan words to be spelt in accordance with the phonetic requirements

of the language adopting them. Thus the Russian *krovat* (bedstead) was adopted into Kirghiz as *kerevet*.

This same question was discussed at the Second Linguistic Congress of Turkmenistan in October, 1954. On the eve of the congress a lecturer at the Turkmenian State University declared:

'Many words which have passed into Turkmenian from Russian are written in a distorted form: *cheinik*, *bedre*, *mashyn*, *fabrik*, *gazet*, *chemedan*, *sekunt*, *minut*. This is absolutely wrong. We must be guided basically in this matter by the younger generation who already speak of *chainik*, *vedro*, *mashina*, *fabrika*, *gazeta*, *chemo-dan*, *sekunda*, *minuta*.'⁷⁷

In April, 1956, a decree 'concerning the basic rules of Uzbek orthography' introduced changes in Uzbek spelling and the substitution of the Russian hard sign for the Uzbek apostrophe.⁷⁸

The assimilation of Russian loan words has had a considerable effect on the word structure of the Asian languages. According to a work on Uzbek culture, the percentage of Arabic and Persian words in a sample of Uzbek-language newspapers fell from 37.4 in 1923 to 25 in 1940, while the percentage of Russian words rose from 2 to 15 per cent.⁷⁹ Among the Arabic words to pass out of use have been those connected with the Islamic religion, e.g. *Kiroat* (the reading of the Koran), *bozor shab* (evening bazaar in the days of a fast) and *fatvo* (religious instruction). It is stated that Uzbek youth today has no idea of their meaning.⁸⁰ A study of Kazakh-language papers reveals that the percentage of Russian words now varies from 20 to 30 per cent. In Yakut newspapers the figure is approximately 30 per cent.

Opposition among Asians to the 'Socialist reconstruction' of their languages evidently still persists. At the 1954 Turkmenian Linguistic Congress, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Turkmenian Communist Party complained:

'Bourgeois nationalists have tried to erect all possible obstacles in the way of the enrichment and development of the Turkmenian language through the beneficial influence of progressive Russian culture, and have tried to instil disrespect for everything Russian.'⁸¹

* The words in question mean teapot, pail, machine, factory, newspaper, suit-case, second, minute.

In September, 1959, an article in the Party journal *Kommunist* revealed that a Kazakh philologist had written an article deploring the use of Russian words in the Kazakh language and that in Kazakhstan:

'there are also people who, from the desire not to "choke up", as they say, their native language with words from the languages of the fraternal peoples, think up new words completely unintelligible to the people. In this they start from the principle: although it may be bad, at least it is our own.'⁸³

In December, 1962, *Izvestiya* attacked a further 'politically muddled article' which had advanced the 'absurd thought' that it would be better if Kazakh translations of foreign works were to be made direct and not through Russian; and the 'laughable assertion' that German and English were closer to the Kazakh language than Russian, which was nothing but 'an unintelligent sally against the great Russian language'.⁸³

The language question is evidently also a live issue in a number of European Soviet republics. In Azerbaidzhan, for instance, one of the charges laid against the dismissed First Party Secretary and certain of his associates in July, 1959, was that they had brought 'confusion into the completely clear question of language'.⁸⁴ This probably referred to a decree of Azerbaidzhan's Council of Ministers introducing certain modifications in the orthography of the Azerbaidzhani language, which had been published in September, 1958, and which had come into force on January 1, 1959. This decree, by abolishing certain Cyrillic characters and by changing the spelling of a considerable number of Russian loan-words, had been in marked contrast to the decrees passed in other republics, to some of which reference has been made above.⁸⁵

In Latvia the complaint was made in June, 1960, that 'certain comrades inclined to national limitedness and stagnation' were opposing the voluntary principle in the choice of the language of instruction (Russian had been made an optional language in 1959) and the growing influence of Russian on the grounds that this would inevitably reduce the influence of the languages of other nationalities.⁸⁶ At the end of 1965, a Moldavian Central Committee Secretary categorically condemned 'individual cases of setting the Moldavian and Russian languages against each other'.⁸⁷

After Khrushchev was removed from power, some of the

ideas mooted during his incumbency were rejected. At the XXIII Congress of the Georgian Communist Party in March, 1966, for instance, the chairman of the board of the Georgian Writers' Union, I. Abashidze, delivered an impassioned attack on the 'revision' of Party policy in the sphere of national culture and on those Party workers who had allegedly declared war on 'national form', the main constituent of which was language.

'To our shame, to the shame of Leninist Communists, an argument even flared up over whether there should or should not be national languages. . . .'⁸⁷

Abashidze stated that 'anti-Leninist views on national form . . . had taken firm root' in the previous decade and that certain people

'were waiting with impatience, with great impatience, for the moment when all national cultures would merge into one whole.'⁸⁸

The same month, an article in *Kommunist* by N. Dzhandil'din, a Kazakh who had held high Party office, decried, on the one hand, artificial measures aimed at hastening the *rapprochement* of peoples and cultures and, on the other, the fear that the 'interpenetration' of cultures could lead to their "dissolution" and loss of originality' and that the choice of Russian as an international language could lead 'to the loss by other national languages of their practical significance'. He continued:

'The attempt to restore obsolete cultural traditions and customs to life, to take the path of idealising the past, is connected with this groundless fear.'⁸⁹

A small, but revealing, linguistic sop was thrown to the Union Republics when it was resolved once again to publish laws passed by the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium in the languages of the Republics—a practice which had existed until April, 1960.⁹⁰ (A Tadzhik subsequently demonstrated the disabilities suffered by non-Russian speakers in this connection: many collective farmers did not know the provisions of an important decree on pensions, which had been in force for over a year, because it had not been translated.⁹¹)

* He was recalling, in particular, the polemics between Agaev and Solukhin and others in 1962 over the future of national cultural distinctions.

Rewriting the Histories of the non-Russian Peoples

'In contrast to bourgeois objectivism, the guiding principle of Marxist-Leninist historical science is the principle of its Communist Party-mindedness.'⁹²

History is considered in the Soviet Union to be 'one of the most important theoretical weapons in the hands of the class that handles it'.⁹³ In accordance with this concept, the histories of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union have been subjected to periodical revision to meet the changing needs of Soviet policy. The questions most frequently subjected to review have been the significance of the annexation to Russia of the non-Russian territories and the character of the various pre-revolutionary national movements against Russian rule.

In the first period of Soviet power, when Pokrovsky* was the leading historian in the Soviet Union, the annexation of the non-Russian territories by Tsarist Russia was considered an 'absolute evil', as a piece of straightforward colonial conquest, and by analogy all the uprisings of the subjugated peoples were held to have been of a national-liberational, progressive and even revolutionary character.⁹⁵ Stalin himself in 1922 described old Russia as the 'gendarme of Europe' and the 'hangman of Asia'.⁹⁶

With the resurgence of traditional Russian symbols during the 1930s, a change in this approach became necessary. In 1937 the Government Commission for the Competition for the Best Textbook on the History of the USSR, in a decree dated August 27, denounced the views of Pokrovsky as being defective and anti-Marxist, and advanced the theory of the 'lesser evil'.⁹⁷ According to this view, while the annexation of the non-Russian territories was undoubtedly an evil in view of Tsarist colonial oppression, it was a lesser evil than absorption by other imperialist States would have been. Further reinterpretation

* *M. L. Pokrovsky* (1868-1932). Joined the Bolshevik Party in 1905. In 1907 was chosen as a delegate to the V Congress of the RSDRP in London. Interpreted the course of history solely as the interplay of economic forces. According to Pokrovsky, Peter the Great's reforms were of no progressive significance but merely represented a victory of merchant capital over the interests of the gentry; Russian merchant capital and not Napoleon was responsible for the 1812 war. In 1920 his work *Russian History in the Briefest Outline* was warmly received by Lenin, who recommended its translation into the European languages.⁹⁸

tion of the pre-revolutionary relationships between Russians and non-Russians was foreshadowed by an article in *Pravda* in July, 1940, in which a leading Party theoretician, I. Mints, criticised a university textbook edited by the Soviet historian Nechkina, for failing to demonstrate the enthusiastic participation of 'national units' in the Russian Army during the war against Napoleon.⁹⁸ This process was halted by the Second World War.

During the war years considerable concessions were made to national sentiment in the interests of unity, and advantage was taken of these in some degree in the immediate post-war period. Certain works by native historians continued explicitly to treat the annexation of their countries as an absolute evil and to eulogise anti-Russian movements of the past. Thus in Ossetia a native historian, Dzhanayev, wrote a thesis on the annexation of Ossetia 'entirely impregnated with nationalistic ideas, idealising the resistance made by the mountain people to the Tsarist armies'.⁹⁹ In Azerbaidzhan a native author, G. Mekhtiev, wrote a work entitled *The Union of Azerbaidzhan with Russia and its Historic Significance*, in which he refuted the theory of the 'lesser evil' and confirmed that 'in the 19th century the danger of seeing the Caucasus conquered by Turkey and Persia was non-existent'. In this case he considered that 'there could be no question of the progressive character of the annexation of Azerbaidzhan by Russia'.¹⁰⁰

Towards the end of the war a hardening of the line was here and there apparent. A decree of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party dated August 9, 1944, made it incumbent on the Tatar Regional Party Committee to remove the 'serious mistakes of a nationalist character committed by individual historians and writers in dealing with Tatar history'. These mistakes included the glamourising of the Golden Horde. The Tatar hero Idegei,* was to cease to be the subject of a cult because 'he had carried out a number of devastating raids

* Idegei: Leader of the forces of the Golden Horde from 1397 to 1410. Aimed at restoring the power of the Golden Horde in Russia. In 1408 he attacked the Muscovite Principedom, sacked a number of cities, including Rostov, Pereyaslav, and Nizhny Novgorod (now Gorki), and laid siege to Moscow. During the Time of Troubles (1410-1412) he was deprived of his authority among the Golden Horde and took refuge in Khorezm. He died in 1419 at the hand of one of his sons.¹⁰²

against Russian towns and villages'. Tatar Communists were to counteract Tatar nationalist ideology by devoting greater attention to the joint struggle against foreign invaders by Russians, Tatars and other peoples of the USSR.¹⁰¹ This decree initiated a series of attacks on native historians.

The following year a similar decree addressed to the Bashkir Party organisation complained of serious mistakes in the illumination of the historical past of the Bashkir people. No distinction had been made in certain works between the national-liberation movement of the Bashkir people and the brigand raids of Bashkir feudalists on neighbouring peoples. The patriarchal-feudal past of the Bashkirs had been idealised. In the play *Kakhym-Turya* the history of Bashkir participation in the Fatherland War of 1812 had been distorted; Russian and Bashkir troops had been placed in opposite camps. The Bashkir Party organisation would improve its ideological and political work among the intelligentsia, who would write works correctly reflecting the history of the Bashkir people and their joint struggle with the Russian people against Tsarism and foreign enslavers. Finally, the decree directed the Bashkir intelligentsia to study the classical heritage of Russian culture and the works of the best Soviet writers, and to ensure the translation of the classical works of Russian writers into the Bashkir language.¹⁰²

In 1947 the official journal of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party denounced Ukrainian historical works published in 1941–1945 for preserving the nationalist tradition in Ukrainian historiography. Ukrainian historians, it was stated, had never succeeded in overcoming the influences of the nationalist bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.¹⁰³

A post-war example of the rewriting of history to suit the current requirements of Soviet policy was contained in the Central Committee's decree of February 10, 1948, on 'Decadent Trends in Soviet Music'. In this the opera *The Great Friendship*, by the Georgian composer V. Muradeli, was attacked *inter alia* because

'The plot of the opera, which purports to portray the struggle for the establishment of the Soviet régime and the friendship of the peoples in the North Caucasus in the years 1918–1920, is historically false and artificial. The opera creates the wrong impression that such Caucasian peoples as the Georgians and the Ossetians were at

that time at enmity with the Russian people, which is historically false, inasmuch as it was the Ingushi and the Chechens who were during that period the obstacle to the establishment of the friendship of the peoples of the North Caucasus.¹⁰⁵

The Chechens and Ingushi had been deported during the war on charges of alleged collaboration with the Germans.¹⁰⁶

In 1950 a comprehensive reappraisal of pre-revolutionary national movements was foreshadowed by the announcement that the Stalin Prize awarded in 1949 to the Azerbaidzhani scholar Geidar Guseinov for his work *From the History of Social and Philosophical Thought in Nineteenth Century Azerbaidzhan* had been withdrawn. Guseinov had evaluated incorrectly the significance of Shamil (leader of the peoples of the North Caucasus against the Tsarist forces in the years 1834–1859) and the Muridist* movement in the North Caucasus.¹⁰⁷ Shamil's movement, which had previously been regarded as the 'national-liberation' movement of the mountain peoples of the Caucasus directed against the colonial policy of Tsarist Russia¹⁰⁸ was now to be considered 'reactionary and nationalistic and to have been in the service of English capitalism and the Turkish Sultan'.¹⁰⁹ This was in direct contrast to the policy pursued in the war years when the peoples of Daghestan were encouraged to contribute 25,000,000 roubles to equip a 'Shamil' tank column.¹¹⁰

The Kazakh Khan Kenesary Kasymov,† who led the resistance of the Kazakhs against Tsarist forces in 1837–1846, was

* Muridism, which originated in Bukhara in the 14th century, was a form of Sufism. It stressed the rôle of God-appointed Imams, or spiritual leaders, who exercised complete power over their followers. Its ideal was the establishment of a theocratic Muslim state. The leader of the Muridist movement in the North Caucasus in the 1830s to 1850s, the Avar, Imam Shamil, led a revolt of the mountain peoples against Russian rule, which delayed the final pacification of the area for 25 years. Shamil was finally captured by Russian forces and was held prisoner till his death in 1872. He died in Mecca during a pilgrimage which he had been allowed to undertake by the Tsarist authorities.

† *Kenesary Kasymov* (1802–1847). Sultan of the Middle Horde. (The Kazakhs were, in that period, divided into the Brighter, Middle and Lesser Hordes.) Kenesary's father, Kasym and his brother, Sarzhan, who preceded him as Sultan, led Kazakh opposition to Russian annexation from 1822 onwards. Kenesary was killed in 1847 in battle against Kirghiz forces.¹¹¹

also denounced. In December, 1950, *Pravda* accused the Kazakh writer Bekmakhanov, author of *Kazakhstan from the 'Twenties to the 'Forties of the Nineteenth Century*, of propagating anti-Russian and bourgeois nationalist ideas by making the Khan Kenesary Kasymov a hero of the national liberation, and of declaring that 'Kenesary's revolt, which had a clearly anti-colonial and mass character, played a progressive rôle in the history of the Kazakh people.' *Pravda* asserted:

'All the historical data testify that the movement of Kenesary was neither revolutionary nor progressive. It was a reactionary movement, which dragged the Kazakh people backwards to the strengthening of patriarchal-feudal ways, to the restoration of the mediaeval régime of the Khans and to the severing of Kazakhstan from Russia and the great Russian people.'¹¹³

The Andizhan revolt of 1898 was also re-evaluated.* In March, 1950, it was described as a 'revolt of Uzbek and Kirghiz peasants in the province of Ferghana against the national and colonial oppression of Tsarism and the exploitation of the local feudal aristocracy'.¹¹⁴ Seven months later it was stated that previous evaluation of the Andizhan revolt had been incorrect. In fact, the 'ideology of the revolt was reactionary Muridism and those participating in it belonged to the arrant reactionary religious order, the Naksh-Bendi... The Ishan and his followers had been getting ready to "drive out the Russians", to restore the Kokand Khanate... and to put it under the protection of the head of Islamism, the Turkish Sultan'.¹¹⁴

In 1951 the problems of the 'lesser evil' theory were discussed in the journal of the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The historian Nechkina, opening the discussion, maintained:

'Tsarism was the prison of the peoples—that formula is profoundly true. In that country the elder brother of the peoples of our country—the great Russian people—languished also... In the

* The Andizhan revolt was led by Dukchi Ishan, a village religious leader. His following consisted of hill Kazakhs and Kirghiz, displaced by Russian immigrants, and Uzbek farmers who had been ruined by a cotton slump. These forces, proclaiming Dukchi Ishan their Khan, attacked the barracks outside Andizhan and massacred a number of troops. The revolt was put down by Tsarist forces and Dukchi Ishan was executed.

struggle against the common enemy, Tsarism, the friendship of our peoples took on its initial shape . . . It became a brotherhood of peoples based on the greatest historical cause, on the construction of a new Socialist society, on the movement towards Communism.¹¹⁵

'In evaluating the results of the incorporation of the peoples into Tsarist Russia, historians must pay particular attention to evidence of intercourse among these peoples, to the new and positive element which, in spite of Tsarism, the great Russian people introduced into their economic and cultural life. The task of historians is to depict the historical prospect of the unity and struggle of the workers of the various peoples under the leadership of their elder brother, the Russian people, and subsequently under the hegemony of its proletariat.'¹¹⁶

Neither this nor subsequent attempts to redefine the 'lesser evil' theory gained official recognition. Finally, in 1952 the 'lesser evil' theory was officially disclaimed. Bagirov, the First Secretary of the Azerbaidzhan Communist Party, at the XIXth Party Congress declared of the official periodical of the Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences:

'Last year the journal indulged in a pointless, abstract discussion on the subject of the so-called "lesser evil" formula as related to the question of the annexation of the non-Russian peoples to Russia. What aim the journal may have pursued through this discussion is not known, but in any case it was of no assistance to our cadres on the spot, in the national Republics, in their struggles against manifestations of bourgeois nationalism in historical matters, if the reverse was not the case. . . . Without underestimating in any way the reactionary nature of the colonising policy of Tsarism, it must not be forgotten that . . . the annexation of these peoples by Russia was for them the only way out and exerted an exclusively beneficial influence on their future fate.'¹¹⁷

The editorial board in the next issue of the journal conceded this criticism as justified. It pointed out that it had already recognised the publication of Nechkina's letter as a gross blunder, and continued:

'The organisation of a discussion on the question of the historical significance of the annexation of the non-Russian peoples to Russia, long since settled by Marxist-Leninist theory, constituted a serious ideological and theoretical mistake on the part of the editorial board. At the same time, the journal has done very little to illumine the inestimable aid which the great Russian people rendered, and in rendering, to all the peoples of our country.'¹¹⁸

In the years following the rejection of the 'lesser evil' theory the annexation of the non-Russian territories to Russia was expounded practically as an 'absolute good'; the beneficial aspects of the annexations were emphasised and Tsarist colonial oppression was, in the main, passed over. Hand-in-hand with this, a negative attitude to pre-revolutionary national movements was maintained.

In the January, 1953, review, published in the journal of the Party Central Committee of the amended edition of B. G. Gafurov's *History of the Tadzhik Nation*, of which the original 1949 edition had been criticised for describing the Andizhan and 1916 revolts in Central Asia as 'national-liberational' instead of 'feudal-nationalistic', it was noted with approval that

'in the book there are disclosed the deep roots of the friendly ties between the Central Asian nations and the great Russian nation, and the progressive rôle which the annexation of Central Asia to Russia played in the history of the Tadzhik people, is emphasised. . . . Their annexation to Russia made it possible for the Central Asian peoples to be associated with the advanced culture of the Russian people.'¹¹⁹

The same year the complaint was made that the 'grossest errors' had been committed in works on the history of individual peoples and nationalities of Siberia. Basharin, in his book on the history of social thought in Yakutia, had put forward the anti-Marxist thesis of a 'healthy' and 'progressive' nationalism. Other historians in Yakutia had committed the same political errors and bourgeois-nationalist distortions in their treatment of the history of the Yakut people. The history of the Siberian peoples was frequently dealt with in total isolation from the history of the Russian population in Siberia, the historical conditions of the origin and development of the friendship between the Russian people and non-Russian nationalities of Siberia, and the progressive significance of the annexation of the native peoples of Siberia to Russia.¹²⁰

A reversal of emphasis in the Soviet Communist Party's line towards the histories of the non-Russian peoples was initiated

* In 1962, the Yakut Party Committee renounced its 1952 decree on 'bourgeois nationalist distortions in the evaluation of the history of Yakut literature'. Three local writers, Kulakovsky, Neustroev and Sofronov, whom Basharin had commended and who had for that reason been censured, were rehabilitated.¹²¹

early in 1956. In her speech at the XXth Party Congress, the leading Soviet historian A. M. Pankratova stated:

'Our textbooks and books on the history of individual peoples devote almost no attention to exposing the national and colonial oppression of the Tsarist autocracy. While stressing quite correctly the progressive significance of the annexation of the peoples to Russia, certain authors neglect the other side. Tsarism brought the peoples cruel oppression and held back their political, economic and cultural development. . . . It is necessary to adopt a careful attitude towards progressive events in the history of large and small peoples and to continue the struggle on two fronts—against great-power chauvinism and local nationalism, for these are two sides of the same coin.'¹²²

A more moderate line has since been taken although the issue remained tricky. After Shamil was discussed by the Academy of Sciences' Institute of History in 1956, the proceedings were set up in type 'but it was decided not to publish them'.¹²³ In September, 1956, Shamil was recognised as the 'talented ruler and general' of the peoples of the North Caucasus in their struggle against Tsarist oppression, though he took advantage of their keen discontent to kindle in the masses religious fanaticism and hatred of all Russian people. The idea that Shamil's movement had been motivated by Turkish and British agents was acknowledged as erroneous.¹²⁴ Since then the tendency has been to emphasise his opposition to Tsarist colonial policies to the exclusion of the general anti-Russian character of his campaigns.¹²⁵

It is not surprising that Shamil should have become a symbol of the Soviet re-writing of history. A character in a relatively bold modern Soviet play (*Shooting a Film* by E. Radzinsky) said:

'I began as a historian. And my first work was about Shamil. Shamil as the leader of a national-liberation movement. But views changed . . . and at the end of the 1930s, he began to be considered an agent of imperialism. And I confessed my mistake. Then, during the war, he again became [the head of] a liberation movement. And then I confessed that I had made a mistake in confessing my mistake. Later, in 1949, he again became an agent, and I confessed that I had made a mistake. I had been mistaken so often that it seemed to me at one stage that I was a mistake myself.'¹²⁶

A number of other national risings, including the 1916* and

* The 1916 revolt of the Central Asian nationalities was directed

the Andizhan revolts, have again been categorised as 'national-liberationist'.¹²⁷ In addition, the rehabilitation of the Chechen and Ingushi peoples has led to the acknowledgement that the evaluation of the rôle of these peoples given in the 1948 decree on 'Decadent Trends in Soviet Music' was an incorrect one.¹²⁸

However, this process has been as selective as the concessions made in the field of literature. Bekmakhanov, who had earlier been censured by *Pravda* for describing Kenesary Kasymov as a 'hero of the national liberation', described the Kazakh leader in a more recent work as a cruel despot who carried out anti-national policies to increase his own personal power and acted in defiance of the wishes of the popular masses by his opposition to the annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia.¹²⁹ Moreover, those 'who under the flag of the preservation and development of "national traditions" and "national character" cultivate and conduct propaganda for reactionary and obsolete works of art eulogising "their own" "national" princes, khans and tsars'¹³⁰ are still liable to censure in the Party Press.

In 1961, after a textbook on the 'History of the Lithuanian SSR' had been denounced at a local Party Congress for idealising the past,¹³¹ it was branded in the CPSU Central Committee's journal, *Kommunist*, as 'a serious retreat from the principles of Marxist-Leninist historical science'. According to *Kommunist* it had, *inter alia*, thrown little light on 'Lithuania's economic and political ties with Kievan Russia' [the first Russian State], given only cursory treatment to 'the heroic struggle of the Russian people against the Mongol armies', idealised mediaeval Lithuanian princes and failed to emphasise Lithuanian interest in the Soviet Union in the period 1918-40 [when Lithuania was an independent State].¹³²

Shortly before this the Turkmenian Ministry of Education had stipulated that:

'The textbooks of the history of the Turkmenian SSR must reflect: the struggle of the toiling masses of Turkmenistan both against foreign enslavers and their "own" exploiters, the rise of the

against an order of the Tsarist Government calling up members of these nationalities for non-combatant military service. During the revolt Russian settlers and small bodies of Russian troops were massacred. The revolt was suppressed with great severity by the Tsarist General Kuropatkin.

indestructible fraternal friendship of the peoples of our Motherland, and first of all the friendship of the Turkmenian people with the Russians; the question of how this friendship evolved in the struggle for social freedom and national independence and reached full strength in the period of the building of Socialism in the USSR; the community of the historic destinies of the peoples of our country and their long joint struggle under the leadership of the Russian people against Tsarism, landowners, capitalists and foreign usurpers; and must show the development of the culture and the growth of the well-being of the Turkmenian people in the years of the Soviet régime.¹³³

STATE IDEOLOGY OF THE SOCIALIST NATIONS

The founder-theoreticians of Communism adopted a negative attitude to patriotism, so far as this meant love and loyalty towards the native country. The *Communist Manifesto* stated that the working men 'have no country'.¹³⁴ Lenin, elaborating on this point in the *Manifesto*, declared that it meant that the workers' economic position was not national but international, that their class enemy was international as were the conditions for their liberation, and that the international unity of the workers was more important than their national unity.¹³⁵

Lenin maintained, however, that this did not mean that the workers were indifferent to their native countries, which necessarily set the conditions for their class struggle.

"That the proletariat has no Fatherland," this is actually stated in the *Communist Manifesto*. . . . But from this it still does not follow . . . that it is a matter of indifference to the proletariat which Fatherland it lives in. . . . The Fatherland, i.e. a given political, cultural and social environment, constitutes the most powerful factor in the class struggle of the proletariat. . . . The proletariat cannot adopt a disinterested and indifferent attitude to the political, social and cultural conditions of its struggle, and consequently the fortunes of its own country cannot be a matter of indifference to it. But the fortunes of its country interest it only *inasmuch* as this effects its class struggle and not by virtue of some kind of bourgeois "patriotism", which comes ill from the mouths of Social Democrats.¹³⁶

Nor, as Lenin indicated, did Marx's theory exclude a sense of national pride so long as this was continuous with proletarian pride in revolutionary traditions.¹³⁷

Finally, when after the October Revolution the Bolsheviks faced foreign invasion, Lenin regarded the rôle of the Red

Army as that of defending rather the Socialist system than Russia.

'We are defensists from November 7, 1917. We are for the "defence of the Fatherland", but that Fatherland war to which we are marching is a war for the Socialist Fatherland, for Socialism as a Fatherland, for the Soviet Republic as a *detachment* of the world army of Socialism.'¹³⁸

In the 1920s and early 1930s the ideology of proletarian internationalism, the 'international solidarity of the proletariat and toilers of all countries', was propagated and the previous negative attitude to patriotism maintained.

The *Encyclopaedia of State and Law* in an article on patriotism published in 1925 declared that 'in our time patriotism plays the rôle of the most reactionary ideology, the function of which is to justify imperialist bestiality and deaden the class-consciousness of the proletariat, by setting impassable barriers to its struggle for liberation'.¹³⁹

An American expert on Russian affairs, on his return from a tour of the Soviet Union in 1930, observed that the Bolsheviks could move ahead 'not handicapped by patriotism'. Such concepts as patriotism and religion were, he noted, 'sentimental idealisms to the materialistic Bolsheviks'.¹⁴⁰

Soviet Patriotism

Nevertheless, the specific concept of a Soviet patriotism which 'unites all nations and nationalities of the country into a single brotherly family'¹⁴¹ is very much an official creed. This patriotism embodies devotion to the Soviet Fatherland, the Soviet Government and the Soviet Communist Party, and is held to have emerged since the mid-thirties.

'Soviet patriotism manifests itself in ardent love for the Fatherland and the people, and hatred for its enemies, in profound loyalty to the cause of Communism, in the friendship of the peoples of the USSR and in their fraternal solidarity with the toilers of the whole world struggling against capitalism, in trust and in love for the Soviet Government, the Party of the Bolsheviks and Comrade Stalin.'¹⁴²

Soviet patriotism 'manifests itself above all in the unanimous support of the Soviet people for the measures of the Party and Government, whatever side of life and activity these measures affect. The Party of Bolsheviks is the arbiter of the thoughts, aspirations and actions of Soviet citizens of town and country, of all races and nationalities.'¹⁴³

'Soviet patriotism is based on the selfless devotion and loyalty of the working class, collective farm peasantry, intelligentsia and all nations and peoples of the USSR to their Socialist Fatherland, on the fraternal concord of the toilers of all the nations of our country. . . . In Soviet patriotism there finds profound expression the brotherhood of the peoples of the USSR, rallied around the great Russian people, who represent the most outstanding nation of all the nations that form part of the Soviet Union.'¹⁴⁴

In 1939 Stalin described Soviet patriotism as one of the driving forces of Soviet society and its development as one of the most urgent tasks in Soviet internal policy.¹⁴⁵ Its principles are propagated both by the Soviet communications media and through the educational system. Since 1944 the teaching of 'love for the Soviet Fatherland' has been compulsory in Soviet kindergartens, which cater for children from three to seven years of age.¹⁴⁶

The Russian Elder Brother

The leading rôle of the great Russian people in the development of the Soviet State has been increasingly emphasised since the late 'thirties. In 1945 Stalin declared at a Kremlin reception for Red Army commanders:

'I would like to propose a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and above all to that of the whole Russian people.

'I drink above all to the health of the Russian people, because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations within the Soviet Union.

'I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people because it earned in this war general recognition as the guiding force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country.

'I propose a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because it is the leading nation, but also because it has a clear mind, a steadfast character and patience.'¹⁴⁷

Since then the great Russian people have been proclaimed the 'first among the equal peoples in the brotherly family of the nations of the USSR.'¹⁴⁸ In the many declarations on the friendship of the peoples of the USSR it is stressed that the 'guiding force, which cements the friendship of all the Socialist nations of the USSR, is the great Russian people, which has earned general recognition as the most outstanding of all the nations which make up the Soviet Union,'¹⁴⁹ and that 'all peoples and nations of the Soviet Union see in the great Russian

people their best friend and guide, their elder brother, who has played a decisive rôle in the struggle for the victory of the proletarian revolution and the triumph of Socialism'.¹⁵⁰

Accordingly, in addition to professing Soviet patriotism, the non-Russian nationalities are expected to acknowledge the leading rôle of the great Russian people and their indebtedness to the Russian 'elder brother' for their economic and cultural progress.

Frequent declarations of gratitude to the Russian people are made by Party and Government officials in the national republics and in works by leading non-Russian writers. The following examples are characteristic:

'You are our teacher in work, our defender in war; where necessary you will help us, you will put things right! For all this we say "thank you, thank you" to you. Oh, my friend! Oh, my Russian Comrade!'—Daghestani poet, Gamzatov, 1953.¹⁵¹

'Thank you from the land of the Kirghiz, dear Party of mine, Thank you, beloved Russian brother, to whom I owe my life!'—The Kirghiz poet Dzhangaziev, July, 1956.¹⁵²

'As in a family the elder brother is always regarded with esteem and respect, so in our great family of peoples we regard with respect, esteem, love, devotion and fidelity our dear elder brother, the great Russian people from which all peoples are learning to build a new life, and are learning courage, heroism, self-sacrifice and wisdom.'—Nasriddinova, Chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, November, 1959.¹⁵³

'We acknowledge with pride that the cementing force of the inviolable friendship of our people was and remains great Russia. To the liberating struggle of the Russian proletariat and to advanced Russian culture have been drawn, as to the light, all the repressed peoples inhabiting the Russian empire.'—Zarobyan, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia, May, 1961.¹⁵⁴

'You are kind, you are truly great, you are human a hundred times o'er! Oh how dear you are to me, my own, my Russian brother—elder brother!'—Uzbek poet Gafur Gulyam, quoted by Rashidov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 1965.¹⁵⁵

These sentiments are also expressed in the national anthems of non-Russian republics. The anthem of the Azerbaidzhan SSR contains the lines:

'The mighty Russian brother is bringing to the land the triumph of freedom and with our blood we have strengthened our friendship and our kinship with him.'¹⁵⁶

The anthem of the Kazakh SSR declaims:

"True to the triumphant legacy of Lenin, his descendants have enhanced the glory of their native land. We will express our gratitude to the great Russian people, the stronghold of the brotherhood of the peoples of the Union."¹⁵⁷

NEGATIVE (DISRUPTIVE) MEASURES

The Struggle against Bourgeois Nationalism

"The struggle against bourgeois nationalist ideology and its carriers was at the centre of the attention of the Communist Party over the entire period of the formation and development of nations within the USSR."¹⁵⁸

The elimination of national deviations, *i.e.* Great Russian chauvinism and local (bourgeois) nationalism, has always been a cardinal point in the Soviet nationalities policy. In the 'twenties, when Great Russian chauvinism was considered the greater danger, efforts were made to curb racial discrimination by Russians against the non-Russian nationalities. At the same time the problem of local nationalism was not discounted. In 1926 Stalin rebuked Shumsky,* the Ukrainian Commissar of Education, for expressing dissatisfaction with the progress made in the indigenisation of the Party and State apparatus in the Ukraine under the direction of Kaganovich, then First Party Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Shumsky, according to Stalin, had failed to see that, in view of the weakness of the indigenous Communist cadres in the Ukraine, the movement for 'Ukrainisation', frequently led by non-Communist intellectuals might

'Here and there assume the character of a struggle to alienate Ukrainian culture and public life from general Soviet culture and public life, the character of a struggle against "Moscow" in general, against the Russians in general, against Russian culture and its highest achievement, Leninism.'

Stalin also criticised the leading Ukrainian Communist writer Khvilevoy, for demanding the '*immediate* de-russification of the proletariat in the Ukraine' and for maintaining that 'Ukrainian poetry must get away from Russian literature and its style as fast as possible.'¹⁵⁹

* Shumsky was dismissed from this post in 1927 and was arrested in 1933.

In this period nationalist organisations were also attacked. The Central Asian *Milli Ittihad* (National Unification) and *Milli Istiklal* (National Independence), which 'pursued the aim of overthrowing the Soviet régime and setting up a bourgeois State', were 'unmasked' and 'liquidated' in the late twenties.¹⁶⁰ In March–April, 1930, 45 Ukrainian scientists, professors, and scholars, including a Deputy President of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, came up for trial in Kharkov. They were alleged to have been members of a nationalist organisation, the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', which had as its objective the separation of the Ukraine from Russia and the restoration of private property.¹⁶¹

The relative danger of these two national deviations was reviewed in the early 'thirties. Whereas Stalin had continued to maintain in 1930 that Great Russian chauvinism was the 'chief danger in the Party in the sphere of the national question',¹⁶² in 1934 he declared at the XVII Party Congress:

'There is a controversy as to which deviation represents the chief danger: the deviation towards Great Russian nationalism or the deviation towards local nationalism. Under present conditions, this is a formal and, therefore, pointless controversy . . . the chief danger is the deviation against which we have ceased to fight, thereby allowing it to grow into a danger to the State.'¹⁶³

The reason for this change in emphasis may well have been a rise in nationalist feeling following the forcible and mass collectivisation of agriculture. Collectivisation was bitterly resisted in the non-Russian territories. Native farmers and peasants slaughtered their livestock to prevent them from being annexed and for fear of being classified as *kulaks*, whose liquidation was the declared policy of the Soviet Government. As a result, in the Russian Far North and Far East the number of reindeer fell from 2,700,000 in 1931 to 1,889,000 in 1934;¹⁶⁴ in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the neighbouring areas of Western Siberia (the Novosibirsk, Omsk and Altai regions (*oblasts*)) the number of cattle declined from 18 million in 1928 to six and a half million in 1933.¹⁶⁵ Repressive measures were widely used to combat opposition. A joint decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, dated December 6, 1932, stated:

'Because of the shameless breakdown of the grain collection

campaign in various districts (*raions*) of the Ukraine, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine order the local Party and administration authorities to eradicate the sabotage of grain, which has been organised by counter-revolutionary and *Kurkul* (*kulak*) elements. The opposition of a number of Communists, leaders of this sabotage, must also be stamped out, and the passive and indifferent attitude towards this sabotage on the part of some Party organisations must be liquidated. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee have decided to blacklist all those localities which conduct criminal sabotage and to apply against them the following reprisals:

- '1. To suspend the flow of all merchandise and to suspend all State and cooperative trade in these localities; to close all State and cooperative stores, and to remove all supplies of merchandise.
- '2. To prohibit trade in essential foodstuffs, which trade heretofore had been conducted by collective farms and individual homesteads.
- '3. To suspend all credits destined for these localities and to withdraw at once all credits already given them.
- '4. To overhaul the personnel of the administrative and economic organisations and to remove all enemy elements therefrom.
- '5. To do the same on collective farms by removal therefrom of all enemy elements engaged in sabotage.'*¹⁶⁶

Whatever the crucial reason, the Soviet campaign against national deviations was, after 1933, largely directed against local nationalism. The purpose was to destroy nationalist organisations and to eliminate native Party and Government officials suspected of separatist leanings or of attempting to limit the power of the central authorities in the national republics. *Pravda*, commenting in 1933 on the suicide of Skrypnik, a Party member since 1897 and Shumsky's successor as Commissar of Education in the Ukraine, stated that Skrypnik had fallen prey to certain bourgeois-nationalist elements. He had committed ideological mistakes in his literary work on national

* The post-war collectivisation of agriculture in the Baltic Republics met with similar opposition. 'Bandit-bourgeois-nationalist gangs' had to be 'completely liquidated'¹⁶⁷ and as late as 1956 the complaint was made in Lithuania that alien elements were trying 'to undermine the farms from within'.¹⁶⁸ In this latter year, also, nationalists are said to have used the original denunciation of Stalin to attack the Party's policy in the Lithuanian countryside and collectivisation in particular.¹⁶⁹

and cultural questions, and in his administration of the Commissariat of Education. Having discovered the true state of affairs, Skrypnyk had not had the courage to overcome them in a true Bolshevik manner and had committed suicide.¹⁷⁰ Khvilevoy, one of the leading Ukrainian writers, also committed suicide in 1933 after he had been the subject of an attack on the score of nationalism. (Skrypnyk was rehabilitated in 1962 and ironically has since been praised for his exposure of the Ukrainian nationalists' interpretation of the right to self-determination.)¹⁷¹

Ukrainian nationalist organisations uncovered by the Soviet security organs in the 1930s included the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO), the Ukrainian National Centre, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Nationalist Trotskyite Bloc.¹⁷² Among the first leading officials in the national republics to be dismissed for taking a 'bourgeois-nationalist line in their work' were the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of Tadzhikistan, Maksum Nuzratallah, the Chairman of the Tadzhik Council of People's Commissars, Khodzhibaev (1933) and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Karelian ASSR, Dr. Gylling (1935).

The campaign against suspect national officials reached its climax in 1937-1939 when a large number were either executed, committed suicide or disappeared. Leading figures in the national republics acknowledged by Soviet sources to have been executed included, for example:

GEORGIA ¹⁷³	Mdivani	Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
	Toroshelidze	Member of the All-Union Central Executive Committee.
KAZAKHSTAN ¹⁷⁴	Eskaraev	Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
	Kulumbetov	Chairman of Central Executive Committee.
	Sadvokasov	Secretary of the Alma-Ata Party Organisation.
UZBEKISTAN ¹⁷⁵	Khodzhaev	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
	Ikramov *	First Party Secretary.

* Ikramov confessed at his trial that he had worked for the 'bourgeois' independence of Uzbekistan.¹⁷⁶ In October, 1956, it was

Among those who disappeared during this period (some of whom have recently been rehabilitated posthumously) were:

AZERBAIDZHAN	Musabekov	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
BYELORUSSIA	Goloded	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
GEORGIA	Mgaloblishvili	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
KAZAKHSTAN	Isaev	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
KIRGHIZIA	Isakeev	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
	Urazbekov	Chairman of the Central Executive Committee.
TADZHIKISTAN	Rakhimbaev	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
	Shotemor	Chairman of the Central Executive Committee.
TURKMENIA	Aitakov	Chairman of the Central Executive Committee.
	Ataev	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.
UZBEKISTAN	Akhun-Babaev	Chairman of the Central Executive Committee.

Chervyakov, Chairman of the Central Executive Committee in Byelorussia, committed suicide in 1937,¹⁷⁹ as did the Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, Lyubchenko. The latter had been charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian Fascist Party.¹⁸⁰

Nor was this campaign confined to leading officials in the national republics. The local republican Press in November, 1937, reported the execution of 25 minor officials and other persons in Kazakhstan¹⁸¹ and a further 18 executions in other parts of Central Asia.¹⁸² Two months later, 26 more executions were reported from Kirghizia¹⁸³ and 134 from Uzbekistan.¹⁸⁴ December, 1938, saw the announcement of the execution of eight Armenian officials accused of being members of a 'counter-revolutionary Right-Trotskyite nationalist-Dashnak wrecking organisation' and of 'wanting to separate Armenia

stated that his case was being reviewed by the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party.¹⁷⁷ His rehabilitation followed in December, 1957.¹⁷⁸

from the Soviet Union.’¹⁸⁵ A Kirghiz who was a student during the purge has written an account of the destruction of ‘almost all the national cadres created in nearly two decades of Soviet rule in Kirghiziya’.¹⁸⁶ A recent book on the Tadzhik Communist Party revealed that Party membership slumped from 14,329 in 1933 to 4,603 in 1937.¹⁸⁷

The campaign against bourgeois-nationalism has continued since the Second World War. In Estonia sweeping changes were made in the Party and Government apparatus in 1949–50. The drive against bourgeois-nationalism in this republic became particularly intense after the adoption by the Soviet Party Central Committee of a resolution ‘concerning mistakes and shortcomings in the work of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Estonia.’ This resolution, dated February 20, 1950, stated that *kulak* saboteurs were impeding and attempting to disrupt the collectivisation of agriculture in the republic; that educational and cultural establishments were in the hands of bourgeois-nationalists who were hoping and working for the restoration of capitalism; and that persons hostile to the Soviet system had infiltrated into the Party itself.¹⁸⁸

Two of the leading Estonian Communists to be dismissed were Kruus, the Foreign Minister, and Andrezen, a Deputy Chairman of the Praesidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet and a former Minister of Education. An official history of the Estonian Republic, published in 1952, stated that the bourgeois-nationalists, led by Kruus and Andrezen, had greatly harmed the development of Estonian Soviet culture and science. Distorting historical truth, they had praised the old bourgeois order in Estonia and hindered the ‘education of the toilers in the spirit of Communism’. Falsifying history, they had preached the ‘unity’ of the Estonian toilers with their exploiters; had concealed the class struggle in the history of Estonia; and had denied the democratic and revolutionary traditions of the Estonian people and the existence of the centuries-old friendship of Estonians and Russians. The bourgeois-nationalists had kindled hostility towards the Soviet peoples, and first and foremost towards the Great Russian people, in their attempts to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR.¹⁸⁹

Purges of bourgeois-nationalists were also carried out in other republics. In August, 1956, a Russian replaced a Georgian

as Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia¹⁹⁰ in the course of an intensive campaign against bourgeois-nationalism which followed disorders in the Georgian capital in March. In October, in accordance with the more liberal line recently adopted by the Soviet authorities towards national sentiment in Central Asia, it was stated in Uzbekistan that the cases of all those condemned for nationalism in recent years had been reviewed. Many had been rehabilitated and one, Mukhamedzhan Yuldashev, allowed to return to the republic. This statement was coupled with a warning against underestimating the force of bourgeois-nationalism in the republic.¹⁹¹

Since the war there have also been denunciations of underground nationalist organisations. In 1950 a conference of women from the Western Ukraine, in a message of loyal greetings to Stalin, pledged their help and the help of their families in the 'struggle against the most hateful enemies of the collective farm system, the remnants of the *kulak* and OUN bands'.¹⁹² Four years later the then First Party Secretary in the Ukraine called on Party organs to 'increase their vigilance in the struggle against OUN remnants, by not allowing them to penetrate into collective farms, industrial enterprises and educational establishments. . .'.¹⁹³ There is still considerable sensitivity towards signs of Ukrainian nationalism. In December, 1965, it was revealed, for instance, that 'apologists' for the 'so-called Western Ukrainian People's Republic' (established in 1918) still existed and that a boarding school had been teaching Ukrainian history 'from a bourgeois-objectivist position to a considerable extent'.¹⁹⁴ Published attacks on the OUN in 1965 and 1966¹⁹⁵ were followed by a 'Press-conference' in Kiev with an ex-member of organisations connected with the OUN.¹⁹⁶

There has also been evidence of national opposition in the Baltic Republics. In 1953 Kalnberzin, then Latvian First Party Secretary, declared that 'in Soviet Latvia here and there hidden remnants of the anti-Soviet elements crushed by the Soviet régime from the dregs of bourgeois-nationalists, Jewish Zionists, Social Democrats corrupted by imperialism, and Trotskyites have still survived.'¹⁹⁷

In November, 1956, Snehkus, First Party Secretary in Lithuania, claimed the final liquidation of a nationalist 'bandit underground movement,' which had operated in Lithuania since the war.¹⁹⁸ A month later, however, the same speaker

gave warning of the continued existence of anti-Soviet groups in Lithuania:

'The armed revolt of reaction against democratic Hungary has encouraged reactionaries, even in our Republic. Remnants of former anti-popular parties, exploiting classes, bourgeois-nationalist elements and their various accomplices have begun to raise their heads. Some of them, using criticism as a disguise, others behind a mask of false democracy, and some completely openly, are trying to slander and spread distrust in the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet Government in Lithuania.'¹⁹⁹

G. Zimanas, editor of the chief Lithuanian-language newspaper and a frequent writer on nationality problems, said in an article in 1966 that there were still people 'who do not recognise the principles of proletarian internationalism at all; the world-outlook of such people is a bourgeois-nationalist one'. These were rare cases. Commoner were the people who 'have subjectively renounced bourgeois-nationalist ideology . . . but at the same time have not fully freed themselves from the legacy of nationalist psychology'. However, it was wrong to divide people into the 'pure' and 'impure'—*i.e.* those 'uninfected' or 'infected' by bourgeois survivals. The situation was much more complex:

'It happens that a "pure" person can become "impure" in certain circumstances . . . although, in general, the Soviet world-outlook is characteristic of him, whereas those who have been subjected to criticism . . . and considered to be bearers of prejudice can, under certain conditions, surprise one with their conscientiousness.'²⁰⁰

The eradication of nationalism has in part been sought through 'international education'. Measures under this heading have included the giving of lectures on 'friendship between peoples' (a standard item in political education),²⁰¹ the sending of large numbers of young people to study in other parts of the Soviet Union,²⁰² and the establishment of boarding schools where children of the local nationality live together with Russians, while studying in their own language.²⁰³ Russian-language instruction has also been stepped up in non-Russian areas in recent years although, to allay fears, it is emphasised that national languages will not be engulfed and that parents themselves may choose which language their children should be taught in.²⁰⁴ In 1966, the First Party Secretary of Azerbaïdzhân gave this typical list of measures taken in his Republic:

'The study of the Russian language . . . aids the improvement of the international education of young people and all workers, as does the systematic carrying out of lectures, reports . . . and other activities at enterprises, in collective and State farms, institutions and teaching establishments. 'Radio-days' and 'television evenings' devoted to the Soviet Republics have earned great popularity with us. The Ten-day Russian Culture Festival and the Week of Moldavian Culture were held in Azerbaidjan as great festivals of friendship. . . . The Ten-day Festival of Tadzhik literature . . . was also a vivid demonstration of friendship.'²⁰⁵

In the field of the 'mutual enrichment of national cultures', further steps are being taken to raise the output in the Republics of translated classics and the 'best' works written in the Soviet period (including, specifically, *Russian* classics).²⁰⁶

Since about 1963, it has been suggested that the *rapprochement* of peoples is being assisted by marriages between partners of different nationalities.²⁰⁷ Despite the claim that no special statistics are kept of mixed marriages—this being 'yet another proof of the lack of any kind of national restriction in marriage relationships'²⁰⁸—it is clear from published sources that research into mixed marriages is being carried out. The 1959 census also provided data on the subject.²⁰⁹ A telling figure to emerge from investigations in the Uzbek cities of Tashkent and Samarkand was that whereas mixed marriages constituted over 20 per cent of the total of all marriages, 'the proportion of marriages between representatives of the native nationalities and migrants from the European areas of the USSR amounted to 6–7 per cent.'²¹⁰

Other methods aimed at stamping out nationalism have included the publication, in mass editions, of denunciations of nationalists for war crimes,²¹¹ and the mounting of publicity campaigns around the trials of such people.²¹²

Administrative measures have also been used. In Uzbekistan a law has been drafted to provide severe penalties for the wearing of knives as part of the national dress²¹³ and the First Party Secretary, Rashidov, has publicly denounced the 'muddled thinking' of 'certain comrades' on national traditions and festivals which last several days and warned that any idealisation of the feudal past 'provides grist to the mill of the enemy'.²¹⁴ Other, more 'tactful' methods are also in use. The 'only Kurdish-language newspaper in the world', an organ of the Central Committee of the Armenian Communist Party,

was stated in 1965 to be '[helping] Kurds to relinquish their obsolete clothing' which 'hindered work' in fields and factories.²¹⁵

Many officials have been dismissed for 'nationalist distortions'. Those dismissed in the years 1959-1962 included the Lithuanian rector of Vilnius University, a deputy director of a teachers' training institute and a lecturer in the same republic²¹⁶ and a number of leading officials in Latvia. This last-named group, which had advocated a greater measure of administrative independence, was composed among others of a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Chairman of the Republican Trade Union Council, a Deputy Chairman of the Latvian State Planning Committee, the Minister of Education and the editor of the Latvian language newspaper, *Cina*.²¹⁷

In December, 1962, it was revealed that the former Kazakh Chairman of Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers, Daulenov, had been dismissed for making nationalist statements while intoxicated and that Khrushchev had only recently found it necessary to remind members of the republican Party Central Committee's Buro that 'each member of a Leninist party is obliged to be first of all a Communist and then a Kazakh, Ukrainian or Russian'.²¹⁸

Soon after Zarobyan, First Party Secretary of Armenia, was dismissed in 1966, Kochinyan—his successor—referred to the failure to curb the expression of Armenian national sentiments, especially among young people. This factor may well have played a part in Zarobyan's fall, particularly as Kochinyan went on to dwell on the 'undesirable manifestations' which had taken place on April 24, 1965, at the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish massacres.²¹⁹ There had been reports of disturbances in Erevan at the time.

Warnings against economic localism are still frequent. One of the specific measures in use to combat it was mentioned by the First Party Secretary of Azerbaidzhan at the end of 1965: leading officials were given lectures by top Party members, prominent economists, etc., in special seminars organised by the republican Central Committee.²²⁰

Deportation of Suspect Nationalities and National Groups

To counter real or potential opposition in the national republics, the Soviet régime, in addition to eliminating national Communists and anti-Soviet nationalist organisations, has applied repressive measures against entire national minorities and against specific groups within a given nationality. These measures have on occasion taken the form of mass deportation.

During the war seven nationalities in the Soviet Union were deported *en masse* from their national homes and dispersed in Siberia and Central Asia. They included the Volga Germans, deported in 1941, and the Crimean Tatars and the Caucasian nationalities, the Chechens, the Ingushi, the Kalmyks, the Karachai and the Balkars, deported in the period October, 1943 to June, 1944. Official announcements of these measures were made only in the cases of the Volga Germans, the Crimean Tatars and the Chechens and the Ingushi. Deportation of the remaining peoples, though known outside the USSR, was not publicly admitted in the Soviet Union until 1957.

The deportation of the Volga Germans was carried out on the grounds of security. A decree of the Praesidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of August 28, 1941, stated:

‘According to trustworthy information received by the military authorities, there are among the German population living in the Volga area thousands and tens of thousands of “diversionists” and spies, who, on a signal being given from Germany, are to carry out sabotage in the area inhabited by the Germans of the Volga.

‘None of the Germans living in the area have reported to the Soviet authorities the existence of such a large number of “diversionists” and spies among the Volga Germans; consequently the German population of the Volga area conceals enemies of the Soviet people and of Soviet authority in its midst.

‘In case of “diversionist” acts being carried out at a signal from Germany by German “diversionists” and spies in the Volga German Republic or in the adjacent areas, and bloodshed taking place, the Soviet Government will be obliged, according to the laws in force during the war period, to take punitive measures against the whole of the German population of the Volga.

‘To avoid undesirable events of this nature and to prevent serious bloodshed, the Praesidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet has found it necessary to transfer the whole of the German population living in the Volga area to other areas.”²²¹

The Chechens, the Ingushi and the Crimean Tatars were deported for alleged collaboration with the enemy. A decree

of the Praesidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 'Concerning the abolition of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the changing of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into a Crimean Region,' announced in 1946, two years after the events in question:

'During the Great Patriotic war, when the peoples of the USSR were heroically defending the honour and independence of the Fatherland in the struggle against the German-Fascist invaders, many Chechens and Crimean Tatars, at the instigation of German agents, joined volunteer units organised by the Germans and, with German troops, engaged in armed struggle against units of the Red Army; also at the bidding of the Germans they formed diversionary bands for a struggle against Soviet authority in the rear; meanwhile the main population of the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean ASSRs took no counter-action against the betrayers of the Fatherland.

'In connection with this the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars were resettled in other regions of the USSR.'²²²

In both decrees it was claimed that the deported nationalities had received material assistance from the State in their resettlement. The new settlements of the Volga Germans were to be in the Novosibirsk and Omsk regions in Siberia, the Altai Krai, Kazakhstan and other neighbouring localities. The areas allocated to the other nationalities were not specified.

The charges of treason levelled against the deported people were in direct contrast with previous Soviet pronouncements. In 1939 the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* had emphasised the 'limitless devotion' of the Volga Germans to the cause of Communism.²²³ Kalinin, Chairman of the Praesidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in describing the successes of the Soviet Nationalities Policy in the Caucasus, declared in 1942:

'The Caucasus is the most enlightening demonstration of the reforming beneficial effect of the Soviet system on the psychology and character of people who, not without reason, saw danger to themselves everywhere. The Caucasians have now become a social people who see in the collective system their bulwark, the foundation of material prosperity and a higher intellectual life... the whole Caucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples. The whole Soviet land, from border to border, has become their beloved home.'²²⁴

As late as 1943 an official Soviet history cited as evidence of the unity of the Soviet peoples in the war against Germany the fact that in the period December 9, 1942, to March 31, 1943, the Chechens and the Ingushi had contributed 12 million

roubles and the Kalmyks nine million roubles for the war effort. Seven and a half million roubles had also been contributed by the Kabardins and Balkars.²²⁵

It is interesting to recall that similar measures were planned against the Volga Germans by the Tsarist authorities in the First World War, and were carried out against the Crimean Tatars in the Crimean War. These measures were condemned as 'barbarous' in official Soviet publications.

'In 1916 there was promulgated a law against "German dominance", the application of which was also extended to cover the Volga Germans. Shortly after this preparations were put in hand for the expulsion of all Germans from the Volga area, and this was set for April, 1917. The overthrow of the monarchy prevented the carrying out of this barbarous measure. When the colonists appealed to the Provisional Government to revoke this law, Kerensky only agreed "to stay the execution of the decree". Only the Great October Socialist Revolution, which put an end to national oppression . . . rescinded this decree.'²²⁶

'In the autumn of 1854 there followed a decree of the Minister of War to the effect that "the Emperor has ordered all inhabitants of the Muslim faith living in coastal areas to be removed from the coast into inland provinces". This measure, which was carried out in connection with the Crimean War from considerations, as it were, of a military character, was needed by the Tsarist Government to enable it to seize the richest lands on the southern coast of the Crimea. The persecution and brutalities initiated against the Tatars by the military authorities because of their alleged acts of espionage turned this transfer of population into a wholesale flight.'²²⁷

It would seem that despite the successes claimed for the nationalities policy, Soviet Russia could not in the final analysis depend on the loyalty of these nationalities any more than could the Russia of the Tsars.

Although no absolute figures are available on the number of people involved in the war-time deportations, previous Soviet population statistics indicate that they exceeded a million. In 1939 there 407,690 Chechens, 92,074 Ingushi, 75,737 Karachai, 42,666 Balkars and 134,271 Kalmyks in the Soviet Union, according to the Soviet census of that year.²²⁸ Data published in the *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia* showed that there were more than 380,000 Volga Germans in 1939²²⁹ and more than 200,000 Crimean Tatars in 1936.²³⁰

For ten years after the deportation of these nationalities Soviet publications and documents were completely silent

about them. The *Large Soviet Encyclopaedia*, in its volume on the USSR published in 1947, did not include them in its list of nationalities of the Soviet Union.²³¹ No representatives of these nationalities took part in the post-war sessions of the Council of Nationalities. Post-1944 editions of the official *Soviet Gazetteer*, as well as omitting mention of the Chechen-Ingush, the Volga German and the Crimean ASSRs, the abolition of which had been announced, also omitted the Kalmyk ASSR and the Karachai Autonomous Region. The Kabardino-Balkar ASSR was simply listed as the Kabardinian ASSR.²³²

Finally, in 1955, isolated reports about some of these nationalities began to appear in local republican newspapers. They showed that there were Chechen and Ingushi communities in the Semipalatinsk,²³³ Kokchetav,²³⁴ and North Kazakhstan²³⁵ regions in Kazakhstan and also in the Frunze region in Kirghizia.²³⁶ Evidence was also given of Balkar and Karachai settlements in Kirghizia.²³⁷ The very publication of these reports suggested that the attitude of the Soviet régime to the deported Caucasian nationalities was changing. This supposition was reinforced in February, 1956, when it was reported that Khrushchev in a secret speech at the XX Party Congress had included in his criticism of certain of Stalin's past actions the deportation of the Caucasian nationalities, though not those of the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars.²³⁸

A year after this speech, the rehabilitation of the nationalities mentioned in it was announced at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in February, 1957. At this session the Secretary of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet denounced the deportation of entire peoples and the restrictions placed upon them in resettlement areas as violations of the Soviet nationalities policy. He stated that the Chechens and the Ingushi would be resettled in their native areas in the years 1957-1960, while the resettlement of the less numerous nationalities, the Kalmyks, the Karachai and the Balkars, would be concluded in 1958. The Chechen-Ingush ASSR would be restored, the Kabardinian ASSR would again become the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, the Karachai would be included in a Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Region and a Kalmyk Autonomous Region would be formed.²³⁹ The Kalmyk Autonomous Region was later raised to the status of an Autonomous Republic in July, 1958.²⁴⁰

It is difficult to determine the numbers of those who have subsequently benefited from the process of resettlement. The nationality data from the 1959 census published in February, 1960, gave totals of 418,000 Chechens, 106,000 Ingushi, 106,000 Kalmyks, 81,000 Karachai and 42,000 Balkars living in the Soviet Union, figures which pay eloquent testimony to the losses suffered by these nationalities during the time of their deportation. But in the breakdown given of the nationalities by republics only the Kalmyks were mentioned. Of these 101,000 were listed in the RSFSR, which would suggest that their resettlement has been an almost complete one. The other nationalities were not mentioned either under the RSFSR, of which their restored administrative areas form a part, or under the various Central Asian republics, their place of domicile after their deportation.²⁴¹

This process of resettlement inevitably caused some further hardship. According to one Soviet source:

"To help their fellow autonomous republic, the Chechen-Ingush, to get on its feet, over 20,000 Avar and Darghin families and members of more than 60 Daghestan collective farms gave up their land to the Chechens, leaving them the houses, hospitals, schools and factories they had built and giving them the orchards and vineyards they had cultivated, and themselves moved into Daghestan."²⁴²

In their turn the Avar and Darghin families moved in to share the land inhabited by another small Caucasian nationality, the Kumyks. While these transfers of population have been officially eulogised as 'fine examples of the subordination of private interests to public interests'²⁴³ it has to be noted that there is no record of any plebiscite having been held to determine the wishes of these three Caucasian nationalities.

Subsequent to their resettlement the Chechens and Ingushi seem to be proving as difficult to assimilate as before. In August, 1962, an attack on 'the practice of the selection and deployment of cadres in Chechen-Ingushetia whereby some people, making references to "local conditions", continue to push forward, advance and watch over the interests of their "kinsmen"' cited the case of a nephew of a mullah who had actually been put up for the post of a departmental head of a district Party committee.²⁴⁴

At the February, 1957, session of the Supreme Soviet no mention was made of the Volga Germans or of the Crimean

Tatars. In fact, it would seem that the return of neither people to their original homelands is envisaged. In January, 1957, in a broadcast from a Ukrainian radio station, considerable concessions were announced for Transcarpathian Ukrainians willing to settle in the 'under-populated' Crimean Region.²⁴⁵ Meanwhile, the few scattered references to the Crimean Tatars in Soviet publications have continued to place them firmly in Central Asia.²⁴⁶ At the end of 1964, the Supreme Soviet issued a decree which stated that the 'sweeping accusations' levelled at the Volga Germans 23 years previously 'were unfounded' and that the 'overwhelming majority of the German population' had in fact assisted the Soviet victory over 'Fascist Germany'.²⁴⁷ However, this decree only rehabilitated the Volga Germans politically: there was no suggestion that the former Volga German Autonomous Republic (abolished under a separate decree of September 7, 1941) would be restored. On the contrary, the 1964 decree ended by pointing out that the German population was now scattered in a number of areas 'while the areas where it resided formerly have been settled'.²⁴⁸

Deportation measures have also been used against national groups openly opposing the Soviet régime or whose loyalty has been considered suspect. In the years of forcible collectivisation of agriculture (1930-1933), when opposition in the non-Russian areas was particularly intense, deportations assumed mass proportions. An indication of their extent was given by a decree of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the USSR Council of People's Commissars, dated May 8, 1933, signed by Stalin and Molotov. This decree called for the immediate cessation of the mass removal of peasants. Deportations would in future be carried out in the case of individual families only. Specific authorisation was given for the further deportation of 2,000 families in the Ukraine, 1,000 in the North Caucasus, and 500 families each in Byelorussia, Bashkiria, Transcaucasia and Central Asia.

The deportation of suspect elements was carried out in the Baltic States after their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940. It is estimated that by July, 1941, 170,000 persons had been forcibly expelled from these countries. They included former members of anti-Soviet and nationalist political parties, refugees, clergy, active members of religious congregations, and those with contacts abroad, including former Red Cross officials, esperantists and philatelists.²⁴⁹

When Soviet authority was restored in the Baltic States after the German capitulation further deportations were carried out. In the post-war years the Soviet régime had to deal with armed resistance from partisan groups and peasant resistance to the collectivisation of agriculture, which was intensified in 1948. From refugee evidence it appears that some 400,000 Lithuanians were deported towards the end of 1948, about 150,000 Latvians between then and the beginning of 1949, and in May, 1949, alone, 35,000 Estonians.

In recent years many of those deported from the Baltic Republics have been allowed to return under successive amnesties. In 1961 some of these deportations were implicitly condemned by the Lithuanian First Party Secretary, Snechkus, when, in an attack on the Stalin personality cult at the XXIIInd Congress, he declared that:

'In conditions of the class struggle which took place in the years when the Lithuanian people had to break the resistance of the bourgeois nationalist bands set up by the Hitlerite occupiers and supported by the American and British intelligence services, the violation of Socialist legality inflicted no little harm. In committing acts of lawlessness against innocent people, Beriia's adventurers tried to compromise the policy of the Soviet régime, impeded the struggle against traitors and at times thereby allowed real enemies of the people and Socialism to escape responsibility. The violation of legality created great difficulties in our work on rallying the toiling masses around the Party and the Soviet régime.'²⁰

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54. *Sovetskaya Muzyka* (organ of the USSR Union of Composers and Ministry of Culture), 1964, No. 1 pp. 10, 16.
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56. *Sovetskaya Latviya*, September 29, 1961.
57. *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1949, No. 2, p. 135.
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59. *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, March 23, 1966.
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62. *B.S.E.*, 1st edn., Vol. 36, p. 88.
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67. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
68. *B.S.E.*, 1st edn., Vol. 36, pp. 88-90.
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70. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
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75. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
76. *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, June 6, 1953.
77. *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, October 5, 1954.
78. *Pravda Vostoka*, April 12, 1956.
79. T. N. Kary-Niyazov, *op cit.*, p. 276.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 266.
81. *Turkmenskaya Iskra*, October 8, 1954.
82. *Kommunist*, 1959, No. 13, pp. 39-40.
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85. *Kommunist* (Azerbaijani newspaper), September 11, 1958.
86. *Sovetskaya Latviya*, June 10, 1960.
87. *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, December 19, 1965; see also Postovoi, *ibid.*, November 28, 1965.
88. *Zarya Vostoka*, March 10, 1966.
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93. *Ibid.*, 1st edn., Vol. 30, p. 14.
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95. *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 11, p. 83.
96. Stalin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 161.
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131. *Sovetskaya Litva*, September 30, 1961.
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153. *Pravda Vostoka*, November 21, 1959.
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247. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, 1964, No. 52, p. 931.
248. *Loc. cit.*
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V

The Sovereignty of the Union Republics

The highest form of national statehood that nationalities can attain in the USSR is that of Union Republic,* which is designated 'a sovereign Socialist State'.¹

Distinguishing Features

The conditions necessary for national territories to gain Union Republican status were elaborated by Stalin on November 25, 1936, at the Extraordinary VIIIth All-Union Congress of Soviets. They were that:

'First the Republic concerned must be a border republic, not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics have the right to secede from the USSR, a Republic, on becoming a Union Republic, must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the USSR and that question can be raised only by a Republic, which, say, borders on some foreign State and, consequently, is not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Of course, none of our Republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the USSR. But since the right to secede from the USSR is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that the right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper. Take, for example, the Bashkir or Tatar Republic. Let us assume that these Autonomous Republics are transferred to the category of Union Republics. Could they logically and actually raise the question of seceding from the USSR? No, they could not. Why? Because they are surrounded on all sides

* Since 1925 the number of Union Republics has increased with the establishment of the Tadzhik (1929), Kazakh and Kirghiz (1936) and the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Moldavian (1940) SSRs, and by the restoration of the individual Republics of Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, and Georgia following the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (1936). They now number fifteen. The Karelo-Finnish SSR formed in 1940 was transformed into the Karelian ASSR in 1956.

by Soviet Republics and regions, and, strictly speaking, they have nowhere to go if they secede from the USSR. Therefore it would be wrong to transfer such Republics to the category of Union Republics.

'Secondly the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet Republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that Republic. Take the Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example; it is a border Republic but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority in that Republic. On the contrary they are a minority. Consequently it would be wrong and illogical to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category of Union Republics.

'Thirdly the Republic must not have too small a population; it should have a population of, say, not less but more than a million at least. Why? Because it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet Republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain its existence as an independent State. There can hardly be any doubt the imperialist beasts of prey would soon lay their hands on it.'²

Tokens of Sovereignty

These conditions, which continue to be cited as *desiderata* for Union Republican status,³ are thus almost entirely adapted to *the right to secede* which officially constitutes 'the highest expression of the sovereignty of the Union Republics'.⁴ This inevitably invests them with an air of unreality as, though the right of the Union Republics to secede has from the first been written into the Soviet Constitution and much play made of it to support Soviet respect for the principle of self-determination, this right has in practice been of little positive significance.

Not only has no constitutional procedure ever been evolved to determine how the Republics are to raise the question of secession, but given the collective structure of the Soviet State apparatus the possibility of a Republic as a unit raising the question of its secession is remote. This is acknowledged by Soviet sources:

'It stands to reason that the probability of any Soviet Union Republic expressing the desire, through its democratically elected official Soviet organs, to secede is so infinitesimal that, practically speaking, it amounts to nil.'⁵

The main reason for this, and one that effectively circumscribes the much publicised independence of these Republics, is the dominant position of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union. This, which as 'the leading core of all organisations of the working people, both public and State',⁶ 'directs to a single end the activities of all Soviet organs, the trade unions, the co-operatives, the Leninist Komsomol and the other mass organisations of the toilers',⁷ 'is not a federation of Parties or Party committees, it is a centralised organisation'.⁸ The Republican Communist Parties, for their part, have the status merely of regional organisations which within their territory 'conduct all the work in carrying out the Party's policies and organise the implementation of directives from the CPSU Central Committee'.⁹

To press for secession other than through official channels would be to invite criminal prosecution (*see* pp. 92 and 95). Up to December, 1958, Article 58¹⁰ of the RSFSR Criminal Code and the corresponding articles of the republican codes listed 'counter-revolutionary agitation or propaganda, directed at undermining or weakening the Soviet régime by making use of the national prejudices of the masses' as a specific crime.¹⁰ Under the present Law on State Crimes, which has since superseded this Article, 'agitation or propaganda conducted with the aim of undermining or weakening the Soviet State' is punishable by up to seven years' imprisonment with a possibility of up to five years' exile in addition.¹¹

Other declared tokens of the sovereignty of the Union Republics would seem to be similarly devoid of real content. In the field of Foreign Affairs, for example, these Republics have since February, 1944, had the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.¹² Up to the present, however, little advantage has been taken of this concession. With the exception of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegations to the United Nations, no Republic maintains missions of any kind abroad, although Soviet propaganda destined for abroad continues to refer to the 'right' of the Republics in this respect.¹³ A request by the British Government in 1947 to establish separate diplomatic relations with the Ukraine met with a negative response. An indication of the vestigial significance attached to the rôle of the Union Republics in foreign affairs was given in a 1963 Latvian Government list which listed the Latvian incumbent as Minister of Education and Minister of Foreign Affairs in that order.¹⁴ Another indication

was afforded by the fact that in September, 1960, the Ukrainian and Byelorussian delegations to the important XVth session of the United Nations General Assembly were not led by their Prime or Foreign Ministers but by their First Party Secretaries, Podgorny and Mazurov.¹⁵

The position is similar in regard to Defence. The abolition of national military formations in the Red Army had been announced in 1939 (*see* p. 53). But in the course of the war years (especially in 1942 and 1943) many of these were re-formed so that by early 1944 the Red Army included among its operational units a number of Azerbaidzhani divisions, a Latvian rifle division and depot unit, a Lithuanian rifle division, and an Estonian army corps. There were also Ukrainian, Georgian, and Kazakh national units.¹⁶

The re-emergence of national units was retrospectively acknowledged in February, 1944, when a decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet gave the Union Republics the right to their own military formations, and by converting the All-Union Ministry of Defence into a Union-Republican Ministry* established their right to their own Ministries of Defence.¹⁷

Since the end of the war, however, the provisions of this decree would seem to have found virtually no expression in practice. Such isolated national units as continue to exist appear to be confined to the Baltic States and to have no counterpart in the Caucasus or Central Asia. Moreover, these token units are small in number, are staffed by Russian officers and are non-operational. As regards the Republics' Ministries of Defence, these appear to have been very much a dead letter. No orders by them have ever been published, nor has the name of any Minister of Defence ever been included in the periodical lists of Ministers of Republican Governments; despite this, a recent Soviet publication aimed at foreign readers still claimed:

'Each Union Republic has its own Republican military formations. . . . The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic . . . establishes the procedure for setting up Republican military formations.'¹⁸

The remaining declared attributes of the sovereignty of the Union Republics, *i.e.* the necessity for their permission to be

* The differences between these two types of Ministry are defined in the section which follows on Centralised Administration.

given for alterations to be made in their territories, the institution of republican citizenship and the right 'to adopt their own constitution taking into account the specific features of the republic and constructed in complete accord with the Constitution of the USSR'¹⁹ have as little real substance. While, for example, the formalities are duly observed and the respective Supreme Soviets exchange congratulatory messages over changes of territory made periodically necessary by economic considerations, little note is taken of popular feeling. In January, 1963, shortly before a cotton-growing region in Kazakhstan was transferred to Uzbekistan, *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* pointedly complained that:

'National narrow-mindedness and the inability or reluctance to take up the stand of internationalism also manifest themselves in the fact that certain people still harbour old notions about territorial community and about the administrative frontiers between republics. They do not want to understand that, in the period of the building of Communism, politically and economically founded frontier changes between republics with the aim of creating the best conditions for the development of the national economy are becoming natural and comprehensible.'²⁰

Subsequently, the Chairman of Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers was to explain that this had been done because Uzbekistan, as the major cotton-producing republic in the USSR, could better develop this area and that Lenin himself had maintained that the 'national composition of a population has to depend on other conditions and first of all the economic ones'.²¹

THE LIMITS OF REPUBLICAN AUTONOMY

Questions of sovereignty apart, the measure of self-government enjoyed by the Union Republics is limited by the degree of centralism peculiar to the Soviet State, which is expressed both constitutionally and in the ordering of general administration.

Constitutional Limitations

Extensive powers, for example, are reserved to the Central Government by Article 14 of the Soviet Constitution. These include:

- (a) Representation of the USSR in international relations, conclusion, ratification, and denunciation of treaties of

the USSR with other States, establishment of general procedure governing the relations of Union Republics with foreign States;

- (b) Questions of war and peace;
- (c) Admission of new Republics into the USSR;
- (d) Control over the observance of the Constitution of the USSR and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the USSR;
- (e) Confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics;
- (f) Confirmation of the formation of New Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions within Union Republics;
- (g) Organisation of the defence of the USSR, direction of all the armed forces of the USSR, determination of directing principles governing the organisation of the military formations of the Union Republics;
- (h) Foreign trade on the basis of State monopoly;
- (i) Safeguarding the security of the State;
- (j) Determination of the national-economic plans of the USSR;
- (k) Approval of the consolidated State budget of the USSR and of the report on its fulfilment, determination of the taxes and revenues which go to the Union, Republican, and local budgets.
- (l) Administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural institutions and enterprises and trading enterprises of All-Union importance; general direction of industry and construction of Union-Republican importance;
- (m) Administration of transport and communications of All-Union importance;
- (n) Direction of the monetary and credit system;
- (o) Organisation of State insurance;
- (p) Contracting and granting of loans;
- (q) Determination of the basic principles of land tenure and of use of mineral wealth, forests, and waters;
- (r) Determination of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health;
- (s) Organisation of a uniform system of national economic statistics;
- (t) Determination of the principles of labour organisation;

- (u) Establishment of the basic principles of legislation concerning the judicial system and judicial procedure and of the basic principles of civil and criminal legislation;
- (v) Legislation concerning Union citizenship; legislation concerning the rights of foreigners;
- (w) Determination of the principles of legislation concerning marriage and the family;
- (x) Issuing of All-Union acts of amnesty.²²

Further restrictions are contained in Articles 113–117 which define the functions of the office of the Prosecutor-General (*Prokuratura*). These lay down that the Prosecutor-General of the USSR shall directly appoint the Prosecutor and his subordinates in the Union Republics. Among the duties of these officials is the checking of the legality of measures ordered by the Republican authorities and the administration of justice, and they have the right to challenge all administrative enactments in the Union Republics.²³

Centralised Administration

These constitutional restrictions are reinforced by other limitations stemming from the centralised nature of all administration which has been a feature of the Soviet State since its foundation. The original Soviet Constitution of 1924 set the pattern by establishing three categories of administrative agency—the All-Union People's Commissariats with authority throughout the USSR, the Unified People's Commissariats, having in the Union Republics corresponding Commissariats subordinate both to the Republican Governments and the Central Commissariats, and the Republican Commissariats—and by reserving to the exclusive jurisdiction of the republics only the spheres of Internal Affairs, Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture and Social Security.²⁴

The Constitution of 1936 in re-designating the above administrative agencies as All-Union, Union-Republican and Republican People's Commissariats (in 1946 the People's Commissariats were renamed Ministries) followed the same principles. Thus the present day All-Union Ministries direct their branch of administration throughout the USSR either directly or through organs appointed by them,²⁵ while the Union-Republican Ministries direct their branch of administration through the corresponding Union-Republican Ministries in the Republics.²⁶

This Constitution also increased the degree of centralisation by placing Agriculture, Health, Justice and Internal Affairs within the Union-Republican category of administration.²⁷

The planning of the economy of the USSR, including the economies of Union Republics, has also from the first been 'organised and directed by the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Government'.²⁸ This has inevitably led to emphasis on the strategic interests of the Soviet economy as a whole and to the Republics being regarded rather as the producers of specific commodities than as territories with independent needs. An early example was the forcing of cotton cultivation in the 1930s in Uzbekistan. In this Republic the area under cotton increased from 423,500 hectares in 1913 to 946,200 hectares in 1937, while the cereal growing area decreased from 1,521,000 hectares to 1,362,200 hectares over the same period.²⁹ One of the results of this policy was to make Uzbekistan increasingly dependent on external grain supplies and this caused widespread discontent in the Republic. Opposition to the campaign for making Uzbekistan a cotton base for the Soviet Union assumed an all-national character and ranged from the peasants, who advanced the slogan 'you can't eat cotton',³⁰ to members of the Uzbek Government. Khodzhaev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan, at his trial in 1938 confessed:

'We drew up the First Five-Year Plan in a way that ran counter to the instructions of the Union Government and conformed to the line of the nationalists for a self-contained economy. We planned the economy in such a way as to have less cotton, because it was an industrial crop which most of all bound Uzbekistan with the Union; secondly we planned to develop agriculture in Uzbekistan so as to have more grain farming . . . in order to be independent of Russian grain.'³¹

The Uzbek Communist Party is still reminded that an increase in cotton production is the Party's 'main [economic] task. . . Its significance is exceptionally great'.³²

This centralised control of administration and planning has been reinforced by centralised control of finance. The predominant rôle of the central agencies in determining the budgets of the Union Republics has been justified on the grounds that:

'The uniformity of the national economic plan demands not only

the concentration of the bulk of budgetary resources at the disposal of the USSR but also the centralisation of budget planning and regulation with the object of directing the entire budget system from top to bottom on to a single channel of financial budgetary policy.'³³

As a result the regulation of all taxation has been placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the central authorities and the Republican Governments have been barred from any levying of taxes on their own account. Here the position has been that:

'From the principle that throughout the entire territory of the USSR taxes can only be introduced as a matter of All-Union legislation, it emerges that the impermissibility of levying any taxes or dues whatsoever not provided for by such legislation is wholly evident. Unauthorised local tax imposition is a State crime punishable under criminal procedure.'³⁴

In line with this policy the State Budget of the USSR has from the first determined the resources to be allocated to the Republican budgets and the proportion of taxes collected in their territories which can be retained by the Republican Governments. In this latter connection the importance for the State as a whole of the current economic development of a given republic has always been the decisive criterion. Thus, in the 1967 State Budget (the proportions of the turnover tax reclaimed by the Union Republics varied from the 100 per cent. allowed to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenia to the 19.2 per cent. allotted to Latvia.³⁵

For their part the Union Republics have the right through their Governments to participate in the compilation of the State Budget and thereafter through their representatives in the USSR Supreme Soviet to advance amendments either during the debate on the Budget or previously at the sessions of the Budget Commissions elected by both Chambers of the USSR Supreme Soviet.³⁶ However, the effectiveness of these checks has been limited both by the principle of democratic centralism which also governs the procedure for the compilation of the State Budget and by the official contention that in budgetary matters 'any form whatsoever of opposing the interests of the centre and the localities is impermissible in a Socialist State.'³⁷ Nevertheless, the First Secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party admitted some people take the line that:

'the more national income is produced by a Republic, the more it should use. Of course, one cannot agree with this thesis. The allocation of the national income should be subordinated to the interests of the whole country. . .'.³⁸

Limited Decentralisation

The degree of centralisation in Soviet administration reached its peak in the early fifties. In 1952 no less than 18 branches of industry were under All-Union jurisdiction, while in addition, Union Republican agencies administered Light Industry, Timber, Building Materials, the Food Industry and the Meat, Milk and Fishing Industries.³⁹ Further, the dividing lines between All-Union and Union Republican Ministries had in a considerable number of instances been blurred as was acknowledged by the USSR Minister of Finance in 1954 when he deplored that:

'In a number of branches under the jurisdiction of Union-Republican Ministries, the Ministries of the Republics have been essentially barred from the management of enterprises situated on the territory of their Republic.'⁴⁰

The adverse consequences of this situation of administration by remote control became increasingly apparent in the course of economic expansion and from 1954 measures were instituted to offset these defects. These measures culminated in the 1957 decentralisation of Soviet industrial administration in which the functions of the majority of the former industrial ministries were transferred to Councils of National Economy based in the Republics and set up by and answerable in the first instance to the Republican Governments, the heads of which were made *ex officio* members of the USSR Council of Ministers.⁴¹ A number of increased powers, calculated to improve the efficiency of the administrative system, were simultaneously granted to the Union Republics.

In the field of planning, for instance, the USSR State Plans for the development of Republican industry began to lay down only the overall figures for gross and commodity production, capital works, the number of personnel and the size of wage funds. The detailed planning of production and distribution in republican industry was left to the respective governments⁴² which also received the right to use a certain part of the raw materials produced over and above the amount planned for the republic as a whole, for the production of consumer goods.

In addition, in February, 1957, an Economic Commission of the Council of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet was set up with the declared purpose of ensuring greater consideration of Republican interests in the formulation of State Plans. The functions of this body, which consisted of a chairman and two representatives from each Republic, were to:

- (a) Prepare for the Council of Nationalities proposals on questions of economic and social and cultural construction in the Union Republics.
- (b) Conduct a preliminary review of the interests of the Union Republics in the carrying out of measures in the fields of economic construction, education, health, town and country planning, housing, etc.
- (c) Prepare conclusions for the Council of Nationalities as to the conformity of the national-economic plans with the tasks of the economic and cultural development of the Union Republics.⁴⁶

This Economic Commission also had the task of 'systematically [examining] budget drafts and . . . [introducing] amendments, taking into account the interests of the Republics'.⁴⁶ In 1966, there was an increase in the number of Standing Commissions in both chambers of the Supreme Soviet. According to Podgorny, this change was dictated by the considerable increase in preparatory work undertaken by the commissions.⁴⁶ In the Council of Nationalities, a new Planning and Budget Commission took the place of the Economic Commission. Its membership was expanded to 50 Commission members plus a chairman.⁴⁷

There have been a number of other concessions in the field of finance. Since 1955, for example, the State Budget has ceased to lay down how the revenue allocated is to be distributed between the budgets of the Republican Governments and the budgets of the autonomous republics and the various local authorities within their territories. This subsequently received legislative confirmation in the new 'Law on the Budget Rights of the USSR and the Union Republics' of October 30, 1959. This law also laid down that while Union Republics might not alter the total allocation to them of revenue from All-Union taxation, they were now free to make

use of any budget surpluses at their own discretion with the exception of unused allocations for capital expenditure assigned to their Councils of National Economy.⁴⁸ Further minor concessions were made in October, 1965 (*see below*).⁴⁹

However, this measure of decentralisation has not led to any relaxation of the principle that 'the economy of each Union Republic develops as an integral part of the single economy of the Soviet Union'.⁵⁰

This point received striking emphasis in July, 1959, with the dismissal of E. K. Berklav, a Deputy Chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers.⁵¹ It was subsequently revealed that the reasons for this had been that Berklav had 'made persistent attempts to direct the development of the Republic in the direction of national limitedness and exclusiveness' by repeatedly opposing the development of wagon-building and the manufacture of diesel engines in Latvia and by advocating the increasing development of the light and food industries 'whose products are mainly consumed within the Republic'.⁵²

Moreover, a subsequent reverse trend towards re-centralisation was emphasised at the November, 1962, Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Here it was announced that the economies of the four Central Asian Republics—Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan—would be developed and controlled by a Central Asian Council of National Economy, and a Central Asian Cotton Administration, a Central Asian Chief Administration for Irrigation and State Farm Construction and a Central Asian Construction Administration⁵³ (subsequently restyled the USSR State Production Committee for Construction of the Central Asian Economic Region). Overall control would be exercised by a Central Asian Buro of the CPSU Central Committee directly subordinated to the latter's Presidium.

Subsequently these measures were justified on the grounds that they provided for a more rationalised and co-ordinated development of the economic resources of Republics which had a natural mutual attraction not only through reasons of geography but 'first and foremost by the common character of their historical and economic development',⁵⁴ an argument, which, if it ignored the question of sovereignty of the Republics concerned, paid eloquent testimony to the purely political motives which prompted the original division of Turkestan.

The point was also made explicitly that:

'In particular the Central Asian Economic Region and Council of National Economy will help to overcome localist tendencies, attempts to build a closed economy and the dispersal of resources of material and manpower.'⁵⁵

At the same November Plenum, Azerbaidzhan's First Party Secretary appeared to herald similar developments for his own Republic and Georgia and Armenia, when he declared that the Central Asian initiative should be studied with an eye to adapting it for Transcaucasia, where there was already a council for co-ordinating planning.^{56*} Reference was subsequently made to the existence of a Transcaucasian Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee.⁵⁷

A more general measure of recentralisation resulted from the reorganisation in March, 1963, of the guiding lines of the Soviet economy, under which a Supreme Council of the National Economy was established to exercise overall supervision of economic development and to co-ordinate the work of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan), the USSR Council of National Economy and the USSR State Construction Administration (Gosstroï). Simultaneously these three bodies, to which all the State Committees and ministries with economic responsibilities were subordinated, were transformed into Union-Republican bodies and this further increased the degree of centralised direction of the republican economies. Thus,

'Whereas in the past every Republican Council of the National Economy was subordinated only to the Council of Ministers of its Union Republic, it will now be subordinated to the Republican Council of Ministers and to the USSR Council of National Economy. This applies also to the Gosplans of the Union Republics. The decisions of the USSR Gosstroï, which is a Union-Republic body, are mandatory for the Gosstroï and other building organisations of Union Republics.'⁵⁸

After Khrushchev's removal from office his innovations were done away with. The Central Asian Economic Region and Council of National Economy were soon disbanded.⁵⁹ Although there was no official announcement about the dissolution of the

* A similar council for co-ordination and planning was set-up for the Baltic Republics in 1961. In October, 1962, it produced a unified plan for development of building materials industry.⁵⁹

Central Asian Buro and the joint Central Asian Administrations, by the first half of 1965 it had become clear that they had ceased to function (with one relatively minor exception⁶¹).

The abolition of these bodies was almost certainly welcomed in the Republics⁶²; however, the abolition in turn of the Councils of National Economy (many of which coincided territorially with Republics) was greeted with something short of enthusiasm. Republican leaders argued for the retention of the positive features of this system at the October, 1965, session of the Supreme Soviet. Many speakers, for instance, called for increased participation by local Soviets in deciding economic problems, doubtless feeling that these bodies would reflect local needs more faithfully than ministries ultimately controlled from Moscow. A Kirghiz delegate referred to local regrets that certain prosperous engineering works would be 'leaving' the Republic to come within the competence of All-Union ministries.⁶³ A few days previously, Brezhnev himself had suggested that the Councils of National Economy encouraged localist tendencies:

'This is what sometimes happens . . . one Republic or another or a Council of National Economy of an Economic Region produces some commodities in short supply; when it comes to distributing them, real care is only taken in satisfying the needs and demands of "their own" consumers . . . cases of the disruption of inter-Republican supplies are permitted. What is this, comrades, if not the most thoroughgoing localism, a harmful and completely impermissible occurrence in the life of our Socialist State?'⁶⁴

At the September, 1965, Plenum and the subsequent Supreme Soviet, there were frequent references to the 'extended rights' which Republics were to receive under the reorganisation of industry into ministries. Kosygin referred to these rights and further stated that 'centralised planned direction of the economy must be combined with the development of the initiative of Union Republics in the field of economic and cultural construction'.⁶⁵ He mentioned a decree dealing with these 'new rights' but the text only became available the following year when it could be seen that the concessions tended, if anything, to underline republican lack of autonomy.⁶⁶ The first two provisions, for instance, permitted republican Councils of Ministers to examine centrally drawn-up plans for developing enterprises in their own areas (except those concerned with military production) and to make proposals aris-

ing out of them at the appropriate All-Union level. Later provisions allowed republican budgets to be used to provide free invalid carriages and to subsidise local theatres. Certain economic initiatives (*e.g.* the disposal of categories of above-plan production) were permitted only with USSR *Gosplan* approval.

NATIONAL COMPOSITION OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ORGANS IN THE UNION REPUBLICS

Within these limits the degree in which the indigenous nationalities exercise self-government has been further restricted by the presence of a considerable number of non-nationals, mainly Russians, in important posts in various Union Republics. While indigenisation of the Party and Government apparatuses in the national republics has been a declared aim of the Soviet régime, the degree in which this principle has been implemented has varied with the republic, and the prevailing conditions there. In Kazakhstan, for example, where 'in 1927 at the VIth Krai Party Conference under the direction of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) national-deviationist groupings were exposed and smashed',⁶⁷ the post of First Party Secretary was held from 1927 to 1946 by three Russians and an Armenian. In the Ukraine, where opposition to the Soviet authorities continued throughout the thirties, a Ukrainian did not become First Party Secretary until 1953.

In 1966, the key post of Second Party Secretary was held by a Russian in Azerbaidzhan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Lithuania, Moldavia, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. In addition, the Second Secretary in Tadzhikistan was a European and in Latvia a Russian or Ukrainian.

The degree of indigenisation in the governments of the Union Republics has varied. At the present time the proportion of non-indigenous Ministers would seem to be the highest in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics of Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan. An analysis of the lists of the new governments in these republics, published in March-April, 1963, revealed that of their 144 members no fewer than 52 were Europeans, mainly Russians. (This compared with 38 out of 118 in 1959).

In KAZAKHSTAN, for example, where there were 35 members

of the Council of Ministers, a Deputy Chairman with the additional post of Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee, the Chairman of the Kazakh Council of National Economy, the Minister of Health, the Minister of Power and Electrification, the Minister of Motor Transport, the Minister for the Preservation of Public Order, the Minister of Construction, the First Deputy Chairman of *Gosplan* and the Chairman of the State Committee for Construction Affairs as well as the Heads of the Main Administration for Professional and Technical Education, the Main Administration for Highways and the Central Statistical Administration were all Russians. In addition, a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers with the additional post of Chairman of the Republic's *Gosplan* and the Minister for Communal Economy were Ukrainians.⁶⁸

In KIRGHIZIA, of the 25 members of the Council of Ministers, two Deputy Chairmen, one of whom was also Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee, the Minister for the Preservation of Public Order, the Minister of Communications and the Chairmen of *Gosplan*, the State Committee for Construction Affairs and the Kirghiz Association for the Supply of Agricultural Equipment were all Russians. In addition, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (he also held the post of Minister for the Production and Procurement of Agricultural Produce) together with the Chairmen of the State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research and the Committee of State Security were Ukrainians.⁶⁹

In TADZHIKISTAN, eight of the 26 members of the Council of Ministers were Europeans. In addition to an Armenian First Deputy Chairman (he also held the post of Minister for the Production and Procurement of Agricultural Produce) and a Russian Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Russians or Ukrainians headed the Ministries of Health and Communications, the Committee for State Security, the State Committee for Construction Affairs and Architecture, the Chief Administration for Power and Electrification and the Central Statistical Administration.⁷⁰

In TURKMENIA, seven of the 24 members of the Council of Ministers were Russians. They held the posts of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (and jointly Ministers for the Production and Procurement of Agricultural Produce), Minister of the Water Economy, Minister of Communications,

Chairman of the State Committee for Construction Affairs and Architecture, Chairman of the State Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research, Chairman of the Committee for State Security and Head of the Turkmenian Territorial Chief Administration for Construction.⁷¹

Finally, in UZBEKISTAN, Europeans held 13 of the 34 portfolios. Of these the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Motor Transport and Highways, the Minister of Communications, the Chairman of the Uzbek Association for the Supply of Agricultural Equipment, the Chairman of the State Committee for Construction Affairs and Architecture, the Chairman of the Committee of State Security and the Head of the Chief Administration for Construction in the Town of Tashkent were Russians, while a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the First Deputy Chairman of *Gosplan* and the Head of the Central Statistical Administration were Ukrainians. In addition, the Minister of Water Economy had clearly either a Ukrainian or Byelorussian name and a Deputy Chairman of *Gosplan* appeared by her name to be an Armenian, although it cannot be ruled out that she, too, may be a Russian.⁷²

An 'unwritten law' about the nationality of the Chairmen of the republican Councils of Ministers appears to be in force. There was a reference to this in a novel which dealt, realistically, with political manoeuvrings in a Central Asian Republic:

'According to an unwritten law—which has become a virtual tradition—the head of the Government out here can only be an indigenous inhabitant of the country.'⁷³

The republican legislatures provide a similar pattern if to a less marked extent. Thus, of the 473 deputies elected in March, 1963, to Kazakhstan's Supreme Soviet 248 had European, mainly Russian, names.⁷⁴ The relevant figures for Kirghizia were 339 and 114,⁷⁵ for Tadzhikistan, 300 and 43,⁷⁶ for Turkmenia, 282 and 60⁷⁷ and for Uzbekistan 458 and 87.⁷⁸

Colonisation and its Effects

The large-scale direction of workers from the central regions of the USSR to swell the labour force in the underdeveloped areas of the periphery, which has been a constant feature of

the forced development of the Soviet economy, has undoubtedly been one of the factors contributing to this.

While all the Union Republics have been affected by industrial and agricultural colonisation from the centre, this process has assumed the greatest proportions in the Asian Union Republics. From 1926 to 1939, 1,700,000 new settlers emigrated to Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia and Kirghizia.⁷⁹

Since the war the colonisation of these areas has been intensified, notably in connection with the Virgin Lands campaign in Kazakhstan. The following table drawn from official Soviet sources gives an indication of the changes brought about in the national composition of the populations of the various Republics by these migrations:

		1933 ⁸⁰		1959 ⁸¹		
		Per cent.		Per cent.		
KAZAKHSTAN	Kazakhs	...	57.1	Kazakhs	...	29.6
	Russians	...	19.7	Russians	...	43.1
	Ukrainians	...	13.2	Ukrainians	...	8.2
KIRGHIZIA	Kirghiz	...	66.6	Kirghiz	...	40.5
	Russians	...	11.7	Russians	...	30.2
	Uzbeks	...	11.0	Uzbeks	...	10.6
TADZHIKISTAN				Ukrainians	...	6.6
	Tadzhiks	...	78.4	Tadzhiks	...	53.1
	Uzbeks	...	17.9	Uzbeks	...	23.0
TURKMENIA				Russians	...	13.3
	Turkmenians	...	72.0	Turkmenians	...	60.9
	Uzbeks	...	10.5	Uzbeks	...	8.3
UZBEKISTAN	Russians	...	7.5	Russians	...	17.3
	Uzbeks	...	76.0	Uzbeks	...	62.0
	Russians	...	5.6	Russians	...	13.6

This process of colonisation has inevitably weakened the national character of the Asian Republics. In the Virgin Lands Territory in Kazakhstan, for example, there were in 1959 only 512,352 Kazakhs as compared with 1,242,374 Russians and 395,957 Ukrainians and the corresponding figures in the Republican capital of Alma Ata were 39,410 Kazakhs, 333,480 Russians and 22,989 Ukrainians.⁸² In the other Republics there has been a marked tendency towards the Europeanisation of the town. In Kirghizia, where in 1959 Kirghiz outnumbered Russians by 745,027 to 263,231 in the countryside, Russians outnumbered Kirghiz in the towns by 360,331 to 91,804.⁸³ In Uzbekistan,

which had experienced less colonisation, Russians outnumbered Uzbeks in the city of Tashkent by 400,641 to 307,879 and in the other urban centres in the Tashkent region by 172,267 to 75,333. In the urban centres of the historical Bukhara and Samarkand Regions there were 34,726 and 93,969 Russians as compared with 59,052 and 113,018 Uzbeks.⁸⁴ The position was similar in Tadzhikistan. Here, while Tadzhiks outnumbered Russians by 845,648 to 34,309 in the countryside, Russians outnumbered Tadzhiks by 228,301 to 205,516 in the towns and by 107,263 to 41,933 in the Republican capital of Dushanbe.⁸⁵ Similarly, in Turkmenia, Russians outnumbered Turkmenians by 248,181 to 242,895 in the towns and by 85,527 to 50,602 in the capital, Ashkhabad.⁸⁶

Between 1959 and 1966, there was a disproportionate increase in the populations of the Central Asian Republics due to further immigration (although the rate of natural increase is also high).⁸⁷ The average increase in the sizes of their populations was about 30 per cent. The corresponding figure for the other Union Republics was about 9 per cent. The population of the RSFSR, the Republic from which most of the immigrants come, increased by less than 8 per cent. in the same period.⁸⁸

Colonisation may also have been a contributory factor to the relatively slow progress made in the training of local nationals for industry, as opposed to agriculture where except in Kazakhstan they still constitute the vast majority of the labour force. In 1956, for example, Uzbeks comprised no more than 23 per cent. of the workers in Uzbekistan's light industry,⁸⁹ while in 1960 it was acknowledged that little was being done to increase the small number of Tadzhik industrial workers.⁹⁰ An article published in 1965 showed that despite a general surplus of labour in Central Asia (mainly in the rural areas), there was a high rate of Russian immigration into the towns. The flow of the native rural population to the towns was negligible. The writer, V. Perevedentsev, analysed the composition of the labour force on two important sites in Tadzhikistan. On both, many more Russians than Tadzhiks were employed (at the Dushanbe Textile Works there were about 40 per cent. more Russians). One reason was the rural native population's poor knowledge of Russian 'which by force of circumstance is the main language used at work'. Among Perevedentsev's suggestions were

the establishment of a temporary quota of jobs for the indigenous nationalities in the towns and a reduction in the influx of population from largely Russian areas into the towns of the Union Republics.^{91*}

Colonisation has had a marked effect in the field of education by contributing to the large numbers of non-nationals in republican educational institutions. Although some years old, the following tables are revealing. They give:

- (a) the number of specialists with a higher education employed in the national economy in each Republic as from December 1, 1960, including the respective numbers of the indigenous nationality and of Russians and
- (b) a similar breakdown for students in republican higher educational establishments at the start of the 1960-1961 academic year.

Table A⁹⁴

<i>Kazakhstan</i> ...	124,818	29,950 Kazakhs	66,434 Russians
<i>Kirghizia</i> ...	29,776	8,991 Kirghiz	13,864 Russians
<i>Tadzhikistan</i> ...	23,356	7,955 Tadzhiks	8,386 Russians
<i>Turkmenia</i> ...	22,506	9,960 Turkmenians	7,363 Russians
<i>Uzbekistan</i> ...	108,936	40,121 Uzbeks	32,820 Russians

Table B⁹⁵

<i>Kazakhstan</i> ...	77,135	31,351 Kazakhs	34,039 Russians
<i>Kirghizia</i> ...	17,379	8,182 Kirghiz	6,345 Russians
<i>Tadzhikistan</i> ...	19,959	9,473 Tadzhiks	4,680 Russians
<i>Turkmenia</i> ...	13,151	7,285 Turkmenians	3,915 Russians
<i>Uzbekistan</i> ...	101,271	47,758 Uzbeks	26,280 Russians

Here, it is to be noted, that, despite the considerable progress achieved, these Asian nationalities still lag behind most of the other major Soviet nationalities in the educational field. In

* Certain European Republics have similar preoccupations. In Moldavia (another 'labour surplus' area⁹²), it has been admitted that 'insufficient' specialists of the native nationality are employed in industry and construction. Of the 113,000 specialists at work in the economy as a whole, only about 35,000 are Moldavians. The First Party Secretary, evidently reacting to local discontent, found it necessary to warn his hearers that: 'It would be incorrect to give priority to national cadres [*i.e.* Moldavians], irrespective of their capabilities.'⁹³

November, 1962, the number of local nationals with a higher or secondary specialised education per 10,000 of the population was as follows:⁹⁶

1. Georgians ...	542	9. Lithuanians ...	284
2. Estonians ...	457	10. <i>Kazakhs</i> ...	190
3. Russians ...	439	11. <i>Turkmenians</i> ...	178
4. Armenians ...	434	12. <i>Kirghiz</i> ...	175
5. Latvians ...	413	13. <i>Tadzhiks</i> ...	160
6. Ukrainians ...	327	14. <i>Uzbeks</i> ...	143
7. Azerbaidzhanis ...	305	15. Moldavians ...	129
8. Byelorussians ...	300		

Communications media

Another field in which the effects of colonisation have been manifested has been that of publishing. The following tables provide a comparison of the number and circulation of works published in the local languages and in Russian during 1964.⁹⁷

Republic	Books		Circulation (in thousands)	No. of languages from which translated
		Number of Titles		
KAZAKHSTAN				
in Kazakh	500	7,622	11
in Russian	763	10,431	2
KIRGHIZIA				
in Kirghiz	456	2,629	10
in Russian	410	2,138	1
TADZHIKISTAN				
in Tadzhik...	...	370	3,600	16
in Russian	231	1,539	1
TURKMENIA				
in Turkmenian	...	325	2,814	13
in Russian	175	1,222	2
UZBEKISTAN				
in Uzbek	823	14,983	23
in Russian	641	6,541	3

In the entire Soviet Union in 1964, 2,978 magazines were published in Russian while only 784 were published in all the other languages of the Soviet Union combined.

Wherever they are published in the Soviet Union, newspapers are expected to reflect the CPSU's current line. This is

Republic	Periodicals		Annual Circulation (in thousands)
	Number of Titles		
KAZAKHSTAN			
in Kazakh °	18	8,962
in Russian	47	6,369
KIRGHIZIA			
in Kirghiz	13	2,336
in Russian	46	4,763
TADZHIKISTAN			
in Tadjik °	14	2,556
in Russian	33	560
TURKMENIA			
in Turkmenian °	12	3,027
in Russian	17	98
UZBEKISTAN			
in Uzbek °	24	18,002
in Russian	88	13,365

Newspapers				Annual Circulation (in thousands)
Republic		Number		
KAZAKHSTAN				
in Kazakh	83		158,746
in Russian	164		347,783
KIRGHIZIA				
in Kirghiz *	...	20		56,328
in Russian	25		44,711
TADZHIKISTAN				
in Tadjik *	...	24		65,302
in Russian	5		24,863
TURKMENIA				
in Turkmenian *	...	20		56,365
in Russian	10		21,677
UZBEKISTAN				
in Uzbek *	...	82		269,655
in Russian	53		101,470

* These figures are said to include publications put out simultaneously in the local language and Russian.

achieved in various ways: instructions emanate from the Propaganda or *Agitprop* Departments of the local Republican Parties, while news is provided by the centralised news and Press agencies.* Centralised censorship agencies vet all material for publication.† Authorities in Moscow also intervene and criticise erring local newspapers.⁹⁸ In 1964, the CPSU Central Committee heavily criticised the Turkmenian CC, one reason being the lack of attention paid by the Republic's Press 'to the propaganda of ideas of proletarian internationalism, of the friendship of the peoples of the USSR'.⁹⁹

Apart from such central control, a step was taken in 1963 which restricted still further the limited discretion permitted to the editors of many vernacular newspapers. In areas where these were issued in Russian as well as a local language, 'unified' editorial boards were established. This innovation survived Khrushchev. In 1966, the editor of two such combined republican newspapers was referring to the improvement in the 'international education' of the journalists themselves which the change had brought about.¹⁰⁰ Previously another editor had spoken of the advantage of having 'a single politico-ideological tendency for both newspapers'.¹⁰¹ However, a special correspondent of the magazine *Soviet Press* derided the 'positive' way in which the new scheme had been greeted, as if difficulties did not exist: in the area he was writing about, the new editor of the two combined newspapers did not even speak the local language (*i.e.* only spoke Russian).¹⁰²

Two relatively recent CPSU Central Committee decrees on broadcasting have established the relationship between local station and 'central radio broadcasting' (*i.e.* *Moscow Radio*). In 1960, republican radio stations were instructed to arrange broadcasts in Russian as well as vernacular languages and

'to ensure the timely transmission in the vernacular of the most important news reported by the central radio; . . . to establish strict co-ordination . . . between central, Republican and *oblast* radio broadcasting and [to establish] a procedure for relaying broadcasts of news from Moscow by local radio stations'.¹⁰³

* By far the most important news agency is *Tass*. Republican agencies are by definition local organs of *Tass* and subordinated to it.

† The traditional name for the best known of these is *Glavlit*. Its ramifications extend down to district level throughout the Soviet Union and its censors work to instructions from Moscow.

In 1962, the Central Committee complained that sufficient co-operation and co-ordination were lacking:

'and therefore important programmes from Moscow are blotted out by local broadcasts and do not reach many listeners. In recent years, the volume of local broadcasting has, unnecessarily, been greatly increased in the Republics and *oblasts*. . .'

The decree also laid down that the appropriate authorities were

'to organise political broadcasts from Moscow for the eastern areas of the country, taking into account the different time zones, so as to ensure that the peoples of the eastern areas are informed of all important news in the morning and evening.'¹⁰⁴

Similarly, television is transmitted directly from the 'centre' to other areas. On January 8, 1966, *Tass* announced that Moscow programmes could be relayed to 120 cities.

Resentment in the Republics

There is evidence to suggest that, while this process of colonisation has contributed significantly to economic progress, its effect on national development in the Republics is resented by many local nationals. In September, 1959, a Kazakhstan Party Secretary deplored the fact that:

'In places people are to be found, who, if not openly, then covertly, come out against the development of the productive forces and the exploitation of the national wealth of their Republic, fearing the participation in this of representatives of other fraternal republics.'¹⁰⁵

In January, 1963, a leading Party journal in Kazakhstan deplored that there were people who reacted adversely to the fact that 'the Republic's population is becoming progressively more mixed in its natural composition' and declared that:

'Certain comrades even lament the fact that the Virgin Lands Territory receives so much attention from the Party and Government. Such people do not understand or do not want to understand that the Virgin Lands Territory is a very important region of the country for the production of grain and other agricultural produce and that the wealth and resources of the Virgin Lands Territory are the property and pride of the whole Soviet people. National narrow-mindedness and egoism prevent these people from seeing in the development of the Virgin Lands a remarkable process for the drawing together of nations and the uniting of their creative efforts

which are immeasurably speeding up the creation of the material and technical base of Communism.¹⁰⁶

The Virgin Lands Territory was abolished in 1965.¹⁰⁷ Administratively, it had been an anomaly. Although within the Kazakh Republic, the Territory was given separate Party and Government bodies. The restoration of direct control over the area to republican organs could be viewed as a concession to national sentiment.

Similar criticisms have come from Latvia, where the proportion of Latvians has dropped from 75.5 per cent. to 62 per cent. and the proportion of Russians increased from 12 per cent. to 26 per cent in the years of the Republic's incorporation in the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸ In September, 1959, the present First Party Secretary in the Republic stated that:

'From a false and groundless fear that the Latvian Republic would lose its national features, certain comrades have tried artificially to hold up the process of population movement specifically called for. In their speeches, they have repeatedly stated that in Riga, for example, the mechanical growth of the population by a single person must not be allowed.'¹⁰⁹

One of the editors of the magazine *Political Self-Education* asserted in 1965 that:

'Of course, each Soviet Republic possesses a certain independence and wide initiative in the development of the national economy. But it in no way follows from this that one or another Republic must shut itself up into its own "national shell"... All Soviet Republics are interested in the Socialist division of labour....

'Some comrades who incorrectly evaluate the natural process of the increase in the population's mobility display a desire to shut themselves up... within the framework of their own nationality or their own national area.'¹¹⁰

A *Pravda* editorial in September, 1965, echoing the 1961 Party Programme, warned against resistance to immigration:

'It is necessary to remember that the growing scale of Communist construction calls for a continuous exchange of trained personnel between peoples. Therefore any manifestations of national aloofness in the indoctrination and employment of workers of different nationalities in the Soviet Republics are impermissible.'¹¹¹

Potentially, indeed, colonisation can lead to the loss of Union-Republican status and even greater control from the centre

for, as has been stated, one of the conditions for a territory to enjoy this status is that the relevant nationality should represent a more or less compact majority of the population.

In July, 1956, the Karelo-Finnish Republic was transformed into a Karelian Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR principally on the grounds that:

'Owing to the growth of the numbers of the population through the settlement of Russians and some other nationalities in Karelia for work, the proportion of the indigenous national population has considerably decreased. According to the approximate figures at our disposal the Karelians, Finns and Veps constitute only a quarter of the population of the Republic, while people of other nationalities, mainly Russians, constitute threequarters of it.'¹¹²

Nor would the multiplication of this development in any way contradict the 1961 Party Programme which, *inter alia*, foresees that frontiers between Union Republics will progressively lose their former importance in the course of the current stage of 'all-out Communist construction', and that an international culture common to all the Soviet peoples will develop as a preface to 'the future single culture of Communist society'.¹¹³

After Khrushchev's fall in 1964, there were indications that the central authorities were rather more concerned not to offend national susceptibilities. The following comment from a Latvian newspaper article was a sign of the times:

'... any disregarding of specific national characteristics, discussions about the "dying-away" of the essential traits of Socialist nations and peoples, about their "mutual assimilation", the "denationalisation" of national statehood, about the swift approach of "the full legal State merger" of nations, etc., which are sometimes met in the Press are premature, groundless and politically harmful.'¹¹⁴

This indication of the resentment such theoretical assertions occasion in non-Russian areas is telling. The fact that the writer judged them to be 'premature' cannot, however, be of much reassurance.

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4. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
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6. *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik*, 1963, p. 29.

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14. *Sovetskaya Latvija*, March 22, 1963.
15. *Pravda*, September 10, 1960.
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21. *Ibid.*, February 1, 1963.
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23. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
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29. *Revolutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, 1933, No. 40, p. 31.
31. *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet 'Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites'*, pp. 223, 224.
32. Rashidov, speaking at the 17th Congress of the Uzbek CP: *Pravda Vostoka*, March 4, 1966.
33. *Finansovoe Pravo*, p. 161.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
35. *Pravda*, December 20, 1966.
36. B.S.E., 2nd edn., Vol. 6, pp. 459-460.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 458.
38. *Kommunist*, 1964, No. 2, p. 18. That young Lithuanians express similar thoughts was revealed in *Kommunist* (of Lithuania), 1966, No. 9, p. 19.
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54. *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, February 16, 1963.
55. *Pravda Vostoka*, February 22, 1963.
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57. *Bakinsky Rabochy*, March 22, 1963.
58. *Pravda*, March 16, 1963.
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APPENDIX A

LENIN'S NOTES ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION, AS PUBLISHED IN *KOMMUNIST* No. 9, 1956 (pp. 22-25)

I am, it appears, much at fault before the workers of Russia for not having intervened with sufficient energy and incisiveness in the notorious question of autonomisation, which is officially called, it seems, the question of the union of soviet socialist republics.

In the summer, when this question arose, I was ill and then in the autumn I placed overmuch hope on my recovery and on the October and December Plenums giving me the opportunity to intervene in this question. But meanwhile I was unable to attend either the October Plenum (on this question) or the December Plenum and so this question almost completely passed me by.

I managed only to have a talk with Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who had arrived from the Caucasus and who told me how this question stood in Georgia. I managed also to have a word or two with Comrade Zinoviev and express to him my apprehensions on this question. From what Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who headed the commission sent by the Central Committee to 'investigate' the Georgian incident, reported, I could derive only the gravest apprehensions. If matters have reached the point where Ordzhonikidze could have exceeded himself to the extent of using physical force, as I was informed by Comrade Dzerzhinsky, it can be imagined what a bog we have slipped into. Evidently this whole scheme of 'autonomisation' was fundamentally incorrect and inopportune.

It is said that a unified apparatus was required. From where did these assertions originate? Was it not from the same Russian apparatus, which, as I have already pointed out in one of the previous issues of my diary, was borrowed by us from Tsarism and only barely anointed with Soviet chrism?

Undoubtedly this measure should have been held over until we could have said that we could guarantee our apparatus as being our own. And we must now in all conscience state the opposite, that we call our own an apparatus which, in fact, is thoroughly alien to us and which represents a bourgeois and Tsarist hotchpotch, which in five years there has been no opportunity of altering in the absence of aid from other countries and with the predominance of military 'matters' and the struggle against famine.

In such conditions it is very natural that the 'freedom of secession from the Union', with which we justify ourselves, will prove to be a mere scrap of paper incapable of protecting the other nationalities in Russia from the inroads of that truly Russian type, the Great-Russian chauvinist, essentially a scoundrel and a bully, which is the typical Russian bureaucrat. There can be no doubt that the insignificant percentage of Soviet and Sovietised workers will drown in this sea of the chauvinistic Great-Russian rabble like a fly in milk.

It is said in defence of this measure that separate People's Commissariats, dealing directly with national psychology and with national education, have been set up. But here the question arises as to whether these commissariats can be completely separated, and a second question is: have we shown sufficient solicitude in taking measures effectively to protect the other nationalities from the truly Russian *Derzhimorda*? I think we have not taken these measures, although we could and should have done so.

I think that a fatal rôle was played here by Stalin's hastiness and administrative predilections, and also by his irascibility towards the notorious 'social-nationalism'. In general, irascibility usually plays the worst possible rôle in politics.

I am also afraid that Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who went to the Caucasus to investigate the case of the 'crimes' of these 'social-nationalists', here also distinguished himself only by his truly Russian attitude (it is well known that Russified non-Russians are always on the prodigal side when it is a matter of truly Russian attitudes) and that the impartiality of his entire commission is sufficiently typified by Ordzhonikidze's 'rough handling treatment'. I think that no provocation nor even insults can justify this Russian rough handling and that Comrade Dzerzhinsky is irremediably to blame for having adopted a light hearted attitude to this rough handling.

For all the other citizens in the Caucasus, Ordzhonikidze was the régime. Ordzhonikidze had no right to the irritability to which both he and Dzerzhinsky alluded. Ordzhonikidze, on the contrary, was in duty bound to bear himself with that restraint with which no ordinary citizen is obliged to behave, especially the citizen who is accused of a 'political' crime. And, after all, to get to the heart of the matter, the social-nationalists were citizens accused of a political crime, and all the circumstances of this accusation could only designate it as such.

Here there already arises an important question of principle: how should internationalism be understood?

LENIN

30.XII.22

Dictated to M.V.

Continuation of Notes.
December 31, 1922.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE NATIONALITIES OR 'AUTONOMISATION'
(Continuation)

I have already written in my works on the national question that an abstract formulation of the question of nationalism in general is completely pointless. It is necessary to distinguish between the nationalisation of the oppressing nation and the nationalism of the oppressed nation, the nationalism of the large nation and the nationalism of the small nation.

As regards the second nationalism, almost always in historical practice we, the nationals of the large nation, prove ourselves guilty of an endless amount of violence and, even more than that, we, without ourselves noticing it, commit an endless number of acts of violence and insults—one has only to recall my Volga reminiscences of how non-Russians are treated in our country, how a Pole is never called anything but a 'Polyachishka', how a Tatar is always ridiculed as a 'Prince', a Ukrainian as a 'Khokhol', and a Georgian and other non-Russians in the Caucasus as a 'Capcasian'.

For this reason internationalism on the part of the oppressing or so-called 'great' nation (though it is great only in respect of its acts of violence, great only as Derzhimorda was) should consist not only in the observance of the formal equality of nations, but also in such an inequality as would compensate on behalf of the oppressing nation, the large nation, for the inequality which arises in actual life. He who has failed to understand this has not effectively understood the proletarian attitude to the national question; he has essentially stopped short at the point of view of the petit bourgeoisie and, for this reason, cannot avoid sliding with every passing minute towards the bourgeois point of view.

What is important for the proletariat? For the proletariat it is not only important but vitally necessary to ensure the maximum confidence for it on the part of the non-Russians in the proletarian class struggle. What is needed for this? For this not only formal equality is needed. For this it is necessary to compensate in one way or another, either by virtue of one's own attitude towards, or by one's concessions to, the non-Russian for that mistrust, that suspicion and those insults which in the historical past the government of the 'great power' nation inflicted upon him.

I think that for Bolsheviks, for Communists, there is no need for further detailed elaboration of this point. And I think that in the given instance with regard to the Georgian nation, we have a typical example where a truly proletarian approach to the matter requires of us particular caution, forethought and indulgence. The Georgian, who treats this side of the matter with disdain and disdainfully bandies about the accusation of 'social-nationalism' (while

he himself is an authentic and genuine not merely 'social-nationalist' but crude Great-Russian Derzhimorda also), this Georgian, in essence violates the interests of proletarian class solidarity, for nothing so arrests the development and cohesion of proletarian class solidarity as national injustice, and to nothing are 'insulted' nationals so sensitive as to the feeling of equality and to the violation of this equality, even though it be through carelessness or in the form of a joke; to nothing are they so sensitive as to the violation of this equality by their proletarian comrades. That is why in the given instance it is better to be prodigal in the use of indulgence and leniency towards the national minorities than to be niggardly in the matter. That is, in the given instance, why the vital interest of proletarian solidarity and, consequently, of the proletarian class struggle also, demands that we never adopt a formal approach to the national question but always take into account the obligatory difference in the attitude of the proletariat of the oppressed (or small) nation to the oppressing (or large) nation.

LENIN

Dictated to M.V.

31.XII.22

[Derzhimorda is a provincial police official in Gogol's play *The Inspector General*, who has come to personify brutality and ignorance on the part of local officialdom.]

APPENDIX B

THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE TASKS OF THE PARTY IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL RELATIONS

Under socialism the nations flourish and their sovereignty grows stronger. The development of nations does not proceed along lines of strengthening national barriers, national narrow-mindedness and egoism, as it does under capitalism, but along lines of their association, fraternal mutual assistance and friendship. The appearance of new industrial centres, the prospecting and development of mineral deposits, the virgin land development project, and the growth of all modes of transport increase the mobility of the population and promote greater intercourse between the peoples of the Soviet Union. People of many nationalities live together and work in harmony in the Soviet republics. The boundaries between the constituent republics of the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance, since all the nations are equal, their life is based on a common socialist foundation, the material and spiritual needs of every people are satisfied to the same extent, and they are all advancing together to the common goal—communism. Spiritual features deriving from the new type of social relations and embodying the finest traditions of the peoples of the USSR have taken shape and are common to Soviet men and women of different nationalities.

Full-scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved. The building of the material and technical basis of communism leads to still greater unity of the Soviet peoples. The exchange of material and cultural values between nations becomes more and more intensive, and the contribution of each republic to the common cause of communist construction increases. Obliteration of distinctions between classes and the development of communist social relations make for a greater social homogeneity of nations and contribute to the development of common communist traits in their culture, morals and way of living, to a further strengthening of their mutual trust and friendship.

With the victory of communism in the USSR, the nations will draw still closer together, their economic and ideological unity will

increase and the communist traits common to their spiritual make-up will develop. However, the obliteration of national distinctions, and especially of language distinctions, is a considerably longer process than the obliteration of class distinctions.

The Party approaches all questions of national relationships arising in the course of communist construction from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism and firm pursuance of the Leninist nationalities policy. The Party neither ignores nor over-accentuates national characteristics.

The Party sets the following tasks in the sphere of national relations:

- (a) to continue the all-round economic and cultural development of all the Soviet nations and nationalities, ensuring their increasingly close fraternal co-operation, mutual aid, unity and affinity in all spheres of life, thus achieving the utmost strengthening of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; to make full use of, and advance the forms of, national statehood of the peoples of the USSR;
- (b) in the economic sphere, to continue to pursue the line of comprehensive development of the economies of the Soviet republics; effect a rational geographic location of production and a planned working of natural wealth, and promote socialist division of labour among the republics, unifying and combining their economic efforts, and properly balancing the interests of the state as a whole and those of each Soviet republic. The extension of the rights of the Union Republics in economic management having produced substantial positive results, such measures may also be carried out in the future with due regard to the fact that the creation of the material and technical basis of communism will call for still greater inter-connection and mutual assistance between the Soviet republics. The closer the intercourse between the nations and the greater the awareness of the countrywide tasks, the more successfully can manifestations of parochialism and national egoism be overcome.

In order to ensure the successful accomplishment of the tasks of communist construction and the co-ordination of economic activities, inter-republican economic organs may be set up in some zones (notably for such matters as irrigation, power grids, transport, etc.).

The Party will continue its policy ensuring the actual equality of all nations and nationalities with full consideration for their interests and devoting special attention to those areas of the country which are in need of more rapid development. Benefits accumulating in the course of com-

munist construction must be fairly distributed among all nations and nationalities;

- (c) to work for further all-round development of the socialist cultures of the peoples of the USSR. The wide scale of communist construction and the new victories of communist ideology are enriching the cultures of the peoples of the USSR, which are socialist in content and national in form. The ideological unity of the nations and nationalities is growing, and there is a *rapprochement* of their cultures. The historical experience of socialist nations shows that national forms do not ossify; they change, advance and draw closer together, shedding all outdated traits that contradict the new living conditions. An international culture common to all the Soviet nations is developing. The cultural treasures of each nation are increasingly augmented by works acquiring an international character.

Attaching decisive importance to the development of the socialist content of the cultures of the peoples of the USSR, the Party will promote their further mutual enrichment and *rapprochement*, the consolidation of their international basis, and thereby the formation of the future single world-wide culture of communist society. While supporting the progressive traditions of each people, and making them the property of all Soviet people, the Party will in all ways further new revolutionary traditions of the builders of communism common to all nations;

- (d) to continue promoting the free development of the languages of the peoples of the USSR and the complete freedom for every citizen of the USSR to speak, and to bring up and educate his children, in any language, ruling out all privileges, restrictions or compulsions in the use of this or that language. By virtue of the fraternal friendship and mutual trust of peoples, national languages are developing on a basis of equality and mutual enrichment.

The existing process of the voluntary study of Russian in addition to the native language is of positive significance, since it facilitates reciprocal exchanges of experience and access of every nation and nationality to the cultural gains of all the other peoples of the USSR, and to world culture. The Russian language has, in effect, become the common medium of intercourse and co-operation between all the peoples of the USSR;

- (e) to pursue consistently as heretofore the principles of internationalism in the field of national relations; to strengthen the friendship of peoples as one of the most important gains of socialism; to conduct a relentless struggle against manifestations and survivals of nationalism and chauvinism of all

types, against trends of national narrow-mindedness and exclusiveness, idealisation of the past and the veiling of social contradictions in the history of peoples, and against obsolete customs and habits which hinder communist construction. The growing scale of communist construction calls for the continuous exchange of trained personnel among nations. Manifestations of national aloofness in the indoctrination and employment of workers of different nationalities in the Soviet republics are impermissible. The liquidation of manifestations of nationalism is in the interests of all nations and nationalities of the USSR. Every Soviet republic can continue to flourish and strengthen only in the great family of fraternal socialist nations of the USSR.

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